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HISTORIA

Letter from the Editors

A PUBLICATION OF THE EPSILON MU CHAPTER
OF
PHI ALPHA THETA
AND THE
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

We are proud to present the 15th edition of Historia, a journal
entirely written and edited by students of the Epsilon Mu Chapter of
Phi Alpha Theta and the Eastern Illinois University’s history
department. Historia received a record number of submissions this
year, leading to difficult decisions in what proved to be an arduous
selection process. These papers represent some of the very best
student writing of the past year.
The selection process was long and difficult. Every editor read
all sixty five submissions and voted on every paper. The process,
although long, helped to ensure that the best papers were selected.
This year we had a wide range of selections, including papers on the
Irish Famine and the Irish Rebellion; theories of slavery in the United
States, including the idea of paternalism and an analysis of the slave
clause during the Constitutional Convention; constitutional issues,
including in Britain with both the problem of the abdication of
Edward VIII and the abolition of capital punishment, and the issue of
eugenics in the United States during the early twentieth century; the
problem of war atrocities during World War II, including the practice
of Nazism and the issue of the Korean comfort women in Japan. Also
included in this year’s Historia are an analysis of the lack of action by
the United States during the Rwandan genocide and a student
movement in Tlatelolco, Mexico; an examination of the shift from
cotton to wool underwear in Britain; the role of the Cherokee in the
Civil War; the relationships between women and food on the Overland
Trail; and the influence of Machiavelli on Ivan IV. We are particularly
grateful to Dr. Walter L. Arnstein, Professor Emeritus of History at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, for allowing us to
print his plenary talk at the Regional Conference of Phi Alpha Theta,
which was held this year At Eastern Illinois University.
This journal was completed with the assistance of many people.
First and foremost, we owe a debt of gratitude to our faculty advisor
Dr. Michael Shirley. Without his guidance and sense of humor, this
journal would not have been completed. We would like to thank all
the authors who submitted papers this year. For those whose papers
were not selected for publication, we encourage you to submit again
next year. We would also like to thank Ms. Donna Nichols and the
history faculty for their assistance and support. Finally, we thank the
alumni, for without them, Historia’s audience is sorely diminished. All
of these people are a factor in the continued success of Historia, and we
sincerely thank them.
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HISTORY: A MATTER OF HONOR1
Walter L. Arnstein
Let me, first of all, thank Professor Shirley for his most
generous introduction. I am delighted to play a small role in this
successful regional Phi Alpha Theta conference.
I have taken a
personal interest in Phi Alpha Theta for a very long time. Indeed,
Professor Shirley may have invited me to talk to you today merely in
order to add chronological diversity to these proceedings. I was first
initiated into Phi Alpha Theta, after all, when Harry Truman was
President of the United States.
Now, if your first reaction is: “Who is Harry Truman?” then my
response is: “Look it up in a History book!” Looking things up is,
after all, one of the purposes that the study of History serves. But a
study of History serves other purposes also. As I shall try to suggest
in the course of the next half hour, the study and the writing of
History may even be defined as a matter of honor! Admittedly, when
you first informed your parents or other relations that you intended to
become a History major in college, their reaction may have been less
one of honor than one of puzzlement. And why are you doing that?
In the short run, after all, to become a History major does not teach
you to become an engineer or a physician or an accountant or the
CEO of a large corporation.
In the short run, the study of history is more likely to
encourage us to become generalists rather than specialists. By that I
mean that a historian is compelled to take some degree of interest in
the many different ways in which human beings both organize their
world and make it understandable to themselves. Human beings are
social creatures who almost always live in nuclear or extended
families, and those families congregate in neighborhoods, towns, and
countries. They are also political animals who organize cities and
states and nations that alternately send armies into the field or
negotiate treaties with one another. They are part of the economic
world as well: as consumers and as producers, as managers and
laborers and even as retirees. They also demonstrate all manner of
1 A luncheon address presented to the Regional Conference of Phi
Alpha Theta delivered on the campus of Eastern Illinois University on
February 25, 2006. Walter L. Arnstein is Professor of History Emeritus and
Jubilee Professor of the Liberal Arts and Sciences Emeritus at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His publications include Britain Yesterday &
Today: 1830 to the Present, 8th ed. (Boston, 2001), and Queen Victoria (London &
New York, 2003).
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cultural, artistic, ceremonial, and ritualistic behavior and ways of
explaining their world that we may define as religious in some cases
and as secular in others.
Obviously no single historian can be expected to become a
specialist in all these various facets of human experience in all the
different centuries and on all the different continents, but historians
ought to be reminded at regular intervals that, even as they plow their
particular furrow, their furrow is part of a broader landscape that
extends as far as the horizon. In both survey courses and more
specialized courses, as students of the past we should retain at least
some concern with facets of that past far removed from those that we
may know best.
Among the Ancient Greeks, Herodotus and Thucydides began
to practice the trade of history two-and-a-half millennia ago, and in
1400 the Islamic historian Ibn Khaldun declared that “History is a
discipline widely cultivated among nations and races. It is eagerly
sought after. The men in the street, the ordinary people, aspire to
know it. Kings and leaders vie for it. Both the learned and the
ignorant are able to understand it.”2 And yet there have always been
critics who have argued that the trick cannot be done. There have
been philosophers, for example, who have contended, with a surface
degree of plausibility, that the past cannot be recovered, however hard
we may try. "The past is a foreign country," we are told; "they do
things differently there."3 Indeed they do, and yet with effort we may
find it possible to understand the thoughts and actions of some of
those foreigners, even if a perfect translation lies beyond our
competence. Yet other skeptics have contended that we are
permanently barred by our built-in biases and assumptions from ever
understanding any nationality other than our own, any social class
other than our own, any gender other than our own, even any age
cohort other than our own. How can a militant Palestinian truly
understand the frame of mind of an Israeli, or—one might add—viceversa? How can an ivy-covered academic possibly understand the
daily life of either a hereditary monarch or an agricultural laborer?
How can a patriarchal relic conceivably understand the mind of a
dedicated feminist? How can an aging stuck-in-a-rut professor
possibly enter into the mindset of a college freshman?
My general answer to such skeptics is the same as the one that
the eighteenth-century English sage, Dr. Samuel Johnson, applied to a
dog walking on its hind legs: "One does not expect to see it done well!
One is surprised to see it done at all!" Because, in defiance of the
2 Cited in review of Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to
History in the Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 17, 2006, 11.
3 The first sentence of L. P. Hartley, The Go-Between (London, 1953).
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philosophers and the skeptics, good history has been written and is
being written all the time, history that has caused readers and
listeners to conclude that they understand our own age and our own
concerns better than before because a historian has placed them in
context. History has been written that throws genuine light on the
institutions that define our society. History has been written that
clarifies why the decisions taken by particular governments, including
our own, have turned out to be either wise or extraordinarily foolish.
And why can such history be written? Because all human beings to
some degree and some human beings to a very considerable degree
possess the ability that we call empathy, the ability to place ourselves
in the shoes of others, even others distant in time and place, distant in
age and social status.
Such history can be written secondly because the discipline of
history is and remains a collective undertaking, an undertaking that
involves built-in checks and balances. A powerful and wide-ranging
imagination may be a valuable characteristic for a historian to possess,
yet it is a trait that does have to be kept within limits. Every fledgling
historian who has ever had a bright idea and has wanted therefore to
publish an article or even a book discovers--sometimes to his or her
initial dismay--that it is not enough to complete the manuscript. One
has to persuade editors and reviewers before any given piece is
accepted for publication, and once the book is published one has to
anticipate that other reviewers will publicly judge one's work. They
will remind you of all the "facts" that you failed to check, of all the
sources that you failed to consult, and of all the inferences that you
failed to draw.
The difference between novelists and historians is that novelists
too may use their imagination, but a novelist does not have to worry
about an imagination that runs unchecked. Nothing need stop a
novelist from imagining an Abraham Lincoln who bids farewell to his
Springfield neighbors and catches an American Airlines jet to
Washington, D.C. where he arrives just in time to be interviewed on
television by Tim Russert on "Meet the Press.” A historian who
utilized his imagination in that particular manner would not be taken
seriously, however, because collectively we know too much about the
past. We possess a very good idea as to what was and what was not
technologically possible during any given century and even what was
plausible in the realm of social custom and ideas. For a historian
deliberately to claim the privileges that we grant to the writer of
fiction is to commit the crime of anachronism.
We ran into this phenomenon a few weeks ago when the author
of a best-selling memoir called A Million Little Pieces turned out to
have written a work of fiction. Oprah Winfrey, whose imprimatur had
first turned the book into a best-seller, condemned the author for
3

feeling “the need to lie,” and she apologized to her audience for
initially leaving the impression that “the truth is not important.”4
The truth ought to be important to all historians to the extent
that it can be known. For historians, the recoverable past may
appropriately be looked upon as a vast jig-saw puzzle for which we do
not possess all the pieces. On some subjects, we may have very few
pieces—such as, for example, the original King Arthur, who lived (if
he lived at all) in sixth century Britain at a time for which we have
virtually no contemporary records whatever. We have one jigsaw
puzzle piece but ninety-nine are missing. Yet on many other subjects,
such as the American Civil War of 1861-1865, we possess a
superabundance of records. Even those historians who differ
somewhat on the precise combination of conditions that led up to war
agree on a great many highly important matters. They do not argue
as to how many people participated or died or were wounded or what
contemporaries read about the conflict at the time in their books and
newspapers and in records of congressional debates. Unlike
contemporaries, historians also have had access to numerous diaries
and private letters and records of discussions in President Lincoln’s
cabinet. In the case of the American Civil War, unlike that of King
Arthur, we possess ninety-five pieces of the jigsaw puzzle pieces and
lack at most five.
Now, I concede that there have long existed historians who
have felt sorry that history was not a branch of a so-called "social
science" that imposes theoretical models on the past. They regret that
history has not become a branch of anthropology or a branch of
sociology or political science or even a branch of psychology. Such
critics have regretted also that history as a discipline has been largely
free from the kind of jargon that all too often seems to afflict
professional educators and sociologists and psychologists. Most
historians have considered it a virtue to be able to communicate with a
wide audience. They accept the need to use technical terms when
talking about, say, the history of law or the history of naval
construction, but they oppose the notion that historians as historians
should create adopt a specialized language whose necessary
consequence would seem to be to set themselves off from ordinary
people as possessors of, and guardians of an esoteric knowledge all
their own. As the British scientist Peter Madawar phrased the matter
a few years ago: "No one who has something original or important to
say will willingly run the risk of being misunderstood; people who
write obscurely are either unskilled in writing or are up to mischief."5
4 Cited in an Associated Press article in the (Champaign, Illinois)
News-Gazette, Jan. 31, 2006, C-3.
5 New Humanist, December 1972, 314.
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In recent years, other critics of the discipline of history have
contended that historians should worry less about learning facts than
about adopting theories and imposing them upon our understanding
of the past. Thus a generation of literary critics has maintained that it
is altogether impossible for historians to study or to write about
anything real. All that historians have before them, according to such
critics, are texts. Texts, they go on, have no fixed meanings. Every
reader has the right to interpret every text in whatever manner he or
of she finds plausible. No interpretation is superior to any other. All
is open to interpretation. All is relative.
I have sometimes wondered what would happen if such a postmodernist literary deconstructionist historian were to take his
university pay check to his local bank in order to transform it into
cash. What if the bank clerk should explain to him: "What you have
called a pay check is merely a text, merely a piece of paper, and it is as
appropriate for me to interpret that text as idle scribble as it is for you
interpret it as an order to me to pay you cash. It is therefore as
appropriate for me to deposit that piece of paper into a wastepaper
basket as into that theoretical construct that you call your bank
account." That type of deconstruction necessarily undermines
altogether the notion that historians ought to be concerned with the
systematic collection of evidence and the systematic drawing of
conclusions.
The fact remains that happily we do not live in a world today in
which anything can mean anything to anybody. The amount of
money you have in your checking account at any given time is definite
and not relative. If you are driving a car, red means stop and green
means go for everybody; nothing is relative there. If you want to
vote in the next election, then if you are seventeen you cannot
register; if you are eighteen and a citizen and not in jail you can. We
may find aspects of our world confusing, and there may well be
aspects of that world that we find difficult to understand—for
example, nanotechnology and genetic engineering. But our world is
not, in every respect, arbitrary. We can find maps on the internet that
tell us precisely where specific people live and where particular stores
are located and how to reach them. Although you and I may never
have met until today, you can understand the words I use, because the
meaning of words does not change every day. When somebody
proclaims: “All things are relative,” the appropriate answer is: “Who
says so?”
If the world in which we live is sufficiently comprehensible to
enable us to live in it, why should the world of one hundred or two
hundred or even a thousand years ago be altogether unknowable—
provided that we do our research and draw the inferences that the
available evidence permits. Historians who seek truth are more like
5

to come close to finding it than are relativists who insist that there is
no such thing as truth.
The discipline of history ought to serve as a remedy for
present-mindedness rather than as an excuse for having us in the
twenty-first century impose our sensibilities on people and events of
earlier centuries. Historians cannot avoid judging altogether, and
they should not, but surely their first task is to attempt to understand
the past rather than to impose on that past the favored nostrums of a
later era. The Marxist or Freudian or Social Darwinist or multiculturalist or feminist or post-colonialist or deconstructionist cart
ought not precede the evidentiary horse. The discipline of history can
enable us to place the events of our own day—whether they be wars
or hurricanes or supreme court decisions—in a context that makes
them more understandable.
Let me sum up then:
(1) A good historian is a generalist who seeks to learn a little
about a great many matters. In the process that historian learns to
understand better both his own society and that of earlier centuries.
History remains a lynchpin of any liberal arts education.
(2) Good historians develop and enhance, as a central skill,
their powers of empathy.
(3) Good historians learn that there is a difference between
truth and falsehood. Absolute truth may elude us and, like many trial
juries, we may often have to rely on circumstantial evidence, but such
evidence should suffice to enable us to distinguish conclusions that are
more probable from those that are less probable.
(4) Good history adds that fourth dimension known as time to
the often static models fashioned by social scientists. It is the enemy
of the provincial, of the parochial, and of the over-simple. Good
historians do not take a holiday from complexity.
All of these are virtues. All of these are honorable goals. All of
these are values promoted by Phi Alpha Theta, and Phi Alpha Theta is
an honor society that celebrates the discipline of history as an
honorable activity and as an honorable profession. Why then ought
we not look upon History as a Matter of Honor?
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS:
LIMITATIONS THAT LED TO ABDICATION
Amanda Terrell
The 1930s were a time of ambiguity. Subsequently, the reality
fails to coincide with recollection, or, at least, the desired recollection.
Despite being mired in economic hardship and diplomatic tensions, the
thirties are remembered with a sense of dramatic nostalgia because it
was the period before the world was plunged into war. Many
historians have not escaped the trap of wistfulness when chronicling
the abdication of Edward VIII—the British king who relinquished his
throne in order to marry the woman he loved.
The authors who are easily ensnared are the biographers and
autobiographers. Most prominent of these are the Duke and Duchess
of Windsor. In their respective memoirs, A Kings Story (1951) and The
Heart Has It’s Reasons (1956), the Duke and Duchess recount the
abdication with a sense of dramatic longing, the Duchess more so than
the Duke. James Pope-Hennessey, in his biography of Queen Mary
entitled Queen Mary: 1867-1953, presents the abdication as the only
thing to ever break the heart of Dowager Queen. This representation
gives the story more than just a flair for the dramatic. Keith
Middlemas and John Barnes in their 1969 biography of Stanley
Baldwin, Baldwin: A Biography, present the abdication as a problem
only Baldwin could have fixed. In making Baldwin the victim and
hero, the authors added to the growing nostalgia.
Other historians have tackled the whole issue of abdication
instead of one person’s role or account. Christopher Warwick, in his
1986 book Abdication, relays the entire story in abundant detail
making one yearn for the days when kings were not forced to choose
between love and the throne. Susan Williams wrote her book The
People’s King: The Betrayal and Abdication of the First Modern Monarch in
2003 with the benefit of access to letters and papers that were
previously withheld. Williams provides different angles to the
abdication, telling the story from the King’s perspective as well as the
Prime Minister’s. However, Williams’ primary focus is the impact of
the abdication on the English commoner.

Amanda Terrell, a native of Danville, Illinois, earned her BA in History with
Departmental Honors in Spring 2006. A member of Phi Alpha Theta, she will begin
graduate studies in History at EIU in Fall 2006. She wrote this paper for Dr.
Michael Shirley’s HIS 2500, Historical Research and Writing, in Fall 2005.
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There are historians who have only offered one-sided analysis
of the abdication in the form of the “blame game.” Lord Beaverbrook’s
1966 posthumous book, edited by A.J.P. Taylor, places the blame of
the abdication on the shoulders of Stanley Baldwin. Sir Oswald
Mosely, in his 1968 autobiography My Life, accused Baldwin of
manipulating the government in order to maximize his power.
Conversely Robert Rhodes James reveals, in Memoirs of a Conservative:
J.C.C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers 1910-1937, that Davidson, a
Baldwin supporter, faulted Edward’s impossible demands for the
abdication.
Other historians have provided more balanced analysis of the
abdication. Some simply provide that the abdication was inevitable.
Linda Rosenweig, in her 1975 article “Abdication of Edward VIII”,
argues that Edward’s complex mental state cost him his throne.
Rosenweig argues the abdication from a psychiatric point of view. In
1964 Ronald Blythe wrote The Age of Illusion: Britain in the Twenties
and Thirties 1919-1940. In this book he maintains that the abdication
was inescapable because Edward was just too different and the
establishment could not handle change.
Still there are some historians who emphasize the political and
constitutional aspects of the abdication. Alan Clark, in The Tories:
Conservatives and the Nation Sate 1922-1997, expresses the enormity of
the Tories, traditionally being supporters of the monarchy, as the ones
who dethroned a king. M.M. Knappen proposes in the 1938 article,
“The Abdication of Edward VIII,” that, since the abdication, the
position of the monarch has been aggrandized while the influence of
the actual monarch has been diminished. Moreover, Arthur Keith’s
1938 book, The King, the Constitution, the Empire, and Foreign Affairs,
presents a similar argument. He argues that the office of the Prime
Minister was increased while Parliament, the cabinet, and the
sovereign’s roles were decreased.
Clearly the abdication has been researched and arguments made
on nearly every aspect. However, what was the real political climate
like during the abdication? Ignoring causes and results of the
abdication, what did the two sides really want? Moreover, why could
these two sides not come together and avoid abdication? I contend
that that both Stanley Baldwin and the King wanted a pleasant end to
the situation in which Edward remained king; however, each man’s
means to that end were limited by constitutional constraints and thus
a pleasant end could not be attained.1
1Examining constitutional constraints can prove tricky because of the
fluidity of the British Constitution. The British Constitution is made up of
both written documents and unwritten precedent. Therefore, determining not
only the positions of the King and Prime Minister in the government, but the
things that constrain them requires an in depth knowledge and understanding

8

As a prince, Edward caroused and cavorted among London
society. Throughout his bachelorhood the Prince of Wales never
wanted for the company of a woman; however, Edward’s companions
tended to be married aristocrats. Edward met Wallis Simpson, a
married American, in November 1930 at the home of mutual friends.2
The Prince’s initial romantic advances toward Mrs. Simpson failed
when he first asked her about home heating systems in the United
States.3 Nevertheless Edward’s frustrations did not persist. Soon he
frequented the Simpson’s flat for tea or dinner. Edward found himself
captivated and influenced by the social atmosphere. Henry “Chips”
Channon recorded in his diary several encounters with the Prince of
Wales at Simpson’s home; he wrote, “We had cocktails at Mrs.
Simpson’s little flat in Bryanston Court; there I found Emerald
Cunard, David Margesson, the Prince of Wales and one or two
others.”4 On another occasion Channon wrote, “Much gossip about
the Prince of Wales’ alleged Nazi leanings; he is alleged to have been
influenced by Emerald Cunard…through Mrs. Simpson.”5 Rumors
about Edward’s political sympathies were rife; however, now that a
woman was an influence, rumors began taking a serious overtone.
Nonetheless, Wallis was sharp and funny and she surrounded herself
with similar people and the Prince of Wales immediately fell in love
with her. Edward’s thoughts quickly moved to how he could marry a
woman who already had a husband and had previously been divorced.6
As Prince of Wales, Edward’s public life had been devoted to
the service of the Empire. Before he could make major life decisions
the effects on the Empire had to be considered. A prospective
marriage proved no different. Edward said of the situation, “a prince’s
heart, like his politics, must remain within the constitutional pale. But
my heart refused to be so confined.”7 However, Edward concealed his
intentions, at least while his father was alive.

of the Constitution. Both Edward VIII and Stanley Baldwin demonstrated
such an understanding of the British Constitution.
2Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons (New York: David
McKay Co, Inc., 1956), 154.
3Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story (New York: G.P. Putman & Sons,
1951), 256.
4Henry “Chips” Channon, Diary entry 14th May 1935; Accessed at
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.
5Henry “Chips” Channon, Diary entry 10th June 1935; Accessed at
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.
6 Wallis Simpson had been married before her marriage to Ernest
Simpson. She married Earl Winfield Spencer Jr in 1916. Spencer was a naval
pilot who was prone to alcoholism and spousal abuse and the couple divorced
in 1927. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 257-259.
7Ibid., 259.
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King George V died on 20 January 1936 after protracted
illnesses. Edward was now King and believed that he could now
marry Simpson. According to the Royal Marriages Act of 1772, as
King, Edward could restrict the marriage of a family member but no
one could restrict his marriage. The only prohibition on a monarch’s
marriage was that he, or she, could not marry a Roman Catholic.
Since Simpson met the only written standard Edward looked to
proceed with his intentions.8 However, when Mrs. Simpson began
divorce proceedings against her husband the situation became more
difficult.9 In the 1930s divorce was not looked upon favorably,
especially by the elite. In fact, Simpson did not meet any of the elite’s
unwritten qualifications for acceptance into their social circle: she was
American, she lacked status, she did not have money, and most
importantly she was divorced.10 The Cabinet and politicians were
part of the British elite; consequently, they would not tolerate
someone as inadequate as Queen.
Stanley Baldwin returned from a hiatus in mid October 1936,
only to find a stack of papers waiting for him, all concerning the King
and Simpson.11 The Prime Minister was hesitant to intervene in
Edward’s personal life. Nevertheless, the King and Prime Minister
met on 14 October 1936 and had subsequent meetings on the 20
October and 16 November.12 It was not until the last meeting that the
word “marriage” was spoken. Moreover, Edward communicated his
intention to marry Simpson at the latter meeting.
Thus a
constitutional crisis was in the making.
8Susan Williams, The People’s King: The True Story of the Abdication
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 53.
9Mrs. Simpson was granted a divorce hearing on 15 October 1936.
The hearing was scheduled for 27 October 1926 at the Ipswich Assizes. The
different location was granted at the behest of Mrs. Simpson’s lawyer Mr.
Goddard. If the proceedings were held at Ipswich they would be done faster
and there would be less publicity. Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its
Reasons, 228. Mrs. Simpson was granted a decree nisi at the 27 October
hearing. A decree nisi meant the divorce would not be final for six months.
Christopher Warwick, Abdication (New York, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986), 108.
10Williams, The People’s King, 32.
11Baldwin returned on 12 October after a several month sabbatical due
to exhaustion.
12The meeting on the 14 October was at the request of Stanley
Baldwin because he wanted to gauge Edward’s relationship with Mrs.
Simpson, but to his chagrin, the topic was never brought up. Williams, 57. In
the meeting on the 20 October the Prime Minister again skated around the
issue of Edward’s relationship with Mrs. Simpson. However, he did ask
Edward to prevent Mrs. Simpson’s divorce, which Edward declined to do.
Baron Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, (New York: Atheneum,
1966), 47.
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Why would a constitutional crisis be brewing? The only
stipulation on Edward’s marriage pertained to religion, and, as
aforementioned, Simpson met that qualification. Well, at the meeting
on 16 November, Stanley Baldwin told Edward that a marriage to
Simpson would be unpopular with the people.13 All his life Edward
had been fashioned by the will of the people and he was finding that
being King did not change his circumstances. However, as King, he
could retaliate and responded to Baldwin’s warning that he would
marry Simpson or abdicate.14 Edward did not disagree with Baldwin
about the degree of public support; however, his resolve was strong.
At the same meeting he received permission from Stanley Baldwin to
meet with two cabinet members, Samuel Hoare and Duff Cooper,
regarding the situation. Mr. Hoare provided no help or sympathy for
the King’s plight. Duff Cooper offered advice Edward did not want to
hear. Cooper advised the King to wait until after his coronation to
marry Simpson. Cooper reasoned that the government would not be
able to prevent the marriage if Edward was crowned.15 Perhaps
thinking that by being crowned Edward would have garnered so much
public support the government could not possibly oppose his
marriage. Nevertheless, Edward rejected Cooper’s proposal. The
King believed he would be misleading his people if he proceeded in
that fashion.16 Instead, Edward wanted to marry Simpson before his
coronation and either have her crowned with him or have her present
at the ceremony and recognized as his wife. This led to Edward’s
mantra “No marriage, No Coronation.”17
Another reason for Edward’s insistence that the coronation take
place with him either married, or not at all, was a religious one.
Edward did not consider him self a religious man; nonetheless, he did
recognize the religious aspects of coronation. He tells in his
autobiography that the coronation “is essentially a religious service.”18
As head of the Church of England, he did not think he could
participate in such a ceremony when he, as king “swears an oath to
uphold the doctrines of the Church of England, which does not
approve divorce.”19 Edward further noted:
13Stanley Baldwin believed that he could speak for the people because
he represented a government that was elected by the people.
14 This is important because many historians contend that abdication
was thrust upon the King. In fact, the King was the first to mention
abdication as an option to the situation. Ibid., 34.
15J. Murphy V., and J. Bryan III, The Windsor Story (New York:
Morrow, 1979), 246.
16Warwick, Abdication, 109.
17Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 16.
18Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 340.
19Ibid.
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For me to have gone through the Coronation ceremony
while harboring in my heart a secret intention to marry
contrary to the Church’s tenet’s would have meant being
crowned with a lie on my lips. My soul contained
enough religion for me to comprehend to the full the
deep meaning attached to the coronation service.20
Despite Edward’s overall ambivalent attitude toward the
established religion and its leaders, he was decided on the fact that he
could not blatantly disregard the church and be crowned intending to
violate its teachings.21
On 21 November the “King’s Matter”, as it was know among
London society, took a new turn. Esmond Harmsworth, heir to Lord
Rothermer, presented Simpson with the idea of marrying the King
morganatically.22 According to Simpson’s account neither she nor the
King favored a morganatic marriage, but since both desired not only
to marry, but a quick and favorable end to the developing crisis the
option was explored further. Edward met with Baldwin on 25
November and had him pose the question of morganatic marriage not
only to the Cabinet, but to the Dominion governments.23 This action
exhibits Edward’s adherence to the Constitution. Here he is seeking
the advice of his ministers and acting through his prime minister. The
20Ibid.
21 Another person that would not accept a marriage between the King
and Mrs. Simpson was Dr. Cosmo Lang, Archbishop of Canterbury. Dr. Lang
planned to use Edward’s coronation as revival for the Church of England.
Lang’s proposed revival would serve as a counterattack on the increasing
number of divorces in Britain. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 332.
However, the movement would lack legitimacy if Edward, as head of the
church, married a divorcee. Edward’s thoughts about being head of the
Church of England are unclear. There are times like the aforementioned
when he treats the church with respect. There are other times when he
displays his frustrations with the church. At his first, and only, state opening
of Parliament, Edward objected to affirming the Protestant faith. He realized
the historical importance, but still he said “the duty of uttering this outmoded
sentiment was repugnant to me.” Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 325. As
head of the church, Edward’s thoughts are troubling. There are also instances
during the abdication crisis when Edward reveals his feelings toward the
Archbishop of Canterbury, he said: “I fully appreciate the quandary in which I
had placed Dr. Lang.” Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 332. All of these
occasions muddy the position of Edward toward the Church of England.
22A morganatic marriage is one in which a monarch marries but his or
her spouse is not recognized his or her equal; therefore the spouse does not
become the monarch’s consort. Also, any children resulting from the
marriage are excluded from the line of succession. Beaverbrook, The Abdication
of Edward VIII, 50.
23Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons, 240-241.
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King’s personal advisors, namely Lord Beaverbrook, warned him
against such action. Beaverbrook argued that by posing the question
to the government Edward was constitutionally bound to its advice
and, hence, gave the government the upper hand.24 Given the
circumstances, Edward did not have Baldwin rescind the question but
did tell the Prime Minster via Walter Monkton that “he wanted no
advice on the marriage.”25 Nonetheless, since the question of
morganatic marriage had already been posed, Baldwin was bound to
give the King the government’s answer. Channon perceived the
political mood and noted in his diary on 28 November that “the Battle
for the Throne has begun.”26
By 2 December Baldwin had received answers from most of
the Dominions and the Cabinet had reached a decision regarding the
morganatic marriage. Therefore, on the 2 December the King and
Prime Minister met at Buckingham Palace. There Baldwin told the
King the unhappy news. Both the Cabinet and Dominions had
rejected the idea of morganatic marriage.27 With this the King’s cause
took a terrible blow. The next blow came from a most unexpected
source. Bishop Blunt gave a speech on 2 December and in it spoke of
his desire for the King to be more religious. Many newspaper editors
believed Blunt was referring to the King’s relationship with Mrs.
Simpson and the next day ran the story.28 According to the Duke of
Windsor, then Edward VIII, the harsh words and actions of the
24Murphy

& Bryan, The Windsor Story, 251.
Walter Monkton acted as the King’s emissary to Baldwin because
the King no longer trusted his Private Secretary, Alexander Hardinge.
Hardinge wrote the King a letter, which the King received on 13 November,
the letter stated the following: the British Press would report Edward’s
relationship with Mrs. Simpson; the Cabinet was devising strategy on how to
deal with the situation, one solution being resignation; a new government
would not be able to function; new elections would be necessary and the
King’s personal life would be a political issue; and lastly Mrs. Simpson should
leave Great Britain. Edward suspected Hardinge received his information
from Stanley Baldwin and, therefore, utilized Monkton as his “go between.”
Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 49.
26Henry “Chips” Channon, diary entry 28th November, 1936, accessed
at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/MONedwardVIII.htm.
27Duchess of Windsor, The Heart Has Its Reasons, 244.
28Until then the British Press had been silent regarding Edward’s
relationship with Mrs. Simpson per a “gentleman’s agreement” that the press
would not report on the King’s private life. Fred Siebert, “The Press and the
British Constitutional Crisis,” The Public Quarterly 1, no 4 (1937), 121. Dr.
Blunt, Bishop of Bradford, was not referencing the King’s relationship with
Mrs. Simpson in his speech. In fact, Bishop Blunt was hoping to rebuke the
King into taking his duties as head of the Church of England more seriously in
the form of going to church. Williams, The People’s King, 104.
25
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newspaper editors are what made the matter a political one. The
Duke stated, “by that action the Monarchy was brought violently into
politics.”29 Edward had been reared on the maxim ‘the Crown must
remain above politics,’ so to be entrenched in such a situation was
deplorable to him.30 Nevertheless, Edward’s next move was to meet
with his Prime Minister in order to sort out his options. As it turned
out the King did not have many options. When the two met on 3
December Baldwin presented the King with the following alternatives:
give up the marriage, marry despite the government’s objections and
deal with its resignation, or abdicate. The King stood his ground. He
now tried to find a way to marry and keep his throne while still
keeping within the means of the Constitution.31
Despite holding firmly to his position, the King did weaken
emotionally. However when Simpson proposed the idea that the King
address his subjects via radio, Edward perked up. The King decided
that even though the chances of the government allowing the
broadcast were slim, he would prepare a speech and propose the idea
to Baldwin for consideration.32 In his proposed speech Edward
wanted to tell his side of the story, which included this line, “neither
Mrs. Simpson nor I have ever sought to insist that she should be
Queen. All we have desired was that our married happiness should
carry with it a proper title and dignity for her, befitting my wife.”33
Edward went to London to meet with Baldwin and ask permission to
address the nation. Edward’s request was rejected on the grounds
that he would be superseding the government. However, something
more important happened that day. The King saw the crowds that
had gathered outside Buckingham Palace. Portions of the public were
rallying to the King in defense of his cause.34 Nevertheless, the King
would soon find other channels of support. On 4 December the
29 The action the Duke is referring to is his harsh depiction in he print
media. Duke of Windsor, A King’s Story, 358.
30Ibid., 382.
31Ibid., 355.
32Ibid., 356-357.
33 The King wanted to tell his side of the story because he thought the
newspapers were portraying only one side of the issue. Ibid., 361.
34Ibid., 365-367. Edward’s supporters came to be known as the “King’s
Party.” According to Edward, the party was an unorganized group of young
commoners spread throughout London and other cities. Mostly the groups
just carried homemade signs and sang “God Save the King” or chant “God
save the King from Baldwin.” Edward reflected that had he supported the
“King’s Party” he would have begun a civil war. Hostilities may have been
averted but definite war of words would have ensued which would have been
just as devastating. The Duke wrote, “A civil war is the worst of all wars. Its
passions soar highest, its hatreds last longest.” Duke of Windsor, A King’s
Story, 383-84.

14

Catholic Times, an unlikely supporter, made Edward’s case. The
newspaper was anti-divorce, but sided with the King because it did not
want to see the “Crown made the pawn of politicians.”35 However,
ironically, the King’s next means of support would come from a
politician, Winston Churchill.
Churchill played only a small role in the abdication. Per the
King’s request, Lord Beaverbrook met with Churchill on 30
November because Baldwin had prevented the King from doing so.
Beaverbrook informed Churchill of the situation and the King’s
position at that point.36 Churchill only became actively involved in
the crisis after the issue of morganatic marriage was denied by both
the Cabinet and Dominions.37 On 3 December Edward cut ties with
his then advisor Lord Beaverbrook and received permission from
Baldwin to confer with Churchill regarding his position.38 Churchill
joined the King for dinner on 4 December and was against the King
abdicating from the start. Churchill reasoned that Simpson’s divorce
would not be absolute until April, nearly five months; therefore, the
government could not advise the king, and certainly not threaten
resignation, on matter that did not exist. Churchill’s initial advice to
the King was to delay.39 That same night Churchill almost declared
himself the de facto leader of the “King’s Party” but thought better of
it. Churchill agreed with Edward that kings should not be in politics,
and by endorsing the growing party Churchill would have done just
that.40 Nevertheless when Edward did ask for help and advice
Churchill did not hesitate. Both the King and Churchill left their
meeting charged and ready to fight for the cause. In fact, the presence
of Churchill seemed to reinvigorate all of the King’s camp.41 The next
day Churchill wrote the King a letter. The letter makes one think the
two were still soldiers fighting the Germans. Churchill wrote:
News from all fronts! No pistol to be held at the King’s
head. No doubt that this request for time will be
granted. On no account must the King leave the
country. Windsor Castle is his battle station. When so
much is at stake, no minor inclinations can be indulged.

Good advance on all parts giving prospects of gaining
good positions and assembling large force behind them.42
By telling Edward to entrench at Windsor Castle, Churchill
evokes monarchical sentiment. He tried to persuade Edward to defend
his throne like kings of old. He succeeded, but only momentarily.
The previous night Edward had been geared to defend his throne;
however, something changed overnight. The same morning Churchill
penned his letter, Edward sent Monkton to Baldwin in order to
forewarn him that Edward would personally tell the Prime Minister of
his decision to abdicate later in the day. At this point the King had to
see no bright spots in his situation. However, Monkton quickly
presented an optimistic point. Monkton told the King to ask Baldwin
to add with the Bill of Abdication a bill finalizing Simpson’s divorce,
so she could marry right away. This proposal enlivened the King a
bit.43 But of course, once proposed, the matter was in the hands of
Baldwin and the Cabinet.
Baldwin seemed receptive to the idea and according to both
Beaverbrook’s and the Duke of Windsor’s accounts, Baldwin promised
to resign if the two bills were not passed simultaneously.44
Nevertheless the Cabinet rejected the divorce bill and it was never put
before the House of Commons.45 Thus, Edward was left with nothing.
His abdication would not be complete until 11 December and the
intervening six days was a big hullabaloo, the proverbial beating of a
dead horse. The newspapers did not cease attacking Edward and
Simpson. All throughout the crisis the papers daily called for the King
to act wisely. The Times reminded the King and all of London that
“the King is responsible for the Monarchy and for the Empire.”46
Readers of the Daily Dispatch read that “the privileges of kingship
carry with them tremendous responsibility. The personal element
must be subordinated.”47 Due to the majority of newspapers printing
stories with the aforementioned sentiment, the public perception of
the Edward was bound to seem selfish. People could not see how a

42CV,

V, pt 3, pp. 455-6; Quoted in Jenkins 500-01, n. 34.
of Windsor, A King’s Story, 386.
44Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 80 and Duke of
Windsor, A King’s Story, 391.
45The bill carried no support in the Cabinet. Non-Conformists argued
that allowing a twice divorced person to remarry went against their doctrine.
Anglicans simply considered divorce an “abomination” and thus refused.
Other members of the Cabinet refused the bill because the believed they would
lose support at the polls if they supported it. Beaverbrook, The Abdication of
Edward VIII, 80-81.
46The Times (London), 4 December 1936, 18.
47Ibid.
43Duke

35Beaverbrook,

The Abdication of Edward VIII, 71.
65.
37Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years of Preparation (New York:
Hawthorn Books, 1958), 391.
38Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 74.
39Ibid., 76-77.
40Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A Biography (New York: Farrar, Straus, &
Giroux, 2001), 500.
41Beaverbrook, The Abdication of Edward VIII, 78.
36Ibid.,
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king could choose love over a throne. Edward disagreed. In his
memoirs he wrote:
I certainly married because I chose the path of love. But
I abdicated because I chose the path of duty. I did not
value the Crown so lightly that I gave it away hastily. I
valued it so deeply that I surrendered it, rather than risk
any impairment of its prestige.48
Conversely to the public’s and media’s opinion, Edward did
consider other matters beside his own feelings. In fact all throughout
the abdication crisis Edward adhered to his constitutional role. He
never consulted anyone without the permission of his Prime Minister.
He did not address the nation despite his plight, nor did he rally his
supporters. Edward maintained a working relationship with Stanley
Baldwin, and when the situation came to a head could not take the
advice of his ministers so he abdicated rather than plunge the nation
into uncharted political waters.
Baldwin, the Prime Minister, never wanted to get involved in
Edward’s personal life. Baldwin considered himself a close friend to
the King and did not want to jeopardize that relationship.49
Nonetheless, after Baldwin’s aforementioned hiatus he was compelled
to action. Lord Beaverbrook and Winston Churchill claimed that
there was no constitutional basis for Baldwin’s actions. In other
words there was no constitutional crisis, and thus Baldwin stepped
outside his carefully crafted constitutional role.50 However, according
to the Parliamentary Council, Baldwin was still well with his role. On
5 November 1936 the council drafted a memo addressing the topic of
ministers and their advice to a monarch. The memo stated that if a
monarch refused the advice of the government the government can
resign. However this action is a last resort, and to ensure that it does
not happen the government should take the effort that no other party
would form a government, hence forcing the monarch into
submission. The Parliamentary Council reasoned that a monarch can
no longer rule in Britain without ministers, thus he, or she, would
have no other option but to abdicate.51 Therefore, Baldwin was well
within his limits when he consulted the oppositional parties to ensure
that they would not form governments if he was forced to resign.
48Duke

of Windsor, A King’s Story, 385.
Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (London:
Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1969), 980.
50Beaverbrook also disliked Baldwin; therefore, that also fueled his
suspicions. Beaverbrook, 76-77.
51It most likely this memo that compelled Alec Hardinge to write his
letter to the King which warned that the situation involving Mrs. Simpson
could lead to the resignation of his current government and the impotence of a
future government. Williams, The People’s King, 71.
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Baldwin covered all his bases. He spoke with both the Liberals and
the Labour parties. Sir Archibald Sinclair was the leader of the
Liberal Party and he wrote this to Beaverbrook years after the
abdication: “It is true that Mr. Baldwin consulted me about the King’s
proposal to marry Mrs. Simpson and again on two or three other
occasions about the development of the crisis, and the proposed
morganatic marriage.”52
Sinclair does not explicitly say Baldwin asked him not to form a
government but that was the implied question and answer. In fact,
Middlmas and Barnes write in their book Baldwin: A Biography that
the Prime Minister met with both Sinclair and Clement Atlee on 25
November and the purpose of the meeting was to ensure neither man
would form a government should Baldwin resign.53
Once Baldwin had garnered support and guaranteed the
stability of his government he could tackle the “King’s Matter” head
on. The first issue was the morganatic marriage. It has already been
noted that both the Cabinet and Dominion governments rejected a
morganatic marriage between the King and Mrs. Simpson. However,
there was logical, constitutional reason for them to be involved—they
did not wholly reject the marriage out of spite. Great Britain holds no
precedent for morganatic marriage. Therefore, the government would
have had to enact legislation to set the precedent.54 Since the Cabinet
and the Dominions refused the morganatic marriage, Baldwin could
do nothing else with the issue.55
As soon as Edward decided to abdicate in favor of marrying
Mrs. Simpson, Baldwin was faced with the issue of the including a
divorce bill with the Bill of Abdication. Previously mentioned was
Beaverbrook’s assertion that Baldwin promised to resign if the two
bills were not passed concurrently. According to Middlemas and
Barnes, Baldwin never made that promise.56 Baldwin presented both
bills to the Cabinet on 6 December and was met with a flood of
opposition. Neville Chamberlain stated that if Parliament passed both
bills it would be looked upon as “an unholy bargain,” people would see
the passing of the divorce bill as a prerequisite for the King’s
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abdication.57 Baldwin tried, but to avail. He could not convince the
cabinet and the bill was struck down.
There have been other allegations that Baldwin’s actions were
fueled by a personal vendetta. People have claimed that Baldwin
never wanted Edward to be king and that he used the marriage issue
to force Edward off the throne. This assertion is not altogether true.
Baldwin often found himself preventing others from being too harsh
on the King. For instance, on 9 November Neville Chamberlain and
other members of the Cabinet drafted a letter containing an
ultimatum, telling the King to give up Simpson at once or else.
Baldwin did not approve of the ultimatum and was able to tactfully
dismiss the issue when he took the letters home with him to review
them and never brought them back.58 Another example that signals
Baldwin’s desire to resolve the situation and keep Edward on the
throne is when he arrived at the King’s home on 6 December prepared
to spend the night. Baldwin intended to be available to the King to
talk out the issue, in case there was any possibility of avoiding
abdication.59
Stanley Baldwin was not the villain in the drama of abdication.
At every turn he acted constitutionally. Whether it was consulting
the Cabinet, or Dominions, or advising the King according to the
merits of the Constitution Baldwin adhered to his role. Despite
Baldwin’s compassion for the King, he did not abuse or misuse his
position in order for the King to keep his.
Edward VIII ceased being King of England in the afternoon of
11 December. His reign had lasted less than eleven months. the
shortest reign by an English monarch in 453 years.60 These facts
leave no room for ambiguity. The abdication of Edward VIII has
attracted much research. Scholars have propounded theories of cause
and effect. Nevertheless, the actions of each of the principal players-the King and the Prime Minister--have not been analyzed as to what
constrained them, the Constitution, and that factor being the means
for abdication until now. Indeed, both men adhered to their role
circumscribed in the Constitution so adroitly that a pleasant end could
not be attained. Perhaps, if one man had stepped outside the
limitation of his office, abdication could have been averted; however,
this was not to be, and was never really likely. Abdication occurred,
Edward left England for self-imposed exile, and the story was left to
be told, nostalgia and all.
57Ibid.,
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN:
THEORIES CONCERNING ABOLITION
Ashley Tomlinson
As early as 450 B.C., records report the death penalty being
used as criminal punishment in England. Though kings generally
decided what type of punishment should be inflicted, those sentenced
to death were most commonly thrown into a quagmire and left to die.1
As the Middle Ages unfolded, the number of capital crimes increased,
as did the cruelty of the punishment. It was not long until methods of
burning, drawing and quartering, boiling, and hanging were used for
commoners, while beheading, an honorable death, was left for the elite
classes.2
Despite all the possible approaches, hanging replaced most
other methods of capital punishment by 1547.3 This became the
English tradition. For example, those executed at Tyburn in London
were routinely paraded through the town, usually sitting on a coffin,
wearing a shroud.4 Crowds gathered in the street to mock the
condemned, and there were rarely fewer than three thousand present
to watch the execution. With similar execution traditions developing
around the country, public support of execution lasted well into the
twentieth century.5 Yet, the death penalty was abolished in 1969. The
reason England, having such strong tradition and public support
behind capital punishment, voluntarily eliminated capital punishment
from their penal code is still debated.
Four central theories, all centering around twentieth century
occurrences, have been developed to offer a solution. First, scholars,
such as Victor Bailey, conclude that the public developed sympathy for
the condemned during the twentieth century and, as a result, pushed
for abolition. Others believe that abolition resulted from a shift in
Ashley Tomlinson is a senior History and History with Teacher Certification major
who will be graduated in Spring 2007. A member of Phi Alpha Theta, she has earned
numerous awards, including a Livingston Lord Scholarship by EIU. She wrote this
paper for Dr. Michael Shirley’s HIS 2500 class, Historical Research and Writing, in
Spring 2005.
1 John Laurence, A History of Capital Punishment (Port Washington:
Kennikat Press, 1932), 2.
2 Ibid., 6.
3 Ibid., 8.
4 This London execution place was named after the Tyburn River. It
is estimated that the public watched over 50,000 people executed there.
5 John Laurence, A History of Capital Punishment, 1777.
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English penal philosophy after World War II. Another theory claims
abolition is the result of the twentieth century Labour Party pushing
for the issue in their newly formed platform. Finally, some reason it
was a series of controversial trials in the mid 1900s that changed
England’s opinion on the death penalty.
All four of these theories provide significant information
concerning the abolition of capital punishment in Britain, but none
proves completely correct. Abolition was not won by a single set of
twentieth century circumstances. Instead, the path to abolition was a
two hundred year struggle against tradition and strong public
opinion. Tom Phillips described the course of capital punishment in
Great Britain as “a disease whose… symptoms slowly got better until
a complete cure was effected in 1965.”6 With roots in the eighteenth
century, the cure was found by a series of select individuals and
interest groups who met strong opposition but kept persistent until
they accomplished their goal in 1969. By examining all the possible
theories, it becomes obvious why the road to abolition was gradual
development, not a twentieth century phenomenon.
Benevolent Sympathy for the Condemned
Some, including Professor Victor Bailey, claim that during the
early and mid- twentieth century a majority of the public was
“disturbed” and turned their support from the “barbarous and
immoral” death penalty out of feelings of sympathy for the
condemned.7 Evidence proves otherwise. The public was never fully
supportive of abolition, and those who were rarely felt compassion for
the criminal.
The early twentieth century Gallup polls provide evidence
demonstrating that the majority of the public supported the use of the
death penalty, before and after abolition. For instance, in November
of 1938, fifty-five percent expressed they would not support abolition.
Interestingly enough, as the year of abolition came closer, the
numbers rose. A poll from March of 1953 said the use of the death
penalty was acceptable to a seventy-three percent majority. As late as
1960, seventy-three percent of the public believed that abolishing the
death penalty would increase the crime rate. When a five-year trial
period for abolition drew to a close in 1968, a majority still supported
capital punishment. A few years after abolition, in 1973, sixty-six
percent still thought that death was an acceptable form of

6 Tom Phillips, “The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Great
Britain,” Contemporary Review 272 (February 1998), 1.
7 Victor Bailey, “The Shadow of the Gallows: The Death Penalty and
the British Labour Government,” Law and History Review 18 (Summer 2000),
313.
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punishment.8 However, the public’s opinion was never asked in the
form of an official government referendum or vote. Executioner
Albert Pierrepoint9 expressed in his autobiography that he “would not
pretend that, …in 1964, and for many years afterwards, a national
referendum of the population of Great Britain would ever have cast a
majority for the ending of the death penalty.”10 In fact, there were at
least five new applications every week from men and women to
become executioners.11
Those of the general public who did support a push for
abolition were not always behind it for benevolent reasons. Many
supporters were not concerned with the suffering of the condemned
but expressed that death was no longer a successful deterrent.12
Pierrepoint suggested that if capital punishment was a successful
deterrent, he “might be expected to know.” Instead, he witnessed
“young lads and girls, working men, grandmothers” walk with
courage to their death. He explained that death “did not deter them
then, and it had not deterred them when they committed what they
were convicted for.”13 Many abolitionists stood behind this claim,
producing evidence from other countries where the death penalty was
already abolished. If these countries crime rates had gone anywhere, it
was down. There obviously were more successful ways to deter a
crime.14
In addition, pointing to the suicide of a public executioner in
1932, many were concerned for the mental well-being of the person
Pierrepoint
performing the execution, not the condemned.15
supported this by stating that he “sincerely hope[d] that no man is
ever called upon to carry out another execution,” due to the effects it
had on him and his family.16
8 George Gallup, ed., The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls:
Great Britain, 1937- 1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), 11-1229.
9 The Pierrepoint name was represented in the office of executioner
from 1900 to 1956, the most current being Albert Pierrepoint II. After
resigning in 1956, he has claimed that, looking back, he did not support capital
punishment, feeling it achieved nothing except revenge. Albert Pierrepoint,
Executioner, Pierrepoint (London: Harrap, 1974), 8.
10 Ibid., 170.
11 Ibid., 187.
12 Tom Phillips, “The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Britain,” 1.
13 Albert Pierrepoint, Executioner, Pierrepoint, 211.
14National Council for the Abolition of the Death Penalty, “Capital
Punishment Should be Abolished,” (London: privately printed, 1935)
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Despite the emotional impacts of the duty, executioners had
their job down to a science. They calculated various human weights
and sizes to perform the most humane drop possibly. Only a few on
the record had not been performed absolutely perfectly.17 Because of
this, few could make a strong argument that capital punishment was
inhumane or barbaric. Death was efficient and instantaneous. This is
not to say that compassionate arguments towards the criminal were
not used. C.O.P.E.C. (Conference on Christian Political and Economic
Citizenship) of 1924, held in Birmingham, refuted capital punishment
by stating that “the business of the Christian Community is to redeem
the offender.” Nevertheless, these arguments were held by a minority
population.
Shift in Penal Philosophy
Near the end of WWII, Britain had become “a laboratory of
social engineering.”18 Public ownership of at least one fifth of the
economy left many believing this is when the real foundations of the
welfare state were erected.19 Historian Ken Morgan agreed when he
stated, “Not since the Washington of the early New Deal in 1933 had
the governmental agencies in a democratic country been so caught up
in experimentation and social advance.” Consequently, many believed
that the beginnings of criminal justice reform served as a primary part
of the postwar transformation.20 Actually, none of the efforts made
during this era producedvreal effects on the push for abolition. If
anything, the movement went backwards during this time.21
Postwar Britain was much less welcoming to penal reform than
many let on. The atrocities of the war and the flood of postwar human
rights activation did not alter any opinions of capital punishment in
Great Britain; rather, it justified them. The Nuremberg Court,
beginning November 20, 1945, sentenced twelve of the twenty-two on
trial to death. Ten of these men were hanged, and public opinion held
that they deserved it. For many, these and similar trials served as
justification to a “retributive approach to indigenous murder.”22
Consequently, attempts in 1947 and in years following to reintroduce
the Criminal Justice Bill of 193823 failed, and no legislation concerning
Laurence, History of Capital Punishment, 139.
Victor Bailey, “Shadow of the Gallows,” 319.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 349.
22 Ibid., 309-310.
23 This 1938 bill was introduced with two abolitionist amendments:
Five year trial period or complete abolition. It was rejected 16 –7. Elizabeth
Tuttle, “The Crusade Against Capital Punishment in Great Britain,” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1959), 53-54.

capital punishment would be passed until the Homicide Act of 1957.
Even then, this bill did not mention abolition, only “amendments of
law relating to homicide and the trial and punishment of murder.”
Specifically, it addressed the death penalty surrounding issues of
“abolition of ‘constructive malice’, persons suffering from diminished
responsibility, provocation, and suicide pacts.”24
If the shift in penal philosophy in the years following the
Second World War was as strong as some claim, there would have
been more advancement seen in the area of abolition, especially from
the Labour Party. This party, which was supposedly the main
supporter of abolition, took office in 1945 with a parliamentary
majority of one hundred and forty-six. The bill, if not easily passed,
should have been at least reintroduced, but there was no
progression.25
Labour Party Platform Issue
Emerging in 1906, the Labour Party appeared to provide a
realistic opposition to the Conservative Party, changing
“parliamentary dynamics of the capital punishment debate.” This led
many to believe it was the Labour Party’s support and influence that
caused the push for abolition, but in reality, they did very little.26
Capital punishment was usually divided right down party lines,
regardless of evidence. For instance, a 1930 Select Committee was put
together to examine the possibilities of abolition. Convincing
arguments both for and against abolition were presented, yet neither
side shifted at all. With seven Labour party members, six
Conservatives, and two Liberals, the evidence proved of small
influence, and the vote was split right down party lines.27
If abolition was such a party issue, it would seem that, once in
power, the Labour Party would strongly focus on abolition. This was
not the case. The first two Labour Governments, 1924 and 1929-31,
were met with limited success.28 Parliament refused to allow time to
even debate the issue. As Elizabeth Tuttle points out, the Labour
Party was not “truly zealous for the abolition of capital punishment, or
time would have been allocated for a debate on the subject.” Time for
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the first two Labour Governments slipped away. It would be up to the
next victorious Labour Government to get the ball rolling again. 29
When the party took control of the Parliament by a large one
hundred and forty-six majority in 1945, the time seemed perfect.
Abolitionist groups like the National Council for the Abolition of the
Death Penalty (NCADP) felt the end of WWII and the majority of the
Labour Party “should bring success to our efforts for Abolition within
the next few years.”30 However, it would be close to twenty years
before abolition was passed.
A few strong individual abolitionists
would continue the push, not the party itself. In fact, the trend of the
Labour Party was beginning to worry abolitionists in the mid
twentieth century. It seemed “the Labour’s leadership tended to be
more enthusiastic abolitionists when in opposition than when in
government.”31 This left the work up to leading groups and
individuals truly devoted to abolition.
Controversial Trials
Tom Phillips argues that it was “not rational arguments but a
series of controversial individual cases” that finally passed abolition
legislation.32 Some of these cases included that of Derek Bentley and
Timothy Evans. In 1953, Bentley, a nineteen year old boy with
mental handicaps, had already been taken into custody for a break-in
when his accomplice shot and killed a policeman. His companion, only
sixteen years of age, was not sentenced to death, but Bentley, who did
not pull the trigger, was. Pierrepoint was forced to carry out the
execution despite much public outrage. In the second case, Evans’s
daughter, Geraldine, had been found dead next to her murdered
mother, Evan’s wife. With the help of a principle witness, John
Christie, Evans was tried, convicted, and executed for his daughter’s
murder. However, as the years passed, this “credible witness” turned
out to be a “self –confessed necrophiliac murderer of seven women,”
including Evan’s wife.33 This led many to question if they had hung
an innocent man. Crimes like these struck an interest from the public,
but not the kind of interest that could be used to abolish capital
punishment.34
The truth was that many felt Evans’ execution was an
unfortunate mistake but not a case for legislative reform. During this
time, the Gallup Poll asked if the death penalty was applied in too
29 Elizabeth Tuttle, “The Crusade Against Capital Punishment in
Great Britain,” 44.
30 Victor Bailey, “Shadow of the Gallows,” 308.
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many cases. Only five percent of the respondents said yes, and fifty
percent said it was not applied enough. Of those individuals who
supported the death penalty, only nine percent would change their
mind if an innocent man was wrongly executed. As for the Bentley
case, the Homicide Act of 1957 provided for those with “abnormality
of the mind” to be taken into special consideration.35
It seems the real outcries that came from controversial cases
were merely “propaganda versions of various controversial trials.”36
Pierrepoint gives an example of how these trials were used more for
entertainment purposes then actually confronting the issue of
abolition. Take the two cases of Ruth Ellis and Mrs. Christofi, both
women. Females had been executed before but in much fewer number
than men. Ellis directly killed her lover, firing at leave five bullets
from point blank range, whom she wrongly suspected was having an
affair. Christofi hit her neighbor during a confrontation, inflicting
injuries that later caused death. Happening only one month apart,
Pierrepoint received many petitions, even a check for ninety pounds,
not to carry out the execution of Ellis. It seems unusual that Ellis,
killing in cold blood, received the attention. It would seem more
logical to defend Christofi, whose intention was only to argue, never
to kill someone. Pierrepoint reasoned it was because Ellis was pretty.
The “blonde night-club hostess” won the hearts of the public, while no
one gave notice to “a grey-haired and bewildered grandmother who
spoke no English.”37 If people were actually paying attention to these
trials to promote abolition, Christofi should have received wider
attention then Ellis. As Pierrepoint claims, “all public life is field for
controversy and misrepresentation…a denial never gets the publicity
of the first false publication.”38 People read into these trials what they
wanted, and they did not want to abolish the death penalty.
Two Hundred Year Struggle
Clearly, the war for abolition was not won by any one single
twentieth century battle but many, over the course of two hundred
years. Pushed largely by individuals and interest groups, abolitionists
were essentially realistic in their strategy. They realized they were up
against two strong factors, public opinion and years of tradition, and
“neither of these responded readily to argument.”39 It was these
abolitionists’ determination and endurance, even when they were
repeatedly rejected, that would eventually win the fight. Each one of
United Kingdom, Parliament, Homicide act 1957.
Albert Pierrepoint, Executioner, Pierrepoint, 208-209.
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the movers was a necessary component because they developed
arguments and goals that would last through generations. Though
the struggle is much more complex, the theory can be best examined
by a combination of three major pushes: Origins of Abolition, New
Intensity, and Twentieth Century Push.
I. Origins of Abolition
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria wrote Essay on Crimes and Punishments,
expressing a view on capital punishment that widely contrasted his
contemporaries. In his view, humans, not being the creator of life, had
no right to take it away. Capital punishment could only be justified in
two ways: if the death of an individual would save a popular
government or if death was the only way to deter others from
committing the same crime. These views directly influenced Jeremy
Bentham and Sir Samuel Romilly, through whom English culture got
its first dose of abolitionary thought.40
Later in the eighteenth century, Bentham created a few
arguments against the death penalty that would leave a lasting
impression. First, he claimed the threat of death was not deterrent,
and worsened criminals would be more influenced by “the
contemplation of perpetual imprisonment, accompanied with hard
labour and occasional solitary confinement.”41 This point was later
picked up by Albert Pierrepoint, who felt no criminal he witnessed
walking up to the scaffold was deterred by death. Bentham also
stressed that judges and witnesses are both fallible, another argument
that kept strong through the twentieth century.42
Sir Samuel Romilly pushed abolition into the political arena.
During his time, there were over two hundred and twenty offences
punishable by death. While addressing Parliament, fellow Commons
member Fowell Buxton reinforced Romilly’s main argument when he
said, “Kill your father, or catch a rabbit in a warren—the penalty is the
same! Destroy three kingdoms, or destroy a hop-bine—the penalty is
the same!”43 Romilly made a hard push but was only successful in
passing three bills, which concerned the repeal of capital punishment
in certain instances of theft. However, his work was not done in vain.
He, together with other early abolitionists, had brought the cause to
the surface. Later abolitionists readily picked up their ideas with new
intensity.
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II. Nineteenth Century New Intensity
After Romilly’s death, the seeds of his ideas were cultivated by
two men, Sir James Mackintosh and Sir Robert Peel. In March of
1819, Mackintosh’s request for a Select Committee on abolition was
accepted, and as a result, many bills formally supported by Romilly
were eventually revised and passed. When Peel became Home
Secretary in 1822, action started to increase. By 1827, eight acts were
passed that took at least 250 old statutes off the books.44
These two men’s intensity was met and possibly surpassed by
Quaker John Bright. He spent the majority of his life speaking and
voting in favor of abolition in the House of Commons. Two main
arguments solidified when Bright entered the field. The first of these
was that the “certainty of punishment was more important than
severity in preventing the development of crime.” Secondly, he
argued, drawing from Becceria, man “was usurping a power only
belonging to God”45 by practicing the death penalty.
These men’s intensity spurred the creation of the Royal
Commission of 1833, which concluded:
That the punishment of death ought to be confined to
crime of High Treason (happily on of rare occurrence)
and (with perhaps some particular exceptions) to offence
which consist in, or are aggravated by, acts of violence to
the person or which tend to endanger human life.46
As a result, a bill was passed that removed twenty one of the
remaining thirty seven offences punishable by death.47
Though some limited success had been made, the majority of
England still agreed with Sir George Grey who said that the feeling
towards abolition, including those of newcomer William Ewart, were
“contrary to the general feeling of the House and to the country.”48
Nonetheless, Ewart and Bright pushed on, producing bills in 1848,
1849, and 1850, and were denied every time. Again, though their
persistence did not produce a new law, it brought their issue to the
front. A Royal Commission was set up again in 1864, but again, its
success was limited. The commission produced only the suggestion of
outlawing public executions.49

44 Elizabeth Tuttle, “The Crusade Against Capital Punishment in
Great Britain,” 6-7.
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Two new players would emerge after the 1864 Commission,
Sir Eardley Wilmot and J.W. Pease. They stirred up one of the most
convincing arguments used in abolition; focusing on other countries
that had already abolished the death penalty. This argument was
expressed by Bright when he said:
The Attorney General…says, what murders would be
committed if hanging were abolished? The burglar or the
garrotter would be tempted to kill his victim; but the
answer to that is, that in all countries where capital
punishment has been abolished, there is not one atom of
proof that any such thing has occurred.50
Although a later bill by Pease was defeated two hundred and sixty
three to sixty four, these men’s arguments “laid the foundation upon
which the twentieth century case for the abolition of the death penalty
was built.” From then on, the arguments changed very little right up
to abolition.51
III. The Twentieth Century Push
With only murder, treason, piracy, and arson left punishable by
death, the twentieth century push was met with a strong resentment.52
However, a few individuals did continue to push, including former
executioner James Berry and Penal Reform League founder Captain
Arthur St. John. The historical cycle was continued with bills that
were continually drafted, printed, and never heard of again. Like
always, these individual’s fruitless sacrifices helped bring ideas to
other’s attention. Roy Calvert, the leader of the NCADP, was one of
those individuals. Writing Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century,
Calvert capitalized on the logical arguments of abolishing the death
penalty. Again, these included death as an unsuccessful deterrent and
the stationary or declining murder rates in capital punishment free
countries.53
In 1930, a Select Committee suggested that a test period of
abolition be tried during peace time, but again, the bill went no where.
The same failure occurred in 1938. In 1948, abolitionists inched a
little closer with an amended Criminal Justice Bill, but it was defeated
by the House of Lords. With all the commotion, another Royal
Commission was set up in 1949 to look into the issue.54 Things for
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abolitionists were not looking any better, but the sacrifice and
determination sparked a debate which resulted in the Homicide Bill of
1957. Discussed above, this act gave Britain a mild taste of abolition
because it severely limited the number of executions. Just as
abolitionists had been claiming for years, there was no increase in the
murder rate.
The last influential individual was Sydney Silverman. Just like
his predecessors, he continually pushed for bills, was rejected, then
picked up and pushed again. Finally, in 1964, Silverman gave one last
push. He presented an abolition bill that was read three times and
adorned with an amendment.55 This amendment stated that abolition
would expire in five years unless it was directly implemented again by
both houses to keep it permanent. It passed, two hundred and four to
one hundred and four. Four and a half years into the experiment, it
was deemed a success and voted in permanently on December 18,
1969.56
Conclusion
From the evidence, it is obvious that all of these key players
were needed for abolition to conclude the way it did. Though the
theories focusing just on the twentieth century provide important
information, no single event or theory originated from that time alone
was responsible for abolition. The death penalty had been a long
standing tradition in England, and it took over two hundred years of
individuals and groups pushing for abolition, despite being continually
rejected and knocked down. These fighters created arguments and
determination that were taken up by generations after. With these
types of roots, the process of abolition was nothing sudden. Instead,
capital punishment had “been on its way out since the first
murmurings of doubt about its efficacy were heard in the eighteenth
century.”57
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THE EXCUSE OF PATERNALISM IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH: IDEOLOGY OR PRACTICE?
Josh Cole
Slavery was a major economic contributor to slaveholders in
the antebellum South. Their livelihood depended on it, and slaves
were exploited as much as possible in order to benefit their white
masters. Abolitionists, mostly in the North, viewed the institution of
slavery as a non-Christian practice that took advantage of a less
fortunate group of people simply because of their skin color. They
thought that the small amount of slaveholders present in the South
treated their slaves inhumanely and committed atrocities that had no
place in the states. Historian Eugene Genovese re-examined the
master-slave relationship a few decades ago. He agreed with past
historians that slavery was a cruel institution that treated the slaves
unfairly. However, he believed that extreme forms of mistreatment
were very minor. Genovese introduced slave-owner “paternalism,”
not a good, painless, or benign slavery, but a slavery in which masters
took personal interest in the lives of their slaves.1
Genovese believes that paternalism “brought white and black
together and welded them into one people with genuine elements of
affection and intimacy.”2 It was a compromise between master and
slave--the master would provide for the slave as long as the slave
produced for him. Genovese fails to distinguish between paternalism
as an ideology and as a way of life.3 This sense of paternalism that
Genovese mentions was a self-justifying ideology and, with a few
exceptions, not a very visible practice in the slaveholding South. The
institution of slavery was meant to fully exploit the slaves, while the
ideology allowed whites to exercise their “superior” status with
relatively no guilty conscience. Compromise involved the participation
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of both master and slave, and most slaves in the South did not agree to
this pact. They did everything in their power to defy the master’s
authority due to their own brutal conditions and treatment by whites.
The ideology of paternalism meant that the masters took care
of their slaves because they were personally attached to them.
Genovese believes that this was especially true because slaves were
given an abundant supply of food by their masters, and they retained a
plentiful, if not nutritionally, balanced diet. Also, he points out that
medical care on the plantations exceeded that of Southern whites, and
slaves were relatively healthy under the care of their worried masters.4
Masters closely governed the nature of slave life on their plantations;
this was a central feature to Genovese’s paternalism. He states that
slaves had many outside contacts with whites that extended far
beyond the exploitation of labor.
During the 1930s, many ex-slaves were interviewed about their
time in bondage by the Works Progress Administration (WPA). One
major theme that was constantly revealed by these former slaves was
the prevalence of mixed-race ancestry between master and slave. In
the eyes of many slaves, these relationships between white masters
and black servants were usually matters of forced sex between the
powerful and the powerless. This is in direct opposition to Genovese’s
theory of voluntary association with whites outside of the labor circle.
As one former female slave noted, “Immoralwhite men have, by force,
injected their blood into our veins.”5 Ex-slaves understood sexual
relationships as strictly coercive with white owners and overseers
being the aggressors while slave women were the victims. White
masters not only included the male and female heads of the household
but also their sons. Former Kentucky slave Henry Bibb even
suggested “that the strongest reason why southerners stick with such
tenacity to their ‘peculiar institution’ is because licentious white men
could not carry out their wicked purposes among the defenseless
colored population, as they now do, without being exposed and
punished by law if slavery was abolished.”6
Many of these former slaves recalled how some slave women
actually sought sexual relationships with owners or overseers to
improve their own or their families’ lives and futures. Ellen Craft
claimed that masters sometimes promised slave women that they
would educate and emancipate the children of their union. However,
Craft added that “a great majority of such men care nothing for the
happiness of the women with whom they live, nor for the children of
4Peter
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whom they are the fathers.” Craft’s own master never educated nor
freed her, as he had promised her slave mother. The possibility of
better accommodations, increased food rations, and luxuries also
prompted some slave women to seek out their white masters or
overseers as sexual partners. Several former slaves suggested that the
long-term mistresses of white men fared much better than field
hands.7 This evidence does support Genovese’s argument that some
slaves did seek out whites outside of labor. However, it is important
to note the motives of these slaves for doing so. They felt that the
only way to survive the system was to form “beneficial” relationships
with powerful whites. They did so in order to feed, clothe, and care
for themselves and their families. Keeping the master happy allowed
the slaves to stay alive, while also sending a few extra provisions their
way. Paternalism does not apply to these situations because the slaves
felt forced to bend to the desires of their masters.
Most masters handpicked their mistresses, and no “plain” black
woman could throw herself at the sexual mercy of her master if he did
not desire her. These womenhad little power to refuse the sexual
advances of their superiors. Anthony Christopher’s family avoided
punishment and received better treatment because of his sister
Deenie’s relationship with the master, Mr. Patton. Deenie understood
that her family faced negative repercussions if she denied the master
sexual access to her body, and consequently, she decided not to refuse
him. After all, Southern white men owned slave women as property,
and the law permitted them great latitude in the treatment of their
human property.8
Slave men were forced to endure this humiliation of knowing
that their masters and overseers could demand sexual access to their
partners and wives. They often stood by helplessly while their female
partners and daughters endured the unwanted attention of white men.
If male black slaves did attempt to interfere with the master’s
advances on slave women, they could be severely punished. Some
masters even castrated their black rivals for coveted black women.9
Slave wives often did have two competing intimate relationships –
with husbands and with masters. The ultimate authority in these
relationships rested solely with the white masters and overseers.10 If a
black male slave got in the way between the master and concubine, the
white master could simply separate the couple through sale. White
men were not going to allow inferior black males keep them from
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exercising their sexual urges, even if it meant severing family ties.
The master’s own personal ambitions mattered more than those of any
of his chattel.
Wives of slave masters also practiced miscegenation with
blacks. By choosing a slave lover, an elite white woman could coerce
the silence of her sexual partner because she could threaten him with
an accusation of rape should he refuse her advances or reveal their
relationship. Black male slaves accused of this crime were swiftly and
severely punished, often resulting in death. Sexual codes of the time
assumed that the concept of rape did not apply to men, especially not
black men, because all men “welcomed” the sexual advances of women
due to their instinctual, masculine nature. This standard failed to
This hardly
recognize white women as sexual aggressors.11
represents a paternalist relationship between female master and slave.
The female master, knowing that she could sexually exploit a black
male slave, demanded affection from her black victims unless they
wanted to suffer the consequences by refusing her. Once again, the
slave had no chance but to give into her demands so that he would not
lose his family or life.
Harriet Jacobs is an example of the sexual domination that
white slave owners attempted to exercise over their black female
slaves. Jacobs was a Louisianan slave owned by Dr. Flint. At the
tender age of eleven, and while being forty years her senior, Flint
began to sexually harass her. Jacobs viewed Dr. Flint as any other
white slave owner – he considered women of no value, unless they
continually increased his stock. When Harriet grew into adulthood,
she began to engage in a relationship with a black carpenter from
another plantation.12 Flint discovered her relationship with this man
and disallowed her from marrying him or even seeing him again. She
would end up becoming pregnant and delivered a baby boy, and Flint
flew into a rage over this. He threatened to sell her child if she did not
consent to his future sexual demands. Flint also threatened to shoot
the carpenter and made plans to build a cottage on the outskirts of
town to incorporate Harriet as his “permanent” concubine.13 Harriet
estimated that he already had eleven slave mistresses prior to her, and
he sent them away with their babies when his lechery turned
elsewhere.
His lewd lust became a lifelong obsession to bend her to his will
and to force her to submit voluntarily to his sexual demands. She
refused to become his “cottage concubine” and managed to escape
from his clutches when he handed her over to his son. Harriet did
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believe that humane slaveholders existed, but they were “like angel’s
visits – few and far between.”14 She did not feel comfortable in a
sexual relationship with her master, but he insisted that she persist in
one unless she wanted to see harm come to her and her loved ones.
Genovese states that for the masters, paternalism meant reciprocal
duties within which the master had a duty to provide for his people
and treat them with humanity. Also, it was the slave’s duty to work
properly and to do as they were told. Whites thought that slaves had
an obligation to be grateful.15 Dr. Flint took this idea and reworked it
to his liking. He wanted Harriet to perform sexual labors for him,
while completely giving into his power and being thankful for it at the
same time. Her refusal caused her to be separated from her family.
There was no understanding or common ground between Dr. Flint
and Harriet.
Genovese describes slavery as a paternalist system that saved
blacks from extermination. He states that “it gave the masters an
interest in the preservation of the blacks and created a bond of human
sympathy that led to an interest in their happiness as well.”16 He fails
to mention that the masters were only interested in the preservation
of “superior blacks” or mulattoes. Miscegenation between the white
master and mulatto slave was a common trend in the antebellum
South, and Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb of Georgia favored this
superior race as the result of their mixture of white and black blood.
He blamed miscegenation on the “natural lewdness” of blacks but
found the problem mitigated because race mixture was beneficial to
slavery. Light-skinned mistresses served as regular partners to
Southern whites, and quadroon balls were held in New Orleans where
gentlemen arranged liaisons with beautiful black slave women. In an
auction of “nigger wenches,” slave traders presented their sexual
victims as warranted virgins, excellent concubines and valuable for
the manufacture of light colored slaves. Slave masters preferred
mulattoes to darker blacks and provided them with better
opportunities in slavery and in freedom.17
Proprietors generally preferred mulattoes as house servants
and plantation tradesmen and gave them more opportunities to
acquire skills for these occupations than they gave darker slaves.
Masters chose mulattoes for household chores because, it was alleged,
the “mixed race” was more susceptible to improvement and could
handle tasks requiring higher capabilities. More often than darker
63.
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skinned bondsmen, mulattoes were provided some education, enjoyed
good food, clothing, and shelter, and had opportunities to move
around both inside and outside of the plantation. Sometimes they had
just as much authority as plantation managers. Mulattoes were major
beneficiaries of manumission. Masters usually granted them this
freedom because they did not want their own children to grow up in
bondage. Due to all of these advantages that mulattoes enjoyed, they
considered themselves superior to other slaves. This feeling of
superiority allowed mulattoes to associate with their masters on a
more personal level.18
However, slaveholder opinion remained divided about the
mulattoes’ potential role in a crisis. Some viewed their feelings of
superiority and independence as a dangerous sign, while others
believed that it would make them loyal and trusted friends of the
white man. The latter believed that the failure of Denmark Vesey’s
conspiracy of 1822 showed the truth of this expectation because
mulatto servants reported to their masters the plans for revolt before
they could be put into action.19 Mulattoes and masters seemed to be
more capable of paternal bonds because the masters treated mulattoes
like human beings rather than heathen barbarians. This relationship
also shows that masters did favor a certain sect of slaves over another;
The sect that more closely resembled themselves rather than the
“unknown” purebloods. Therefore, paternalism was an ideology that
justified the better treatment of one people over another, although
both peoples were “black.”
Slavery was a ruthless system of controls designed with
deliberate intent to employ any form of degradation considered helpful
in exploiting slave labor for profit. As evidenced by the mastermulatto relationship, castes were maintained among slaves and
espionage was rewarded to divide slaves against slaves to support
white control.20 However, slaves struggled fiercely against this
growing power of the master class and their determination to reduce
black people to labor and little more. They created new economies
and societies that tried to protect themselves from the harshest
aspects of the slave regime and provide a measure of independence to
counter the trauma of enslavement. This trauma was a result of the
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atrocities of slave life: towering rates of mortality, endless work, and
the omnipresent violence of white masters and overseers.21
The vision of the natural inferiority of peoples of African
descent became a mainstay of the defense of slavery and certain proof
that the proper and most humane place for black people was under the
The paternalistic
watchful supervision of a white master.22
compromise, as Genovese described it, implied a basic agreement
between master and slave. Slaves thought that they were entitled to
sufficient autonomy within slavery to fashion their own lives and that
masters would respect this arrangement because slaves would hold
them to it.23 The problem with this theory is that slaves were not able
to resist or rebel against white oppressors, who always worked to
constrain slave autonomy. Slaves had no one to appeal to except the
masters or overseers, and masters would not be told by their slaves
how to manage their chattel.
From the mainstream masters’ perspective, slaves were
property that had no control over their own possessions because all of
their things actually belonged to their white masters. Family
formation and child rearing were business matters to be handled by
whites. Masters and slave mothers usually argued over how to care
for the children in these families. At Rosswood plantation near
Natchez, Mississippi, the owner, Dr. Walter Wade, who fancied
himself an expert on the care of newborns, always blamed mothers
when children died of starvation (the mother failed to provide
sufficient milk) or suffocation (the careless mother rolled over the
child asleep at her side). Former slave Fannie Nicholson related how
her cousin’s child was treated by the master, recalling “One day my
cousin’s marster didn’ want to feed her chile, and when de chile kep’
on asking for food, her marster beat her and tied her up in de attic and
de chile died. ‘Cause of disawful thing my cousin went crazy.”24
Slaveholders, such as South Carolinian politician James Henry
Hammond, viewed these deaths as “the deliberate design of heaven to
prevent me from accumulating wealth and to keep down that pride

21Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in
North America (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
1998), 215-217.
22Ibid., 363-365.
23Christopher Morris, “The Articulation of Two Worlds: The MasterSlave Relationship Reconsidered,” The Journal of American History 85, No. 3
(Dec., 1998), 982-983.
24Charles L. Perdue Jr., Thomas E. Barden, and Robert K. Phillips, eds.
Weevils in the Wheat: Interviews with Virginia Ex-Slaves (Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1980), 217.
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which might in such an event fill my heart.”25 White attitudes similar
to these did cause the blood to boil in some blacks, and these
individuals defied white authority as much as they could without being
killed. The endless cycle of work with no freedom in sight was too
much to bear for these rebels.
Many planters were psychotically possessive in regards to their
human property in this slave economy.26 Paternalism not only spared
these planters from having to justify an oppressive system of force,
intimidation, and ceaseless struggle, but it cast all responsibility for
that reality elsewhere. They wanted slaves to look at them as allknowing, all merciful, and all-powerful, and they bombarded slaves
with words and deeds telling them that they sprang from savages and
could be nothing but slaves. They treated the slaves inhumanely, and
almost all slaves concealed a burning indignation against their
enslavement and the illegitimacy of those whose authority was rooted
in it.27 They did not cooperate with each other in order to provide
protection, rather they looked to defy each other by any means
possible. Genovese recognizes that this system of exploitation
encouraged kindness and affection for mulattoes while also
encouraging cruelty and hatred for purebloods.28
Paternalism was a way of life that, in the words of Genovese,
“necessarily involves harshness and may even involve cruelty so long
as it is within the context of a strong sense of duty and responsibility
toward those in dependent status.” Herbert Gutman thinks that
Genovese has utilized little evidence to prove “that the typical slave
viewed himself or herself as bound in an ‘organic’ relationship” in
which they depended on their masters for support. He concludes that
Genovese has not shown how slaves either benefited from the
ideology of paternalism or acceded to these “mutual obligations” that
were necessary for the unpractical system to operate.29 Paternalism
was an ideal system in which slaves were to be treated fairly and as
human beings, and the way that the majority of masters treated their
slaves does not reflect this mindset.
Masters exerted their superiority over their slaves through
physical and psychological means. They whipped slaves for various
and often-insignificant reasons, branded them to reaffirm their
25Christopher Morris, “The Articulation of Two Worlds: The MasterSlave Relationship Reconsidered,” 990-994.
26Norrece T. Jones Jr., Born a Child of Freedom, Yet a Slave: Mechanisms
of Control and Strategies of Resistance in Antebellum South Carolina, 45.
27Ibid., 19-28.
28Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made, 4-5.
29John and Judith Modell, Book review of Herbert G. Gutman’s The
Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925, Signs 4, No. 2 (Winter, 1978),
380-381.
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domination over them, and sometimes had their ears cut off if they
disobeyed direct orders. Slaveholders also constantly looked for ways
to trim the costs of feeding their slaves and threatened to sell them if
they did not produce enough for their masters. As mentioned earlier,
the slave family was not only at the base of masters’ most effective
control mechanism, but it was also the source of their most persistent
aggravation of the runaway. Owners also awarded slaves sporadic
holidays so that they could effectively pacify and control the slaves for
a little longer.30
Slaves felt the wrath of their owners because the owners were
unhappy, intoxicated, or just in the mood to abuse their property.
These acts of brutality became much easier once the masters ceased to
identify or empathize with blacks and began to regard them as
“subhuman beings.” This subhuman status of black slaves allowed
slaveholders to resort to curtailment or the complete denial of food
allotments as punishment for “unproductive” slaves. Masters also
pierced their slaves with forks, burned them with tar, skinned them
with knives, and killed them outright with pistols and whips. Many
more graphic accounts of slave brutality are available to us through
slave accounts. In his memoirs, Horace Muse illustrated the
thoughtless sadistic master class, claiming, “I ‘member a marser in
Ashland, Virginia what backed one o’ his slaves in a barn an’ shot an’
stabbed him to death ‘cause he said de slaves was ‘jarrin’ at him.’”31
An unidentified former slave in Georgia said that his master
“had a barrel with nails shove in it that he would put in when he
couldn’t think of nothin’ else mean enough to do. He would put you in
this barrel and roll it down a hill. When you got out you would be in
a bad fix, be he didn’t care. Sometimes he rolled the barrel in the river
and drowned his slaves.”32 Punishments such as this hammered black
slaves with the reality that they were a despised race, oppressed for
their skin color. They dealt with the world on those terms, thus
further underlining the gap between master and slave. Rejected by
white society, blacks rejected white judgments in turn and developed
their own moral system and mental world in opposition to the
master’s.33
Solomon Northup recorded his terrible experiences after his
servitude. Tibeats, an overseer, was constantly abusing him for menial
offenses. He even attempted to split open Solomon’s head with a
30Norrece
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hatchet and then axe because he falsely accused him of ruining a crop,
which Solomon claimed he did not do. Solomon’s future owner,
master Epps, treated his slaves far worse. His chief delight was in
dancing with his “niggers,” or lashing them around the yard with his
long and heavy whip, simply for the pleasure of hearing them screech
and scream as the great welts were planted on their backs.34 Recalling
these pitiful festivities, Solomon recorded being “bent with excessive
toil – actually suffering for a little refreshing rest, and feeling rather as
if we could cast ourselves upon the earth and weep, many a night in
the house of Edwin Epps have his unhappy slaves been made to dance
and laugh.”35
Epps did not care one bit that his slaves were made to suffer
under his ownership, and no one knew this any better than Solomon.
He claimes his master “could have stood unmoved and seen the
tongues of his poor slaves torn out by the roots – he could have seen
them burned to ashes over a slow fire, or gnawed to death by dogs, if
it only brought him profit. Such a hard, cruel, unjust man is Edwin
Epps.”36 Obviously, Northup did not encounter any notions of
paternalism from his various masters. He constantly lived in fear for
his own life and viewed whites as evil human beings bent on greed and
power.
Charles Ball lived forty years in Maryland, South Carolina, and
Georgia as a slave under various masters. One of his masters tied him
with a clothesline to a mill post and left him there overnight. The
cord was bound so tightly around his wrists, that before morning the
blood had burst out under his fingernails.37 Under another master,
Charles was falsely accused of murdering a white woman. The master
brought a doctor onto the plantation to examine Charles. The doctor
assorted his instruments, felt Charles’ pulse, and told him that it
would not do to skin him since he was so full of blood. Instead, the
doctor thought it was necessary to bleed Charles in the arms, as to
reduce the quantity of blood before taking his skin off. He then bound
a string around Charles’ right arm, and opened a vein near the middle
of the arm.38 He bled until he lost consciousness, but he was not
skinned after all.
Charles recalled other incidents that he witnessed as a slave.
One slave was whipped until he crumpled to the ground. A heavy
34Solomon Northup, Twelve Years a Slave (Louisiana State University
Press, Baton Rouge, 1968), 111-122.
35Ibid., 137.
36Ibid., 139.
37Charles Ball, Slavery in the United States. A narrative of the life and
adventures of Charles Ball, a black man, who lived forty years in Maryland, South
Carolina, and Georgia, as a slave… (J.T. Shryock, Pittsburgh, 1854), 93.
38Ibid., 193-195.

40

block of wood was chained to one foot, which he had to drag after him
at his daily labor for more than three months. This slave escaped to
the woods by cutting the irons from his ankle, but he was caught
about a week later. He was whipped again and had an iron collar
placed on him, which extended from one shoulder over his head to the
other, with the bells fastened to the top of the arch.39 One master was
murdered by one of his own slaves, a black woman, whose husband he
had sold to a man who was going to New Orleans. The woman
accomplished her task by sneaking into the master’s chamber through
the window, and then cutting his throat with a carving knife. Two
murder convicts were hung together, and another slave who
attempted to conceal the murder of his master received five hundred
lashes. This slave was tied to a tree and whipped until blood flowed
down in small puddles at the base of the tree. Charles saw flakes of
flesh as long as his fingernails fall out of the gashes in the slave’s
Charles’ experiences with masters also suggest that
back.40
paternalism was simply an ideology that did not reach fruition in the
antebellum South.
J.S. Lame was a slave in the South as well, and his reflections on
the institution mirror that of Northup and Ball. His master starved
his slaves and punished them most severely for crimes both real and
imaginary. Genovese’s paternalism maintains thatslaves ate more
than most other laborers. He acknowledges that starvation did occur
with the slaves but was infrequent.41 One imaginary crime involved a
few missing chickens at the master’s home, which was attributed to
the theft of one of his slaves. The slave “lied” about the theft, and the
master proceeded to place one end of a rope around his neck. He then
fastened the other end to his carriage and dragged him along the
roads surrounding the plantation. Lame “needed no works of fiction
to illustrate the evils of slavery.” They were seen in the social, civil,
spiritual, and mental degradation of the blacks, and in its
corresponding influence on the whites.42
Edmund Covington was a Mississippi slaveholder who
represented these evils of slavery. He minimized expenditures on food
and health care and increased work loads of female and child laborers
to the point of exhaustion. Slave families that lived on his land lost
nearly ninety percent of all children born on the plantation, a
39Ibid.,
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horrendously high rate of child mortality even for a coastal rice
plantation in Mississippi.43 He simply replaced dead slaves with new
property in order to maintain high levels of production. Slavery was a
purely economic matter to him, and if killing a few dozen slaves meant
saving a few dollars, he would gladly accept this fate.
Jermain Wesley Loguen attributed the cruelties of his white
masters to evil temptations instead of their natural wickedness. His
masters and their mistresses were made beasts of as a result of the
whiskey from their distilleries. They were endurable while sober for
the most part because the slaves knew how to perceive them and how
they could and could not act around them. Loguen’s master and
mistress were always intoxicated though, and the slaves sensed that
they were never safe in the presence of their white superiors. They
became very short-tempered, intolerant, and physically violent toward
their chattel. Loguen thus viewed slaveholders as licentious and
intemperate, or in “kindred evils.” Their “sensuous spirits looked
downward to the earth, where they held their human chattels only as
instruments of their pleasures, and neverupwards to the heavens.”44
The white superiors treated the slaves as wild animals because they
felt that they had the right to do so, and the spirits enabled the
masters to exercise this power without blame. Loguen believed that
the only way to live through a life of servitude under a white master
was to resort to “trickery,” or pretending to be content with his
bondage.45
The concerned efforts of Southerners to hide these less
attractive features of their slave society caused an almost total
censorship of information in local publications about the more hideous
aspects of slavery.46 This makes Genovese’s argument for the practice
of paternalism that much more doubtful, simply because there are so
few sources besides slave narratives to rely upon for accurate details of
slavery. He argues that sinister treatment by cruel masters was in the
minority, but we simply do not know to what extent this cruelty was
practiced. The narratives that are available to us though make clear
that slaves were not “pitiful infants but angry men and women who
had to endure unfavorable conditions that were not in their power to

43Christopher Morris, “The Articulation of Two Worlds: The MasterSlave Relationship Reconsidered,” 982.
44Jermain Wesley Loguen, The Rev. J.W. Loguen, as a slave and as a
freemen: A narrative of real life (Syracuse, J.G.K. Truair & Co. (printers), 1859),
102-104.
45Ibid., 253.
46Norrece T. Jones Jr., Born a Child of Freedom, Yet a Slave: Mechanisms
of Control and Strategies of Resistance in Antebellum South Carolina, 74-88.
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change. They retained their self-respect and sense of justice and hated
the master for his cruelty toward them.”47
Many slaves resisted the authority of their masters through
violent and nonviolent means. Genovese mentions this resistance, but
he focuses more on the occasional, organized slave rebellions rather
than the everyday acts of resistance. Feigned illnesses were
widespread, and this allowed the slaves to get out of work for a day if
they were able to successfully fool the overseers. Others stole from
their masters as often as possible simply to resist complete control.
Arthur Greene shifted the blame of stealing from the slave to the
master class, claiming “White folks certainly taught niggers to steal.
If dey had give ‘em nough to eat dey wouldn’ have no cause to steal.”48
Slaves also participated in work slowdowns on a large scale in an
attempt to hinder the master’s economic gains. A small percentage of
bondsmen helped fugitive slaves escape and sneak across the
countryside. Arson and poisonings were more lethal objections to the
master’s authority. These acts were mostly committed by domestic
servants since they personally prepared the master’s family’s meals.
These frequent acts of resistance helped spread a sense of moral and
spiritual autonomy among the slaves – something that paternalism
failed to do because it was not practiced by many Southern
slaveholders.
The most fractious and courageous bondsmen were removed
from the slave quarters by sales and voluntary departures, and this
greatly depleted the human resources for antebellum rebellions. The
fear of betrayals by other slaves also played a very influential role in
minimizing revolutionary activity. The infrequency of mass rebellion
allowed slaveholders to hold firmly onto their ideology of paternalism.
However, masters only behaved paternally toward their “perfect”
black slaves. These were slaves who produced greatly for their
masters and peaceably lived their lives in servitude. Patriarchs
thought nothing of destroying kinship ties when “forced” to sell those
who had breached the “contract.” They were more concerned with the
loss of valuable laborers than with the dissolution of any paternal
bonds when a chattel died.49 This reinforces the suggestion that
paternalism was more of an ideology than an actual practice in the
antebellum South.
Disdain of masters as a whole often inspired a complete distrust
of whites in general. Slaves instructed their youngest offspring to

view masters as evil and powerful adversaries with whom they should
have as little contact with as possible. Some masters were liked more
than others, but slaves rarely allowed any kindness or humoring to
blur the reality that the principal objective and motive of planters was
to enrich their own pockets and their power at the complete and utter
expense of slave labor. The grapevine and personal observation
taught the slaves that all planters, however “different,” were potential
sadists capable of unleashing barbaric rage whenever they chose to do
so.50 Former slave Robert Ellet shared in this disgust of the white
race, especially the master Class, recalling “The overseers was white
and of the lowest grade. The slave always hated them.”51
Some slaves did want to use “friendly” whites to secure pardons
or milder punishments for stealing. Genovese says that such appeals
by servants “strengthened the doctrine of paternalism among the
whites as well as among themselves.” This type of situation is as close
to paternalism as slavery represented. Slaves considered bondage an
evil that would cause the damnation of anyone who advocated or
supported it. Bondsmen knew that the possibility of freedom depended
on their correct behavior and that only faithful and “deserving” slaves
would be rewarded, therefore the prospect of liberation became an
effective mechanism of control in itself. The small minority of
pureblooded slaves who consummated paternalistic bonds came about
exclusively from the top of the domestic hierarchy: mammies, butlers,
and lady servants. These slaves knew it was in their best interests to
wear masks of loyalty and docility so that they could live favorably
above the standards of field hands and other outdoor manual
laborers.52
Genovese asserts that paternalism demanded protection for
blacks “in a strange and hostile white world.”53 The problem is that
blacks were not offered this protection at all because they were the
everyday victims of white cruelty and exploitation. Genovese believes
that paternalism insisted upon “mutual obligations – duties,
responsibilities, and ultimately even rights – which implicitly
recognized the slave’s humanity.”54 Slaves had little to no rights
under their white masters, and their superiors viewed them as
property to be controlled in every aspect of their lives. There was not
much compromise or affection between master or slave either, and the
two groups could not have been more socially fragmented from each
50Ibid.,
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KOREAN COMFORT WOMEN

other. Paternalism was simply an ideal that allowed slaveholders to
justify the exploitation of blacks in bondage. Genovese’s description
of the ideal is accurate in a few different areas. However, I have not
been able to find many existing examples of it in the slave narratives.
Paternalism was not the reason that slaves and masters coexisted; the
slaves had no legal identities, few social connections, and relatively no
organized resistance movements due to the support of slavery in the
South. They had no means to end their oppression to the “superior”
white race; they were forced to live in bondage or to die resisting it.

Krishna Ignalaga
Whenever I think of the events of the past or talk about
them, I get headaches and am unable to sleep for many
nights. Even if I cry aloud, I don’t think I can feel
relieved. My anger has become a kind of disease. It
shoots through me, and even in the depths of winter, I
can only sleep with my door open.1
The plight of the comfort woman is of vital importance in
discussing sexual violence in Asia. Brought to attention almost five
decades after the end of World War II, the story of comfort women is
a sad reflection of women’s rights in Asia. The extent of Japaneseinflicted destruction and atrocities in Southeast Asia need not and
cannot be repeated within the scope of this essay. However, it is
integral to examine the issue of comfort women within the context of
World War II, prior Japanese settlement of Korea and the Greater
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
Indeed, the concerns involved in the comfort women issue stir
up the question of military prostitution, transforming into one of
sexual slavery based on race, class and ultimately, gender. While one
cannot precisely determine the number of women forced into
“voluntary” labor corps, the numbers range from 80,000 to almost
200,000 women, approximately eighty percent of whom where
Korean.2 With the sheer velocity of women subjugated into these
corps, it is no wonder that there was both controversy and hesitancy
on the part of the Japanese government to admit guilt. Accordingly,
repatriations and even formal apologies from the Japanese
government have been withheld, an issue that has created much
antagonism with neighboring Asian countries. Indeed, the view taken
throughout Asia is that unless and until Japan seeks responsibility for
all its atrocities, including sexual crimes against women in what were
then its colonies, Japan will continue to lose its credibility.
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The purpose of this paper is to deepen understanding of the
complex issues surrounding comfort women by concentrating on who
these women were, why Koreans were a vast majority and why
women were used for comfort.
Who Were The Comfort Women?
While official military documents on the recruitment and
retention of comfort women during World War II have long since
been destroyed, much research on the issue has hinged on the
testimonies of aging comfort women hailing from Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia, and the Philippines. Perhaps one of the most disturbing
features of this phenomenon is the serious and systematic involvement
of the Japanese military in the testimonies of comfort women. Indeed,
to prevent public criticism of atrocities, such as the Rape of Nanjing,
where Japanese soldiers raped and murdered tens of thousands of
Chinese women, and to combat the spread of venereal disease,
Japanese military leadership called for the institution of military
comfort stations.
Nationalities, age, class, marital status and methods of
recruitment do not seem incredibly varied among surviving women’s
testimonies. It is generally accepted that eighty to ninety percent of
comfort women were Korean, primarily because Korea was a colony of
Japan and because Koreans were considered racially inferior. Health
documents by Aso Tetsuo, a former military surgeon stationed at a
comfort station in Shanghai in 1939, illustrates that most comfort
women were in fact Korean.3 Another important factor in this issue is
the relative youth of many women and girls recruited as comfort
women. While the legal age for prostitution in Japan was eighteen and
for Korea seventeen,4 there appears to have been no age restrictions
for comfort women. Some were reported to have been as young as
eleven. Indeed, Howard states that considerably younger girls were
preferred by the Japanese soldiers because Japanese women that were
recruited likely had been prostitutes before the war. Yet another
interesting perspective is how most of the comfort women came from
poor farming communities, with very little, if any, formal education.
As such, the Japanese government has been duly criticized as it
appeared that the government systematically took comfort women

3 Aso Tetsuo, Karyubyo Sekkyokuteki Yoboho [Positive Methods to
Prevent Venereal Disease] (26 June 1939); Cited in Keith Howard, True
Stories of the Korean Comfort Women, (London: Biddles Ltd., 1995), 16.
4 Yamasida Yongae, Han’guk Kundae Kongch’ang Chedo Shilshi-e
Kwanhan Yon’gu [A Study on the System of State Regulated Prostitution in
Modern Korea], (MA dissertation, Seoul: Ewha Women’s University, 1991);
Cited in Howard, True Stories of the Korean Comfort Women, 17.
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from the poorer classes, with no real voice, in order to minimize public
criticism of such practices.
Why Were So Many Comfort Women Korean?
According to Pyong Gap Min, the victimization of Korean
comfort women had three major components: first, their forced
recruitment into sexual slavery; second, their suffering inside comfort
stations and finally, their decades-long silence.5 In 1905, Korea
became a protectorate of Japan, and by 1910 Korea was annexed by
Japan.
This simultaneously ended diplomatic ties with other
countries, remaining this way until Japan’s defeat in 1945. In the end,
Korea exported not only rice, other agricultural products, minerals
and laborers, but also thousands of young, unmarried Korean women
to satisfy the Japanese war machine.
Min adds that colonial power and racial prejudice intertwined
with gender relations in this mobilization of Korean women to
Japanese military brothels.6 Indeed, for sheer convenience, it was
considerably easier to draft and transport Korean women for sexual
service because of Japan’s imperial dominance. Varying methods of
recruitment were used, such as abduction, coercion and false promises
of employment. As colonial subjects, the Korean people were governed
exclusively by Japanese officials and military police. At the same time,
with so much agricultural produce being shipped to the Japanese
motherland, many rural communities were willing to let their
daughters go abroad for more lucrative employment.7 The issue of
racial prejudice is also highlighted in the fact that the only military
tribunal after the war concerning sexual abuse of comfort women took
place in Jakarta, Indonesia in 1948, wherein thirty-five Dutch women
were repatriated.8
Various testimonies from aging comfort women state that it
was their powerlessness as young girls in a colonized state to be the
reason for their mistreatment. Park Ok-Sun, for example, expressed
her anger at the Korean government, saying:
We were taken to the military brothel by the Japanese
military mainly because our country, colonized by Japan,
was not strong enough to protect us. Therefore, this is
5 Pyong Gap Min, “Korean ‘Comfort Women’: The Intersection of
Colonial Power, Gender and Class,” Gender & Society 17 no. 6 (December
2003), 942.
6 Min, “The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class,” 944.
7 Ibid., 945.
8 Jan Ruff-O’Herne, “The Forgotten Ones,” Interview by Caroline
Jones (ABC, 20 August 2001) Australian Story; Accessed September 2005 at
http://www.abc.net.au/austory/archives/2001/AusStoryArchive2001Idx_Th
ursday30August2001.htm.
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not our individual problem, but our nation’s problem.
Until the Japanese government resolves the Jungshindae9
issue, it cannot have normal relations with Korea. The
Korean government should put pressure on the Japanese
government to acknowledge the crime and compensate
the victims.10
Why Were Women Used For Comfort?
Wartime exploitation of women for sexual services has been
part of wartime tradition for a long period of time, even before
Japanese institution of comfort women. Indeed, in the context of
combat and uniform, battlefields have been described as one of the
most stressful environments, as ‘temporary derangements’ as one
Japanese Army medical officer has said.11 While not condoning the
blatant abuse of women for sexual services during wartime, more or
less institutionalized means of catering to this sexual need have been
found for various armies in history. The Roman Empire, for example,
had a comfort system similar to that of the Japanese. A proponent of
institutionalized slavery, the Romans instituted a system wherein
captive females were made slaves for military brothels attached to
every Roman garrison or campaigning army.12 During the 16th
century, the Spanish Duke of Alva’s army, when invading the
Netherlands with the Armada, was followed by ‘400 mounted whores
and 800 on foot.’13 The British Empire was by no means immune to
this phenomenon. With a prostitutes’ quarter attached to each
cantonment,14 military prostitution was at first an official policy, later
to be rescinded in favor of a more fluid policy based on voluntary
participation.
In feudal Japan, prostitution was quite open, making infamous
the pleasure districts of Kyoto, Osaka and Tokyo. Indeed, Edo (as
Tokyo was then called) was epitomized as ‘the nightless city.’15
Accordingly, sexual superstitions, a dominant feature of culture,
pervaded the military along with death and suffering superstitions.
Advocating the belief that sex before going into battle worked as a
charm against injury, the Japanese ritualized the practice of visiting
comfort women, especially before a unit was to leave for the front.
Korean term for military sexual slavery.
Min, “The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class,” 945.
11 George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced
Prostitution in the Second World War, (New York: W.W Norton & Company,
1994), 28.
12 Ibid., 29.
13 Ibid.
14 A distinct settlement of the Indian Army.
15 Ibid., 28.

Amulets would be made with the pubic hair of comfort women, or
from something taken from them. Kim Il Myon, although critical of
Japanese militarism, highlights the plight of the armed forces, saying,
“To soldiers in the frontline, ever surrounded by the sound of guns,
wrapped in smoke stinking of death and not knowing when death
come… a visit to a comfort station was no doubt the only form of
relief. It was the only kind of individual act in which one was
‘liberated’…. It was their ‘oasis.’”16
The Decades Long Silence and the Movement for Redress
Although factors such as the destruction of official documents
and the understandable reluctance of surviving comfort women to
bring up memories of the past contributed to the five-decade long
silence, another factor is also quite important. Indeed, the cultural
legacy of a patriarchal society is a major player in this silence. Soh
states that in the traditional Korean patriarchy, sexual freedom for
men was enthusiastically encouraged, whereas women’s sexuality was
rigidly controlled.17 As such, comfort women returning from the
enclaves of Japanese military brothels were often ostracized by family
and friends, a huge detriment in a society where family kinship is
integral to one’s place in the society. At the same time, it is interesting
to note that one of the Dutch women in Indonesia was deemed unfit to
be a nun because she had been forced to be a comfort woman.18
Within this cultural legacy, it is not surprising to note that
many comfort women actually committed suicide, or were adamant
about keeping their shame to themselves, at least until 1991, when
Kim Hak-Sun came forward to testify her life as a comfort woman.19
So all encompassing was this silence that the international community
came to hear about militarized sexual slavery only when a class action
suit was filed against the Japanese government, demanding
compensation for this gross violation of human rights, and primarily,
women’s rights. Perhaps the most contentious issue in both South
Korea and Japan involving comfort women has been the official role
and responsibility of the Japanese government during this time period.
Indeed, Japan did not admit its involvement in the recruitment,
management and supervision of comfort stations until mid-1992.20
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While the movement for redress and compensation cannot fit
within the scope of this paper, it is highly interesting to note that the
debate on comfort women has come at a time when women’s rights are
slowly but surely gaining momentum in the patriarchal societies of
Asia, creating not only an awareness of women’s rights but also one of
true pan-Asianism. Whereas nationalism has at times played a
detrimental role in the movement for redress, feminist activists have
been able to forge international coalitions across Japan, Korea,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to help
bring this movement to the forefront. In 1995, for example, the Asian
Women’s Solidarity Forum held its conference in Seoul, adopting a
resolution to denounce the intention to forego responsibility by
allowing Japan to pay indemnities from nongovernmental funds.21 Yet
another example is the vast representation of these countries at the
U.N World Conference on Women in Beijing in September 1995,22 as
well as various war crime mock-trials spearheaded by many feminist
organizations in Japan and Korea.
Conclusion
While it has taken five decades to interrupt the silence, it has
also taken the rise of feminism among Asian women to bring the
comfort women to the forefront of women’s rights. There is a
substantive link between wartime exploitation of women and
patriarchal societies, as Asian politics and governments are still
overwhelmingly dominated by males. But then again, fate is never
destiny. Indeed, the Korean comfort women movement for redress can
be seen as a victory for feminist political activism. It is integral to see
this issue as part of the universal moral issue of human rights, along
with sex tourism in various parts of Asia and rape during wars, such
as in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, and more recently, Liberia.
Alongside infamous atrocities, it is unlikely that this issue of
comfort women will be easily forgotten. Until and unless Japan
completely announces its responsibility for the institution of comfort
women, it will continue to lose its credibility as a major advocate of
human rights. At the same time, it is integral to note that while Japan
created a systematic institution for militarized prostitution, the Allies
also failed to address the concerns of comfort women at the end of the
war. While addressing this issue will never bring back lost years, it
must be emphasized that continuous work in the fields of feminism
and humanitarianism is required in order to promote global
egalitarianism and prevent the spread of various forms of violence
against women. The need to address global issues relating to women
is not just good politics; it is a fundamental right.
21
22
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MASSACRE AT TLATELOLCO
Lauren Berggren
Mexico in 1968, much like in many other countries throughout
the world, experienced a student movement to demand political and
social changes. Although this was not the first time students in
Mexico had initiated protests, the events that took place at Tlatelolco
became a tragedy in Mexican history. The movement officially began
on July 22, 1968 and lasted only a few months until the massacre at
Tlatelolco on October 2, 1968. The casualty estimates in the massacre
range from around twenty or forty nine, as government accounts
suggest, to well over seven hundred.1 The movement succeeded in
uniting people and bringing political discussions into the public to
attack “the one party system that had ruled Mexico for over forty
years.”2 Even though the government ended the student movement in
October through the use of extreme violence, the students left a legacy
that is still felt today.
The student movement came about in a political climate that
was dominated by the Partido Institucional de la Revolución Mexicana
(Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), which had come to power in
the 1940s.3 The party saw itself as the embodiment of the Mexican
Revolution.4 One of the characteristics and criticisms of this party has
to do with the Cardenista myth.5 The key was to maintain the façade
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of the president being “the personification of a perpetually strong,
progressive state,” 6 and there was also an emphasis on modernization
and economic growth. But, during the last few years of the presidency
of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) the myth of the strong executive
branch of the government began to be criticized. The student
movement in Mexico City showed the weakness of the Mexican state.
The only response the government had for the students was violence
and repression, displaying the flaws in their political system.
It was not the first time that students in Mexico had
organized and protested. The difference was that in the past the
students’ demands and protests related directly to school issues.
Students demanded “easier exams, higher grades, or the removal of an
unpopular administrator,”7but those were not the goals of the students
in 1968. The Mexican government was quick to accuse the students of
subversion. Rather than see the students’ critique of the political
system as valid, the government chose to point the blame at
communist groups, foreign influence, or anyone else who wanted “to
embarrass Mexico before the world.” 8
The student movement coincided with the 1968 Olympics,
held in Mexico City. For those in the government, this was an
opportunity to show the world how much Mexico had developed and
that the Mexican Revolution was a success.9 This put a lot of pressure
on the government to make sure that there were no problems while
they had the attention of the entire international community. Mexico
invested 140 million dollars in preparing for the Olympics. The
government constructed high-rise apartment buildings, hotels, a
transportation system, and a stadium with murals by the famous
Mexican painter, Diego Rivera.10 All of these projects were supposed
to show that Mexico was a modern, “stable, and democratic” nation. 11
The student protests and the way the government dealt with them
portrayed a different Mexico.
Early in 1968, there were no apparent problems with the
students. It seemed like the country came together in order to make
the Olympics a success. There were no anti-war protests like in Paris
and the United States and no incidents like at the Democratic
National Convention in Chicago in 1968. Student and government
relations had remained fairly peaceful. Soon that changed, relatively
quickly.

Erfani, The Paradox of the Mexican State, 57.
Mabry, The Mexican University and the State, 247.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices, 11, 37.
11 Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices, 37.
6
7

53

The Mexican generation that came of age in the 1960s had been
influenced by a variety of sources. They had witnessed the Cuban
Revolution, the rise of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara and even the
Mexican labor disputes in the 1950s and 1960s.12 Also, unlike the
demonstrations of the past, the student participants were middle
class.13
The problems began on July 22, 1968. It was a conflict between
groups of students from rival schools that was eventually joined by
street gangs.14 The conflict flowed over into the next few days. The
conflict itself did not start the protests, but rather the way the police
reacted to this conflict. The protests began after the government sent
in their riot police, known as the granaderos.
The granaderos went after any student that they saw in the area,
whether or not they were involved in the conflict. There were also
reports of the students fleeing to avoid the violence, only to be
pursued by the granaderos.15 During these events, students were jailed
and tortured.16
As was expected, there were discrepancies between government
and eyewitness accounts. The government claimed that the students’
violence was what caused them to call in the granaderos. This story
made it easy for the government to defame the students. The
eyewitness accounts, which were not reported in the papers, described
a scene in which the granaderos were provoking violence and “looting
and breaking windows.”17
One of the main student groups at this time was the Federación
Nacional de Estudiantes Técnicos (National Federation of Technical
Students, FNET). Following the first few days of violence, FNET
organized a peaceful protest march on July 26, 1968. They wanted to
protest the use of violence against the students and the efforts of the
government to make the students look bad. Even though the march
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was legal and peaceful, the police were called in and violence ensued.18
This set the tone for the rest of the movement. The protesters
intended to have peaceful demonstrations, but they were met with
police violence. This police violence helped bring the movement
together and resulted in students responding with militancy.
While FNET was mainly protesting the use of police violence,
other student groups were participating on more ideological grounds.
Students from Central Nacional de Estudiantes Democráticos (National
Center of Democratic Students, CNED) and Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México (National Autonomous University of Mexico,
UNAM) were being criticized by the government for being too
politically liberal. Some in the government referred to these groups as
communists.19 However, the government did not stop at simply
harassing students. On July 26, the day of the protest, the police
invaded the Communist Party headquarters and arrested Eduardo de
la Vega Ávila and other members of the party, who were referred to as
the “76 red agitators” in the newspapers. 20 The government
continued to justify their actions by asserting that the communists and
other students did pose a threat to the government.
The students responded by going on strike, and the members of
UNAM and Instituto Politécnico Nacional (National Polytechnic
Institute, IPN) created a list of demands. The list included the release
of the students that had been arrested, disbandment of the granaderos,
and compensation for students and families of students who had been
injured.21 None of these demands were met. The government refused
to negotiate and violence continued into August.
The next major step in the student movement was the creation
of a new student organization that would represent all the schools in
the country.22 The organization was the Consejo Nacional de Helga
(National Strike Council, CNH). They had a six-point petition, which
outlined the demands of the students:
1. Liberty for political prisoners
2. Dismissal of [police chiefs] Generals Luis Cueto Ramírez
and Raúl Mendiolea, and Lt. Colonel Armando Frías
3. Abolition of the granaderos corps, direct instrument of
repression, and prohibition of the creation of a similar corps
18 Elena Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, translated by Helen R. Lane
(New York: Viking Press, 1975), 325-6; Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices, 41.
19 Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices, 42.
20 Ibid., 43, 205 n. 21.
21 Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, 326.
22 The groups that were included were UNAM, the IPN, the Normal
Schools, the College of Mexico, the Chapingo School of Agriculture, the
Iberoamerican University, the Lasalle University, and the national
universities in the provinces. Ibid., 328.
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4. Abolition of Articles 145 and 145 bis of the Penal Code,
judicial instruments of aggression
5. Indemnification of the families of the dead and injured who
had been victims of the aggression since July 26
6. Clarification of the responsibility of officials for the acts of
repression and vandalism committed by the police, granaderos,
and army23
Just as before, the government was unwilling to negotiate. The
government believed that it could not have met any of the demands
without appearing to have lost control. This would then lead to more
requests.24 Even though the demands of CNH were very specific, there
was a greater goal of the movement. By demanding rights and
attempting to hold the government responsible for its actions, they
were calling for a true democracy in Mexico.
Since the government did not respond to the demands, the
students continued with mass demonstrations, winning the support of
professors and other intellectual groups. One of the more successful
actions of the CNH was its use of brigades. Brigades were small
groups within the organization that printed flyers, made speeches, and
helped rally popular support for their cause. Each brigade “went far
beyond the aims and policies of the CNH.”25 Michael Soldatenko
stated that “the key was not the leaders or organizations but the
actions of thousands of students that educated and incorporated
increasing numbers of Mexicans.” 26 Women played a large role in this
aspect of CNH.27 This method of using participatory democracy to try
and reform the political system was the strongest strategy of the
CNH.
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The period from August 13 to August 27 has been recognized
as “the Golden Age of the Movement.”28 Marches taking place on
these two dates to the Zócolo29 were among the largest and “most
festive.”30 The scene that Elena Poniatowska and Michael Soldatenko
describe resembles that of a festival. They describe the atmosphere as
optimistic; the students believed they had already made some impact
on the political system and society. The students thought President
Díaz Ordaz could not refuse to open dialogue between the opposing
factions.31 The demonstrators had pictures of famous revolutionaries
such as Poncho Villa, Zapata, Hidalgo, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.32
Salvador Martinez de la Roca, a member of the action committee of
UNAM, stated the goal of the students that day. “We had to take over
the Zócolo; we had to deconsecrate the Zócolo—and we did, three
times.”33
Despite the optimism of the students, President Díaz Ordaz
refused to negotiate. In an address to the nation on September 1, 1968,
he said:
It is evident that non-students had a hand in the recent
disturbances; but it is also evident that, whether
intentionally or just by going along, a good number of
students took par…. The other road is open. We would
not like to see ourselves forced to take measures against
our will, but if it is necessary we will do so; whatever is
our duty, we will do; just as far as we are forced to go, we
will go.34
In his response, Ordaz hinted that the government was not going to
tolerate the demonstrations or disruptions anymore, especially since
the Olympics were right around the corner.35 Yet, the CNH still
continued with their public discussions and distribution of flyers. In
an attempt to further the movement, they organized another march.
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This march would be both nonviolent and silent. Students
placed white tape over their mouths in protest.36 They then marched
to the Zócalo in silence. This was an attempt to change the way that
the media and others perceived them. Their peaceful demonstration
showed that they were neither violent nor “out of control.”37 The
Great Silent March also served as inspiration for other groups who
had not yet become involved. Mainly, it showed that students were
not powerless.38
The government eventually agreed to written negotiations
with the students in the days following the Great Silent March. But,
on September 18, 1968, the army invaded University City in an effort
to break-up UNAM. The government stated that UNAM was the
center of subversion and had been controlled by outside forces.39
The students responded with violence, and the army then took
over the IPN. After this, violence continued to spread to other schools.
The leaders of CNH and other groups were forced to stay in hiding to
keep from being arrested. This was all happening as the Olympic
visitors were beginning to arrive. President Díaz Ordaz seemed to
think that he had beaten the students into submission, so he sent two
representatives to negotiate. The students refused to negotiate until
the army pulled out of UNAM. The army left UNAM on September
30, and the representatives from CNH met with the president’s
representatives on October 2.40
Events seemed to quiet down until protesters began to
assemble in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas for another rally. Soldiers,
tanks and jeeps surrounded the plaza, but nothing was done by the
army to prevent the rally.41 With the military blocking off the plaza,
the organizers decided to cancel the march to IPN. However, the
soldiers still invaded the rally. Some soldiers were dressed in civilian
clothes, distinguishing themselves with a white handkerchief or glove
on their hand. A helicopter began dropping flares, and soldiers calling
themselves the Olympic Battalion fired into the crowd. The plaza
erupted into absolute chaos. One of the eyewitnesses said:
There was nothing we could do but keep running. They
were firing at us from all directions…. A girl came by
shouting “You murderers, you murderers!” I took her in
my arms and tried to calm her down but she kept
screaming, louder and louder until finally the youngster
behind me grabbed hold of her and started shaking her. I
Carey, Plaza of Sacrifices, 112.
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noticed then that her ear had been shot off and her head
was bleeding. The people in the crowd kept piling on top
of another.42
The military would not let the Red and Green Cross ambulances into
the plaza until much later. By then, many of the dead and injured were
already taken by the military.43
There were differing versions of what happened that night in
the Plaza. The soldiers and the government claim that they only used
violence in response to being fired at by students. There are also
differing accounts of how many people were killed that night. The
government estimated twenty-nine casualties, but many who were
present that night believe that hundreds, possibly as many as seven
hundred people were killed.44 They even accused the government of
disposing or burning many of the bodies to hide the truth.45 In the
official history the students are painted as the instigators. However,
most people know and believe the story told through the eyewitness
accounts and testimonies of the survivors. Paco Ignacio Taibo, a
writer and participant, wrote:
Here is the truth confronting the official version
propagated by the Grand Commission of the Senate that
the students had incited the shooting. Today, all the
world knows that the provocateurs were soldiers in
civilian clothes and with a white glove belonging to the
Olympia Battalion.46
Following the massacre, there were many that were trying to
find out why this happened. But, there was not much available
evidence because the government had quickly covered it up. The
massacre ended the 1968 student movement. The government stood
by their story that some of the students were armed, and the police
only fired into the crowd after being shot at. The government also
came up with confessions from some of the movement’s leaders who
acknowledged the CNH had communist goals and that the students in
the Plaza de las Tres Culturas were armed. The army also added to
the case against the students with “a list and photographs of arms it
found in buildings around the plaza,” which proved there was a
“revolutionary conspiracy.”47 Although this supposed evidence is not
convincing, considering the power that the government had in
coercing these confessions, there has been a period of silence
Poniatowska, Massacre in Mexico, 219-21.
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concerning the true story of what happened in Tlatelolco. Even as late
as the 1990s, there was no mention of the Tlatelolco protest in
primary-school textbooks. Ernesto Zedillo, when he was minister of
education before becoming president, tried to insert a neutral
paragraph about the protest into a textbook, but he was forced to take
it out, due to pressure from government officials.48
Recently, there has been more interest in what actually
happened that day in October, specifically in finding out what real role
the Mexican government played in the massacre. On June 10, 2002,
President Vincente Fox signed a freedom of information law in
Mexico. With this law, many secret police, military and intelligence
documents were made available to the public.49 Currently, new
investigations are being performed to see what measures the
government took to hide the events. Some soldiers have come forward
to confirm the eyewitness accounts.50
Just as these Mexican documents have been opened, United
States CIA documents on this topic have also been made public. The
CIA documents showed that the United States government had been
informed on the students’ actions in Mexico. A White House memo
from July 31, 1968 talks about communist involvement. The Mexican
government claimed to have proof that the communists were behind
the disturbances. Although the CIA did not have evidence to back this
claim up, they agree that the USSR might have somehow been
involved.51
Many historians recognize the massacre at Tlatelolco as a
turning point in Mexican history. Even though the students were
defeated, they struck a large blow against the government, leading to
political changes. The way that the government responded to the
demonstrations and protests showed the weakness of the political
system, and it also showed the lengths to which the government
would go to hold on to power. The extreme use of violence in the
Plaza de las Tres Culturas and the subsequent government has not
been forgotten. The student movement was a large step towards
democracy in Mexico.
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GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
Meghan Houlihan
In April 1994, the systematic slaughter of almost one million
men, women, and children began in Rwanda. On May 5, 1998, the
United States House of Representatives held a special meeting
concerning the genocide in Rwanda, four years too late. The genocide
in Rwanda was not a high priority in the United States in 1994 and
only years later would Americans appreciate the extent of the horror
and death of the genocide. In 1994, the U.S. was already devastated
by failure in Somalia and had seen the devastating results of ethnic
warfare in Burundi. Due to these events, it did not want to intervene
in Rwanda. The U.S. played no role in Rwanda and contributed to the
massacre by not recognizing the genocide early enough and not
offering military and humanitarian support in a timely fashion.
The origins of genocide in Rwanda reside in the colonial era.
Rwanda was ruled by Germany from 1894 until the end of World
War I.1 At the conclusion of WWI, Belgium took control of Rwanda
and neighboring Burundi. In 1924, the Belgians enforced a system of
To
indirect rule to govern the two newly acquired territories.2
separate the native people of Rwanda, short and dark people were
categorized as Hutus; taller, lighter-skinned people were categorized
as Tutsis. The colonial powers believed that the Tutsis were
descendents of the Oromo tribe who originated in Ethiopia.3 The
German colonizers believed this attribute made the Tutsis more
“white,” and thus superior to sub-Saharan Africans. 4 Another way to
classify a person as Hutu or Tutsi was by occupation. Hutus generally
worked in agriculture, whereas Tutsis usually worked as herdsmen.5
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This proved to be a horrible way to classify Hutus and Tutsis. Many
Hutus were classified as Tutsis if they owned ten or more heads of
cattle.6 Many Hutu chiefs bribed government officials to change their
identity cards to say they were ethnically Tutsi so they were
supported by the colonial government.7 The lines defining one as a
Hutu or Tutsi were very thin and often altered to accommodate those
in power at the time. In reality, the Hutus and Tutsis were not
ethnically different. The two groups had similar religions and cultural
beliefs, a common mythology, and near identical languages.8 Both the
German and Belgium governments supported Tutsi monarchies. The
Tutsi monarchy suppressed the Hutu population and encouraged
education and literacy for the Tutsi population only. Small incentives
such as these created hatred among the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda.
The United Nations and Rwandan government officials decided
Rwanda deserved its independence, setting 1962 as a tentative date.
With Rwanda on the brink of independence, the Belgians realized that
in order to continue to profit from its soon to be former colony, they
would have to side with the Hutu majority.9 Once Rwanda achieved
independence, the Hutu population would control the government
because they made up a majority of the population. The Hutu
population knew that they would soon be leading Rwanda and tried to
prepare for the task ahead.
In 1957, an extremely important document was written that
would play a vital role in the genocide in 1994. Nine Hutu
intellectuals wrote the Bahutu Manifesto, which outlined the unjust
treatment of Hutus. The authors believed the privileged lifestyle the
Tutsi population had been living had to be ended. The document also
called for identity cards to distinguish the different ethnic groups.
The most influential part of the Bahutu Manifesto was the “Ten
Commandments,” which listed rules that the Hutu population should
support and obey. The Commandments were supposed to lead to Hutu
political, economic, and social control of Rwanda. The most
influential of the Ten Commandments were:
1) Every Hutu must know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she
may be, is working in the pay of her Tutsi ethnicity.
Therefore, a traitor is any Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman,
makes a Tutsi his concubine, or makes a Tutsi his secretary
or protégé.
5) Strategic posts such as political, administrative, economic,
military, and security posts must be given to the Hutu only.
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6) The armed forces of Rwanda must be exclusively Hutu. No
member of the military should marry a Tutsi.
8) The Hutu must stop feeling pity for the Tutsi.
9) The Hutu, wherever they may be, must be united, show
solidarity, and be preoccupied with the fate of their Hutu
brethren. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant in their enmity
against their common Tutsi enemy.10
Tension between the two groups obviously began to escalate
after the release of this document. In 1959, the Hutu, with the support
of Belgium, overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and took control of the
government. During the overthrow, Hutu extremists massacred many
Tutsis. Some estimate that as many as 130,000 Tutsi refugees fled to
other African counties to avoid persecution.11 This event planted the
seeds for future genocide.
After Rwanda claimed its independence on July 1, 1962, the
Hutus continued to control the government through force. The 1960s
proved to be an extremely bloody and violent decade. Refugee Tutsis
living in exile in Burundi banned together to battle the Hutu. The
group moved north and began to attack Hutu extremists and political
figures. In retaliation for the attacks, Hutus attacked local Tutsis.
Lemarch wrote, “In late 1963 and early 1964 thousands of innocent
Tutsi were wantonly murdered in what has been described as a
genocide.”12
In July 1973, Major Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, overthrew
President Kayibanda and declared himself the new Rwandan
president. A dictatorship was established under his rule.13 The Tutsi
minority was oppressed, although a few Tutsi were allowed to
participate in government or hold officer positions in the army.
Habyarimana continued to rule Rwanda until 1991, when opposing
political parties were allowed to run against his party.
Refugee
Tutsis living in exile in Uganda formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) to run against Habyarimana’s party.14 The clashes between
these two groups led to the death of thousands of Hutus and Tutsis.
Hutu extremists staged mini-massacres of Tutsis. The international
community failed to take notice, setting the stage for a worse genocide
a few years later.
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On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot
down.15 It is believed that Hutu extremists shot the plane down
because before confirmation of the president’s death, roadblocks were
set up in Kigali that checked identification cards and executed Tutsis,
human rights activists, and Hutus who sympathized with Tutsis. The
state-controlled radio Milles Collines spread the call for genocide and
urged revenge upon the Tutsi population. It aired propaganda against
the Tutsis and encouraged the mass murder of men, women, and
children.16 Over the course of three months, 500,000 to one million
Tutsis, Hutu who sympathized with Tutsis, and peace activists were
killed. 17 Machetes were used to mutilate the bodies, inflicting a slow
and painful death. Many victims were violated, raped, and humiliated.
Inhumane crimes were committed against women and children:
fetuses were taken out of wombs, doctors killed patients, teachers
killed students, and neighbors killed neighbors while the world sat
watching.
After the atrocities of World War II and the Holocaust, the
United Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was established. This was an agreement among the
members of the international community that if a genocide occurred, it
would be put down by members of the United Convention. It also
ensured that those responsible for the crimes would be brought before
a tribunal to be punished.
This group did nothing about the
Rwandan genocide. The UN describes genocide as “acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or
religious group.”18 The Rwanda genocide put the UN, the global
community, and legal polices to the test.
The international
community did put down genocide a year later. In 1995, genocide in
Bosnia gained international attention. The United States and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization sent troops on a peace-keeping
mission to Bosnia.19 By formally recognizing the genocide in Bosnia,
15
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide
(London: Verso, 2004), 133.
16 The radio broadcasts that aired propaganda allowed the genocide to
reach the rural areas of Rwanda. If not for the radio broadcasts, many rural
dwellers of Rwanda would not have known about the genocide.
17M. Khan Shaharyar, The Shallow Graves of Rwanda. (New York: I.B.
Tauris Publishers, 2000), 9.
18 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Research Toby T. Gati to
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and
Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad Harper, “Rwanda – Geneva
Convention Violations”, circa May 18, 1994. Secret/ORCON (originator
controlled), 2.
19 Richard, Sobel, “Trends: United States in Bosnia,” The Public Opinion
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the U.S. was able to protect the Muslims from the Serbs. However,
nothing was done to protect Tutsis from Hutus in Rwanda.
During Clinton’s campaign for president in 1992, he promised
to be directly involved in the consolidation of democracy throughout
Africa.20 He also wanted to support UN preventive diplomacy and
peace-keeping missions where needed. In 1993, civil war broke out in
Somalia, and President Clinton sent troops under Operation Restore
Hope to preserve order. During the mission thirty U.S. soldiers lost
their lives. As a result, Americans lost faith in the cause and wanted
their troops to return home safely.
In 1994, President Clinton
removed troops from Somalia. Also beginning in 1993, 50,000 people
were killed in an ethnic dispute in Burundi.21 Hutus and Tutsis made
up the majority of the population in Burundi, and similar tensions to
those in Rwanda took place. Uneven distribution of wealth, political
power, and economic power between the Hutus and Tutsis led to
physical altercations.22 These altercations turned into massacres but
were not inspected by the UN or the international community. These
two events kept the U.S. from promising military aid to help end the
genocide in Rwanda.
The events in Somalia and Burundi helped shaped American
and international policy. The U.S. implemented the presidential
decision directive, which refused U.S. aid to some UN missions which
were not in the interest of U.S. relations.23 This policy was intended
to “allow systematic slaughter that did not implicate national
interests.”24 Another aspect of the presidential decision directive said,
“The United States would henceforth be extremely wary of nonmilitary involvement in humanitarian crises and of peacekeeping
missions undertaken by other countries-because these could lead to
eventual U.S. entanglement.”25 In order for the U.S. to support a
peace-keeping mission, all financial support, equipment, and troop
requirements must be met without the support of the U.S. This policy
was put into effect to try and reduce the amount of money the U.S.
was putting into the UN.26 This policy made it extremely difficult for
the UN to go on peacekeeping missions without the approval of the
Adar G Korwa, “The Clinton Administration and Africa: A View
from Nairobi, Kenya,” Journal of Opinion 26 (1998), 70.
21 House, Rwanda’s Genocide: Looking Back. 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004,
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22
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United States. When the U.S. decided it did not want to intervene in
Rwanda, it also made that decision for the world.
The United States received classified information on January
11, 1994 from Canadian General Romeo Dallaire that hinted towards
a possible genocide in Rwanda.27 Dallaire was the Force Commander
of United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Kigali
and was present during the genocide.28 While stationed in Rwanda,
Dallaire learned that the government was paying people to create lists
of Tutsis to be executed. He also learned there was a plan to start a
civil war and kill several Belgian peacekeepers. The Hutus believed if
their peacekeepers were killed, Belgium would remove its troops.
Dallaire sent a fax, soon to be known as the genocide fax, to Secretary
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan.29 The fax was filled with
classified information about possible hints and movements towards
genocide. Annan responded that Dallaire should not get involved
militarily in the situation. He also said, “Such situations and alarming
reports from the field, though considered with the utmost seriousness
by United Nations officials, are not uncommon within the context of
peace-keeping operations.” 30 The information received in the fax was
passed on to President Habyarimana and the American, French, and
Belgian Embassies. The U.S. did not want to intervene and prevented
other countries from executing a large intervention as well.31
After President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, ten
Belgian peacekeepers were shot while trying to protect the Rwandan
prime minister. As a result, Belgium removed its troops and other
countries followed. The country immediately erupted into civil war.
The United States had the information, troops, and supplies to prevent
the genocide in Rwanda but did not use any of its resources.
Ironically, the United States was captivated by other events at
the time, such as the release of Steven Spielberg’s film Schindler’s List.
On April 8, 1994, Prudence Bushnell, a deputy assistant secretary of
state for African affairs, gave a short speech at a State Department
conference, explaining the evacuation of U.S. citizens and the violent
conflict in Rwanda.32 Ironically, the next speech, given by Michael
McCurry, talked about the international community’s reaction to
Schindler’s List. Many countries were preventing the movie from
being shown. Just minutes after the genocide in Rwanda was
mentioned, McCurry said, “This film movingly portrays the twentieth
27 House, Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence, 105th
Cong., 2nd sess., 1998, H.R. 49-306, 191.
28 Magnararella, Justice in Africa, 30.
29House, Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cycle of Violence, 191.
30 Magnararella, Justice in Africa, 32.
31 Ibid.
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century’s most horrible catastrophe and it shows that even in the
midst of genocide, one individual can make a difference. The most
effective way to avoid the recurrence of genocidal tragedy is to ensure
that past acts of genocide are never forgotten.”33 Two speeches about
genocide made within minutes of each, yet, the second speech
overshadowed the first one. The U.S. was compelled to help those
who survived the Holocaust. Despite this, the American public failed
to recognize the genocide in Rwanda as a pressing issue.
The United States did not publicly define the crisis in Rwanda
as genocide. Although the U.S. would not publicly acknowledge it,
unclassified documents by the Department of State, show that the
government did know a full-blown genocide was occurring in
Rwanda.34 With consent of the Clinton administration, the word
genocide was finally used on May 4, 1994, in a speech given by UN
Secretary General Annon. A declassified government document
showed the U.S. government had extensive knowledge and
information regarding the genocide in Rwanda. The document warns
governmental officials not to use the word genocide or the U.S. will
have to commit themselves to stopping the genocide.35
It is argued that radio jamming could have prevented thousands
of deaths. The genocide was encouraged through the radio station
Milles Collines. The station said, “We will not repeat the mistake of
1959. The children must be killed too.”36 The United States had the
capabilities to jam the radios to prevent the spread of genocide. Upon
General Dallaire’s request to jam the radio, the U.S. requested eight
thousand dollars an hour to complete the mission.37 The U.N. could
not afford to support this cost. A human rights advocate said that
radio jamming was “the one action that, in retrospect, might have
done the most to save Rwandan lives.”38
The U.S. secretly considered offering radio-jamming equipment
to other African nations. In a de-classified document, the issue was
raised that if the U.S. jammed the radio, they would be forced to play a
larger role in the conflict. The U.S. did not want to become heavily
involved in the crisis in Rwanda but felt they had to do something.
The U.S. believed it could offer radio-jamming equipment for others
to intervene. The unclassified document made public by the Freedom
of Information Act suggested that the U.S. offer its equipment to a

neighboring African country.39 The U.S. tried to get other countries
to intervene in the crisis but would not use technology or force to end
the genocide themselves.
In a 1998 speech at Rwanda, President Bill Clinton said he felt
that Rwanda was his greatest failure.40 He knew the U.S. had failed to
react to a worldwide crisis that could have been averted. Video
footage of the massacre showed how brutal and inhumane the
genocide was; the world witnessed men, women, and children perish
by means of a machete. New technology such as radio jamming could
have been used to prevent the spread of the genocide. Rwanda was
one of the great tragedies of the twentieth century and the U.S.
directly contributed by not recognizing the genocide and by not
offering military assistance and humanitarian support.
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FOOD AND FRIENDSHIP:
MEALS AND SOCIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN WOMEN
ON THE OVERLAND TRAIL
Rachel E. Elam
During the mid to late 19th century, many people traveled
across the unsettled plains of the American West to pursue a new life.
Some went for gold, some for land, and some just went in the spirit of
adventure. The paths that they chose were numerous. Some went to
California and others to Colorado. Some traveled Platte River Road
which “followed the Platte River from the Missouri River through
Nebraska to western Wyoming.”1 Whatever their path or purpose,
these pioneers were seeking out the vast area for a new home. Among
these people were women, many of whom were wives of men seeking
the new life, just along for the trip. Along the way these women had to
maintain a sense of home in an unfamiliar setting. As part of any
home, food and cooking were important aspects that women needed to
attend to as part of their sphere of influence. Women asserted their
control over their lives and families with activities like cooking.2
Women sought companionship with other women to feel at
home out on the open road, and cooking was a communal, as well as a
necessary function, among groups of traveling women. Women
critically needed other female companions for many other reasons as
well. Even things as simple as privacy for dressing and bodily
functions were difficult to accomplish without another woman to be a
shield.3 But friendship also helped women make the trail seem more
like home. There is a correlation between food and social
relationships. Women needed both, and sometimes they were one in
the same, though the two needs were not mutually exclusive. Women
might find companionship or social interaction because of food.
Sharing of food among members of a wagon train made meals a sort of
social institution.
Rachel Elam, a senior History with Teacher Certification major and member of Phi
Alpha Theta from Villa Grove, Illinois, wrote this paper for an Honors Independent
Study course, HIS 4444, with Dr. Terry Barnhart.
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Women’s companionship and their interactions in food
preparation were central to their survival on the overland journey,
both physically and psychologically. Women were often put into a
difficult situation by leaving all that they knew and traveling to an
unknown land to start a home over again. Some women had yet to
start a family, while others were with child when they left on their
journey. Most of the time, childbearing had no affect on whether or
not a husband and wife would decide to leave.4 Because of this, strong
social ties to other members of their traveling party were important.
Women needed to feel that they could count on other women to help
in their time of need, whether for childbirth, extra food, or loneliness.
The experiences of two women analyzed in this work are
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle. Catherine and Ellen made the
overland journey and experienced these needs. Both spoke of receiving
help from others in regards to food and both spend much time
discussing food and cooking. Haun also discusses her interactions with
other women, showing the importance of such activities, which were
the basis of their socialization and the focus of the efforts to make the
trail more hospitable.
Social ties were very important to women on the Overland
Trail. By embarking on the journey, their entire social world was
thrown upside down. Women left behind their social network,
including family and friends. This could be very distressing, causing
some women to become apprehensive when starting out on the trip.
Catherine Haun wrote in her 1849 journal that “a strange feeling of
fear” overcame her on the outset and she was “almost dazed with
dread.”5 One woman even gave the advice, “If you own a home and are
comfortably fixed stay with it and let the other fellow do the
traveling.”6 But not all women were “trudging mournfully after the
wagons,”7 dreading the very thought of leaving home. Even Haun was
able to hide her fears from her husband and continue on without
incident.8 Many women were excited at the prospect of a new life just
as much as their husbands. But one thing that was critical was the
availability of a social group of women.
Women on the trails needed the support of other women.
Often the wagon trains consisted of groups of kin or friends that
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formed a large caravan.9 The women from these groups bonded over
the daily chores that they had to perform. Johnny Faragher and
Christine Stansell note in their article, “Women and Their Families on
the Overland Trail to California and Oregon, 1842-1867” that women
and men faced the same struggles and circumstances, but the women
were not as included in the cultural make-up of the time and therefore
had no defined role to make sense of the suffering.10 Hence, the
commiseration of women with each other during western migration
lightened the “depressing necessity” of daily chores, including some
that would have been considered “men’s work.”11
The notion of women doing men’s work is interesting, for at
this time period, men and women had very distinct, “separate spheres.”
Jeanne H. Watson made the observation in her article “Traveling
Traditions: Victorians on the Overland Trails” that this “separate
spheres” idea was not always applicable to pioneer families because
men depended on women to work with them side-by-side to develop
and build up a successful home on the trail and on their new
homesteads.12 These jobs could include “cooking out of doors, driving
the oxen, collecting buffalo chips and weeds, helping to pitch the tent,
[and] washing on river banks.”13 Watson does point to a blending of
ideals that allowed women to do necessary, difficult jobs and still
maintain a Victorian lifestyle of propriety.14 The particular chores
listed above, for example, are more domestic aspects of traveling,
which are divided from jobs a man might do.15
Women often worked together, performing daily tasks as a
group. From one account, “Often washdays became a community
affair.”16 Women also helped each other out among the wagon trains.
The travel was taxing and possibly exhausting. Everyday chores and
activities were not as easy and monotonous when being performed in a
covered wagon on the way to a new home out west. Childbirth and
sickness were particularly difficult. Women would work together to
help other women out when these situations came up, even visiting
other wagon trains on horseback when they heard of someone needing
help.17 The diary of Lydia Allen Rudd is full of stories of sickness and
death. In one specific instance, she told of a man who became very ill
Faragher and Stansell, “Women and Their Families,” 151.
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on the trail. According to Rudd, “We doctored him what we could but
he was to [sic] far gone.”18 Jane Gould Tortillott wrote in her diary,
“We called to see a woman who had a sick husband. They are
emigrants. Have only been here a week, are waiting for him to
recover. He has the typhoid fever.”19 Women were able to provide
support in this way for ill and struggling families.
Women gave each other moral support as well. Families were
the main social unit on the trail.20 But women needed companionship
outside the family. It was typical for wagon trains to get together and
visit during the evenings after a long day of travel. Often music
accompanied these evenings; “After the singing and dancing, people
generally gathered in groups to talk awhile. Imagine the whole
population of a small town assembled in an area less than a block
square and you get the idea.”21 Inevitably, the women and men divided
themselves into groups. Women talked about their hardships or did
work in groups instead of joining the men.22
During the day, women visited as well. They walked
together, or possibly took a small side trip together as the journey
wore on.23 Women called on each other to “exchange news,
information, advice, and recipes as well as sunbonnet patterns.”24 They
visited with other women and participated in activities such as
knitting and sewing.25 Women enjoyed the company of other adult
women, sometimes without their children around. Flora Bender
recalled that her mother did not include her daughters when she went
calling, but did when it was time to do the washing and go to church.26
Rebecca Woodson, a young mother, became friends with the oldest
girls from a family of ten children, stating “Oh those happy days”
about her time with these new friends.27 Women enjoyed the times
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when they “visited, cooked together, or went swimming” and felt
frustrated when they were unable to socialize with other women.28
The bonds between women traveling the trails were so
strong that when troubles arose among members of different wagon
trains, the women were struck with the fear of being separated.
Friendships were “strikingly intimate and deep” and losing these
would have been heartbreaking to the women.29 Wagon trains often
reached an impasse at certain points of the trail, and some decided to
part ways. When wagon trains broke down, women might be left
without any other females to socialize with.30 Fights were recorded in
many women’s journals because a fight might mean separation from
the company of women in another wagon train.31 After such a
separation, women became preoccupied with looking out for a new
wagon train with women in it.32 This shows how important women’s
relationships with each other were. The journey itself took women out
of their comfort zones of friends and family and put them in a situation
possibly void of this comfort.33 Women found comfort among other
women on the trail, and when it was again taken from them, it was
very detrimental. For women to survive they needed friendship and
community like they experienced in their homes back east before they
headed out.
Along with companionship, food was one of the overarching
components that bonded women together on the trail. Deciding how
much food to take and how to cook it while traveling were of utmost
importance. Women, alone or together, were usually the cooks, as
cooking was part of the normal field of work for women. Women were
in charge of keeping life as normal as possible, and meals were
possibly the largest part of this normality.34 Meals could be considered
the biggest social institution on the trail because it brought people
together and was sometimes a social event as well as a necessity for
living.
Before embarking on the trip west, one of the most important
things to consider was how much and what kinds of food to bring.
People looked to others that had already successfully completed the
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journey for information about what to bring. Joel Palmer wrote what
to bring in his journal:
For each adult there should be two hundred pounds of
flour, thirty pounds of pilot bread, seventy-five pounds of
bacon, ten pounds of rice, five pounds of coffee, two
pounds of tea, twenty-five pounds of sugar, half a bushel
of dried beans, one bushel of dried fruit, two pounds of
saleratus, ten pounds of salt, half a bushel of corn meal;
and it is well to have half a bushel of corn, parched and
ground; a small keg of vinegar should also be taken. To
the above may be added as many good things as the
means of the person will enable him to carry.35
This is a very long list. However, it would be better to have more than
enough than not enough. Some groups, toward the end of the trip,
barely scraped enough to survive on. One man had to live on frogs and
roseberries to survive.36
Food showed up regularly in overland diaries. Some women
would write down every day what they cooked and ate, relating what
they did and what their problems were.37 Cooking outdoors with
different utensils and over an open fire changed the way many women
had to cook. Weather, insects, dust, and many other mitigating
circumstances affected individual and group experiences.38 Margaret
White Chambers, a young woman traveling with her husband and his
team, had to cook for the entire company at only eighteen years old.
She was faced with this difficulty of cooking outdoors with
questionable fuel sources.39 The most questionable of these fuel
sources was buffalo chips. Buffalo chips were the droppings left behind
by buffalo along the trail. These provided a useful source of fuel to
cook with, although not palatable to most travelers. References to
buffalo chips are found in many journals. Their presence or absence
was important enough to mention in the daily accounts.40 Buffalo
chips were a last resort to many groups, used when grass and weeds
ran out in the dusty deserts out west.41
There are many anecdotes relating to the gathering and use
of buffalo chips. Everyone, including children, had to participate in
collecting buffalo chips because their survival depended on it. Children
occasionally formed some kind of competition to make the job less
35 Joel Palmer quoted in Kathryn Troxel, “Food of the Overland
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tedious and disgusting.42 Some wagon trains would laugh at each
other while collecting chips to make it less unpleasant.43 Women
especially found the job unpleasant. Henry Hazard, an eight year old
boy, recalled: “The ladies in the train started on a fast immediately
after we got onto the Platte—the fuel was not the proper kind. After
we had been there about a week, however, they got grandly over
that.”44 Sarah J. Cummins told another amusing story about women
and buffalo chips, recalling “All along this part of the road there was a
great scarcity of wood and many times we were compelled to cook our
food with buffalo chips. This caused many ladies to act very cross and
many were the rude phrases uttered, far more humiliating to refined
ears than any mention of the material used for fuel could have been.”45
The indelicacy of these women’s actions dwarfed the indelicacy of the
actual buffalo chips. But these times added to the social institution of
meals, because to create a meal, people had to work together to even
start a fire.
All women faced these problems, but not all of them had to face
them alone like Margaret Chambers. Women would sometimes
collaborate on meals for the whole wagon train. For a special occasion,
women might prepare a large meal together.46 Women also helped
each other cook when a crisis occurred. Ruth Schackelford witnessed
her friend suffer a “terrible accident” when one of her horses upset her
raising bread. Mrs. Schackelford shared what she had prepared with
her neighbor and they all had a nice meal.47 This adds another aspect
to women needing the company of other women while on the overland
trail. To be able to help out or just commiserate with another woman
about cooking under these unpredictable circumstances was important
to the social order of women.
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle had very different traveling
experiences, but many aspects regarding food and friendship were the
same. There are many mentions of food and companionship in each of
the diaries. These diaries stress the importance of food especially, but
also socialization and working together as well. Both women mention
food and cooking many times, sometimes in the context of working,
but also sometimes as just a particular enjoyment of an otherwise

bland day. Through their diaries, evidence of the social institution of
mealtimes can be seen.
Catherine Haun and her husband left Iowa in 1849 to follow the
gold rush.48 Haun wrote her account of her travels many years later,
so it is not the typical day to day diary that many emigrants left.
Nevertheless, Haun’s account was very well written and provides very
specific information about her trip. One of the first things she
mentioned in her journal was a list of all the provisions they brought.
Flour, bacon, alcohol, dried meats, fruits, and vegetables were all
brought, as well as luxuries which consisted of “a gallon each of wild
plum and crabapple preserves and blackberry jam.”49 Not all wagon
trains could afford the space to bring such luxuries, but Haun’s wagon
train was “large, well equipped, and experienced.”50 That she would
mention this list of provisions shows how important it was to know
how much food was brought.
Another reference to food in Haun’s diary is the fact that their
wagon train employed a cook. Unfortunately, that did not last long, as
Haun described “In the morning our first domestic annoyance
occurred. The woman cook refused point blank to go any further.”51
This was particularly distressing to Haun because she did not know
how to cook. According to Haun, “I surprised myself by proposing to
do the cooking…having been reared in a slave state my culinary
education had been neglected and I had yet to make my first cup of
coffee.”52 Luckily, it seems as though Catherine was able to get along
fine without a cook, although pancakes were not her specialty.53
Haun made several more references to food, mainly when the
food was something special. Haun enjoyed the times when their
wagon train could get delicacies such as milk. One of the members of
the wagon train had cows for most of the trip, so when butter or
buttermilk was made, “We all were glad to swap some of our food for
a portion of these delicacies.”54 Milk was not always easy to come by,
so to have someone with cows in the wagon train would have been
quite a boon to the rest of the travelers. Haun also mentioned
Christmas dinner. She and her husband had made it to California, but
were still living in a tent. Her Christmas dinner was as follows: “a
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grizzly bear steak for which we paid $2.50, one cabbage for $1.00 and
–oh horrors—some more dried apples.”55
Besides food, Haun also mentioned of how she spent some of
her time and the social connections she made on the trails. She very
much enjoyed the group of people she was traveling with—“a
wonderful collection of many people with as many different
dispositions and characteristics, all recognizing their mutual
dependence upon each other and bound together by the single aim of
‘getting to California.’”56 Haun recognized the need for other people
during the trip. She also wrote about the other women in the wagon
train and what they did together during the long traveling days. They
visited other wagons, took walks, did needlework, and swapped food
and recipes to keep themselves busy. Haun apparently had a vibrant
social network and enjoyed the company of the other ladies she was
traveling with.57
The diary of Ellen Tootle offers a somewhat different
perspective of the westward journey. Tootle left on her journey with
her husband in 1862 to the mines in Colorado.58 Tootle has a different
writing style than Catherine Haun, as her diary was written in a day
to day style, rather than all at once at the end of the journey. Ellen
Tootle has several references to food and cooking as well. Although
she does not mention as much about social relationships with other
women, there is mention of other people and how they provided help
with food.
Ellen Tootle’s journey began in Plattsmouth, NB, which was
the starting off point for the trip to Colorado. She and her husband
remained there for several days before they began the actual trip.
Tootle did not begin her diary with a list of provisions brought, as
other overland diaries. She did, however, usually write what they ate
every day. Like Catherine Haun, Tootle was not an accomplished cook
when she undertook the journey with her husband. There are several
humorous anecdotes related to Tootle’s supposed lack of cooking
ability and clumsiness around the kitchen. In one such story she
wrote: “Mr. Tootle says I cannot do anything but talk, so would not
trust me to make the coffee. Boasted very much of his experience. He
decided to make it himself.”59 Mr. Tootle proved himself to be not
much of a cook when the coffee turned out wrong, but he claimed she
had not given him proper instructions.
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Mr. Tootle also bemoaned his wife’s experience in the kitchen
when the following mishap happened: “The first day, the cork came
out of the whiskey bottle and spilled more than half to Mr. Tootle’s
great disappointment. Indeed I don’t believe he has recovered from it
yet.” Fortunately for them, Mrs. Tootle was able to make fine coffee
and cook a good dinner, although she was very nervous about
trying.60
These small anecdotes show just how important food and
cooking were on the trail. Besides needing sustenance, meals provided
enjoyment, and if they were not prepared well, there would be no
enjoyment. Tootle also got enjoyment out of specific kinds of food that
were not always available. Canned peaches, milk, buttermilk, and the
occasional piece of cake while visiting a town were very enjoyable and
very much appreciated. Most of the time, they got these special foods
from other people, whether fellow travelers or people living in the
towns. The first night of their trip they arrived at their campsite very
late and only because a fellow traveling partner gave them some
rhubarb pie did they get dinner. They also received milk and cake
from a lady at a stage office on their way west.61
These two diaries give different stories of westward journeys,
but have similar references to food and companionship. There are also
some other similarities between the two journals. First, both
Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle were young brides traveling with
their husbands and no children. Both women did not have children
until later in their lives. It is not clear when Catherine Haun had
children or how many she had, but we do know that she dictated her
journal to her daughter later in her life, so she did have children at
some point. Ellen Tootle had at least three children, one of which died
in infancy.62 Also, both women place a significant importance on food.
How much and what types of food they brought and ate feature
prominently in both journals.
These two accounts, however, are very different. There is a
thirteen year time difference between when Catherine Haun and Ellen
Tootle left on their journeys. Haun was traveling to California while
Tootle was going to Colorado. Catherine specifically mentions other
women and the activities that they pursued together. It is not clear
how many other women traveled with Ellen. She only mentioned
another woman once, the wife of her husband’s partner, but she never
mentioned her again, and this other woman may not have even been
on the journey with them. The only other person really mentioned in
Tootle’s journal is her husband, so whether other women were even
on the trip or not is not known. Despite the differences in accounts,
Ibid., 64.
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Catherine Haun and Ellen Tootle’s overland diaries show the
importance of food and relationships and how they were sometimes
intertwined on their trips to the future Western United States.
Overall, food and friendship were both very important to the
overland emigrant women. The absence of these elements would cause
problems for the women and their wagon trains. To quote Kathryn
Troxel’s article, “Food of the Overland Emigrants”: “Many of the
emigrants…traveled in groups for reasons of safety, mostly, but often
simply because a large family with their friends were attracted at the
same time by the golden promise of the West.”63 They also traveled
together to maintain social ties that gave women a sense of home and
to share in relationships that were necessary for women’s survival.
Catherine Haun wrote: “Upon the whole I enjoyed the trip, spite of its
hardships and the fear and dread that hung as a pall over every
hour.”64 Maybe this enjoyment came from the food and friendship that
she experienced while on the dangerous trip.

Troxel, “Food of the Overland Emigrants,” 15-16.
64 Diary of Catherine Haun in Schlissel, Women’s Diaries of the Westward Journey, 185.
63

79

A TALE OF TWO CLOTHS: THE TRANSITION FROM
WOOL TO COTTON UNDERGARMENTS IN ENGLAND
DURING THE VICTORIAN AGE
Rachael Harzinski
The trendy and fashion conscious have been dismissed as
inconsequential—at best cute and at worst useless—in the eyes of
history. Fashion and dress, after all, are not vital when compared with
wars, political instability, or dramatic economic changes. It is not
surprising, therefore, that fashion’s alliance with cotton in the
Industrial Revolution has been overlooked. Cotton’s replacement of
wool as the primary material of the English textile industry would not
have been possible without the demands of the fashionable elite during
the nineteenth century.
The shift in fabric popularity hardly commanded the
attention of the world, even though it still affects the world today.
Even fashion and economic historians do not spend a great deal of
time discussing the change. They are likely to explain in passing that
the cause was multi-facetted, combining politics, health, and
economics. There was little understanding of the health needs of the
body during the Victorian Age (although there were some great
improvements) and politics were not a factor after the Manchester
Act. Above all, none of those three categories explain why cotton, a
difficult plant to cultivate, surpassed the patriotic wool.
The missing pieces of the “why” behind the shift from wool to
cotton lies in the efforts of the fashion beaus, dandies and ladies of the
Victorian Era. It was the prudish middle class that selected cotton as
the fiber of choice. Cotton was a brilliant, foreign fiber that could be
woven into thick, soft, towels or nearly sheer, silky, cloth. Cotton’s
versatility for clothing or housewares was second to the ability to hold
brighter colors longer than wool or other materials. Cotton did not
gain popularity, particularly in the domain of underwear, until the
upper and middle classes decided that it was chic. Although in the
modern day, underwear is not heavily considered, the focus on
underwear is necessary to establish the importance of the link between
fashion and cotton’s popularity. During the nineteenth century,
underwear was the only aspect of fashion to go through serious
Rachel Harzinski is a senior History major from Aurora, Illinois. She wrote her
paper for Dr. Michael Shirley’s HIS 2500 class, Historical Research and Writing, in
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changes. Custom and fashion are two terms that are often at ends with
one another. Custom has years or generations of support for it;
fashion, however, is sporadic and is marked by periods of restlessness
and change.1 This would also be an accurate way of describing the
Industrial Age. What is unusual about the clothing of the Industrial
Age is that instead of moving against former ideas of modesty as
fashion is apt to do, the fashions went so far as to define modesty.2 A
narrow waist with fuller hips was the order of the day, even though
the bosom had been the focus during the Napoleonic Era. This new
style was called the bell silhouette.
The introduction of the bell silhouette into fashion during the
Victorian age meant a staggering amount of underclothing for
women. The difference in underwear and underclothing is essential:
underclothing is a garment worn under the outer, and underwear is an
article of clothing which prevents chaffing, absorbs perspiration, and
stops the outerwear from slipping.3 The amount of underclothing
required for a proper woman at the time led one writer to say: “[a
lady’s] underclothing had become, as it were, an integral part of her
personality.”4 As the Industrial Revolution picked up steam, the
middle class’s ranks swelled, as did the trend toward prudishness.5 It
was no longer proper for women to be seen without the armor of
undergarments to protect her virtue and to appease Mrs. Grundy.6
A wealthy woman wore seven separate pieces of flannel or silk
undergarments. She would start her day by putting on her chemise, an
unshaped garment of varying length with a low square neckline,
possibly with narrow frills. While these garments were normally
homemade, they were available through stores by 1850. This was later
replaced by a cotton bodysuit called the combination.7
The next step was the petticoat, the long for winter and the
short for summer. A long petticoat had an attached bodice, buttoned
at the back and a drawstring neckline. A short petticoat tied at the
waist. Around the hem of the petticoat was the only location where
decoration, simple embroidery, was considered acceptable throughout
1 Paul H. Nystrom, Economics of Fashion, (New York: Ronald Press
Company, 1928), 139.
2 Ibid., 142.
3 Lawrence Langer, The Importance of Wearing Clothes, (New York:
Hastings House Publishers 1959); Revised by Julian Robinson, (Los Angeles:
Elysium Growth Press, 1991), 74.
4 Phillis Cunnington and C. Willett, The History of Underclothes,
(London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1981), 77.
5 Ibid., 76.
6 Mrs. Grundy first appeared in “Seed the Plough” by Thomas Morton
in 1800. By 1830 she had become a mythical figure who watched over proper
dress.
7 Cunnington and Willett, The History of Underclothes, 79.
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the whole of a woman’s undergarments. A woman would wear four to
six of these, one on top of the other, depending on the season, to lay
the foundations of the bell shape.8 Following the petticoats was the
crinoline, also known as the horsehair petticoat. Made with horsehair
and a stiff woolen fabric called weft, it ended at the knee with some
measuring six feet in diameter. This petticoat needed to be made
stronger; it was the key to achieving the bell shape until the steel
crinoline cage.
After the crinoline was the drawers, which achieved
acceptability for women by 1843, after years of being considered a
male-only garment. Drawers were the first real example of underwear.
A simple panted garment that went to the knees, drawers had a
drawstring waist with a front closer of three to four buttons.9 Drawers
began in France where they were called pantaloons. While women
there were wearing them as early as 1800, they were not really
accepted until Princess Charlotte wore them in 1811. Proper English
women did not wear them except when riding until 1843.10 Doctors
approved overwhelmingly of drawers, proclaiming them as extremely
sanitary. The Handbook of the Toilet, the guidebook for all things
dealing with undergarments and private functions, said in 1843,
“Drawers are of incalculable advantage to women who expose
themselves to a variety of diseases from the usual form of their
clothes.”11 Previous to the acceptance of drawers, women wore
nothing under their multiple petticoats which would have allowed
easy access to the genitals, a favored location for any type of disease.
Despite the praise drawers received for the sanitary benefit to
both sexes, drawers were eventually replaced by the combination. The
combination was a cotton body suit which buttoned down the front
and at the crotch. It was accepted by 1883 along with the sanitary
corset, a rubber and cotton creation which molded to a woman’s form
and did not require tight lacing.12
The final stage took the longest and remains to this day the
most infamous: the corset. By the 1850s, the corset had been expanded
to cover the shoulders and the hips of a woman (pregnancy was not an
excuse for neglecting a corset).13 It would take nearly a quarter of an
hour to put a corset on, and it would take three pulls. A woman would
grip the edge of something, take a deep breath, and another woman
would pull the strings as tight as she could. There would be a small
Ibid.
Ibid., 32.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 95.
12 Ibid., 96.
13 Alison Carter, Underwear: A Fashion History, (New York: Drama
Book Publishers, 1992), 42.
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break to let the woman breathe before the procedure was repeated
twice more.14 Ideally, a woman’s waist would be drawn in about
fourteen inches, creating a stiff walk and preventing a woman from
sitting or breathing properly. One nobleman noted that when his
daughter had bent to pick up something, her lacings had burst with
such a racket that “the house worried she had exploded.”15 The corset
was normally made of linen or silk with first whale bones, then spring
steel, forcing the female body into the desired shape. The eyeholes for
the laces where reinforced with steel to prevent a woman’s movement
from tearing the fabric. As the incident with the girl bending down
and bursting her corset shows, however, it did not always solve the
problem.
Tight lacing was frowned upon by doctors for the strain it
placed on the ribs and organs. When doctors began noticing the
shocking number of miscarriages caused by the pressure put on the
hips by the corset, the outcry against them grew.16 In compromise, the
fashion world did two things: created an elastic bottomed corset that
stretched over the stomach of a pregnant woman, and demanded the
expanding of the skirts which helped create the illusion of a tiny waist
without such tight-lacing.17 Men in the world of medicine were not
the only ones concerned with the unhealthy nature of corsets;
husbands and fathers were too. Women, not men, demanded the
corset. It was believed that a girl would not develop good posture
unless she wore one, which resulted in the creation of night corsets so
that a girl’s spine would theoretically form properly.18 Many men
confessed confusion about why they were supposed to find “a waist
like an ant to be attractive.”19 There are several records of husbands
requesting that wives abandon tight lacing, due to health reasons and
because many husbands simply did not like the look. When the
crinoline cage widened skirts to such a diameter that a normal waist
looked slimmer, many women gratefully loosened the corset, although
it was not abandoned altogether.20
The startling amount of underclothing that was worn during
the Victorian age was the direct result of prudishness following the
increase in the middle class’s numbers. By the 1850s, fifteen percent of
the population in England belonged to the middle class.21 Certain
Ibid., 80.
Ibid.
16 Ibid., 81.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 77.
20 Carter, Underwear: A Fashion History, 40.
21 Sally Mitchell, Daily Life in Victorian England, (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1996), 130.

characteristics defined the middle class: untitled, highly educated,
piety and prudishness. In many ways, the middle class of the Victorian
Age was a marvel of humanity for taking prudity to the point of
eroticism.22 The color white and virginity were more closely
associated with each other and with constant repetition; eventually it
became what was attractive at the time.23
The previous decades had been a witness to the lax morality
due to wartime. Fashion focused on illuminating the human figure, but
paid particular attention to feminine curves. Loose, flowing garments
with the high Empire waistline24 allowed women to dress in the barest
of underclothing. Some of the more daring, or scandalous, women
abandoned the corset completely.25 When the war was over, such
dress was no longer acceptable, resulting in the astonishing levels of
underclothing.
Not only did the number of required items for a proper young
woman increase, but their appearance was strictly regulated in the
eyes of society. Clothing, in particular the petticoat, was a sign of
wealth and prestige in the nineteenth century.26 Until the end of the
Victorian era the only color that was available – for proper people –
was white. The evening petticoat’s hem, as stated before, was the only
place on underclothing that was considered acceptable to decorate. In
the 1870s, however, while the exterior of clothing was drabber with
the increased popularity of the black suit, underclothing became
colored. Wearing colored undergarments became a sign of success and
class since dyed items were more expensive.27 Cotton’s popularity
would increase enormously during this time.
The most common explanation for the popularity of cotton is
price; it was cheaper than wool and therefore took control. If price was
all that mattered, however, the lower classes, not the middle, would
have been the first to use the fabric. Cotton would have been regulated
down to a “worker” fabric, and considered unseemly for the image
conscious wealthy to wear.
The lower class could not wear clothing that matched the style,
demands, or even the materials of the middle class. Working class
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families made under £300 a year,28 and a well-to-do person of the
lower classes made only twenty seven shillings a week.29 The first
thing a worker’s salary went to was rent and food. A working class
family of seven’s weekly budget in Lancaster allocated for rent of a
two story home at three shillings and six pence, and food totaling
about thirteen shillings and one and a half pence for food for a week.
After schooling for two children to learn to read, a bucket of coal for
heat, and soap and candles, there was a surplus of six shillings and
eleven pence. 30 Clothing and alcohol were not considered in this
budget and the surplus is not enough to purchase clothing yearly for
the family. The cloth would have to be purchased and the clothing
made at home by the mother. It was not until the late 1880s that
clothing began being sent pre-made into stores, and it was later still
until such clothing became truly affordable for the laborer unless it
was through second or third hand shops.31
Fabrics such as fustian, a tough denim-like material, corduroy
and low grade flannel were “worker’s fabrics.” Moleskin, a fabric made
by combining corduroy and woolen linen, became the most popular
and common “worker’s fabric”.32 Even with these cheaper fabrics,
however, the estimated cost of clothing an average family, two parents
and eight children, near London was £12 a year: families had only one
set of clothing per member for daily wear and another for “Sunday
best.”33 Cotton was cheaper to manufacture than wool, but since the
lower class was not the one wearing it regularly, price fails to explain
cotton’s popularity.
Health is another common explanation for the switch from
woolen cloth to cotton, particularly in the case of underwear. There is
no solid evidence, however, that doctors were aware of the health
benefits of cotton’s wicking property. The wicking property refers to a
fabrics ability to hold or dispel water. Doctors preached the wonders
of wool even after its dominance was fading. Cotton, according to
them, was a substandard cloth that would not allow the body to retain
heat and result in more sickness. Most doctors viewed cotton as an
inferior fabric to wool, but acceptable if it was loosely woven into a
towel.34 Heat retention is an important aspect of outerwear, but
underwear has different demands. For once, fashion and health
28Cowell, Factory Commission Report (1833); Cited in Edgar R. Pike,
Human Documents of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, (London: George Allen
and Unwin, 1966), 53.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Carter, Underwear: the Fashion History, 45.
32 Ibid., 80.
33 Ibid., 79.
34 Ibid., 511.

85

combined to negate medical arguments for wool, and cotton rose to
power as king.
As an animal fiber, wool was meant to protect from weather, so
when it gets wet wool will actually bond tighter to itself to protect the
skin.35 This would eventually cause shrinking and tightening of the
clothing rather unpredictably if the article was not allowed to fully
dry. The most important aspect to the fashion world was not if the
clothing would shrink or what the market for it was; the most
important thing was if it could retain a dye. Wool, like human hair,
looses the ability to retain a pigment over time. Additionally, wool has
a tendency to yellow after being exposed to the sunlight.36 This, more
than anything else, insured wool’s fall from dominance.
To doctors however, there was no finer fiber to wear than wool.
Porous and hydroscopic, it conducts heat poorly and while it absorbs
water, it does not release it quickly. Water and air cause evaporation
and heat. By trapping this evaporation close to the skin the body stays
warmer. In the chilly English climate, this would be vital. In 1841, the
initial thought of women’s poor health was because of too much
exposure of the skin to cold and doctors told women to wrap
themselves in wool flannel bodysuits.37
While doctors made an excellent point about wool’s ability to
keep someone warm, a fabric which retains water for long periods of
time is not a good idea to keep around the genitals for either sex, but
specifically for women. Moisture kept near the genitals leads to yeast
infections or other forms of vaginal disease. In an area which is
already kept moist and warm by the body, adding more moisture
meant bacteria could grow. While regular bathing was strongly
recommended, most doctors agreed that drawers and combination
suits needed only to be washed once a week.38 This, however, did not
help the lower class who could not bath daily or wash their clothes
weekly.
Unlike wool, cotton “breathes”. This “breathing” effect is caused
by the fact that cotton is quick to release moisture, which means
bacteria have a more difficult time lingering. This also means that
cotton does not retain heat very well, the main reason why doctors
were so adamantly against it to begin with. For the purpose of
underwear, however, it is much healthier to have cotton than wool or
even silk. While there is no strict evidence that doctors and the public
35 George Vivian Poore, “Clothing,” A Treatise on Hygiene and Public
Health, eds. Thomas Stevenson and Shirley F. Murphy, (Philadelphia: P.
Blakiston and Co. 1892), 510.
36 Howard L. Needles, Textile Fibers, Dyes, Finishes, and Processes: A
Concise Guide, (New Jersey: Noyes Publications, 1986), 63.
37 Cunnington and Willett, The History of Underclothes, 86.
38 Poore, “Clothing,” 520.
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were fully aware of this, around the 1880s, the sanitary corset and
combination suit were advertising that is was safer and healthier for
the body because it was made of cotton and had button openings at the
crotch.39
Cotton’s struggle for medical support was simple compared to
the political sphere. Britain’s empire served not only as a source for
raw materials, but it also established more markets for the finished
product. Cotton was a foreign material that pushed the domestic
product to the side. This was an anomaly for the world.
For centuries, Britain had been the leading manufacturer of
wool products. Cost was minimal, jobs were ample for the populace,
and there was a sense of pride in the international market. Not only
was it patriotic, but wool, in comparison to cotton, was easy to
manufacture. After being sheared from the sheep, it was washed and
then carded to remove impurities. The carded wool was spun into
yarn on a spinning wheel; the make-up of wool makes it very easy to
spin into yarn. Woolen fibers run parallel to each other in a single
direction, which meant less snarls and breaking while spinning.40 The
yarn was turned over to a weaver and woven into a variety of cloths.
This process was perfect for the cottage industry; a whole village
could be dedicated to shearing, carding, or spinning for one weaver.
This meant that whole villages could be invested to produce wool
thread cheaply for factories.
The Enclosure Act, which reverted broad amounts of farmland
into private holdings under the pretense of efficiency, had very little
effect on wool’s popularity. The shift from the cottage industry to the
mill system, the eventual result of the Enclosure Act, did, however.
The mill system allowed an increase in fabric availability, lowered
costs, and created a larger market for wool. The availability of wool
on the British Isles was soon surpassed by the demand for it as a cloth,
and England had to purchase wool from its colonies, mainly
Australia.41 Even with the decrease in price, wool still failed to retain
the interest of the wealthy. It did not have the same mystery and class
status as cotton.
Cotton, called the vegetable lamb in ancient times, is not only a
finicky plant to grow, but also a difficult cloth to prepare. The fluffy
white boll is meant to protect the seeds inside, but the seeds need to be
removed for cloth. This was done by hand until the cotton gin was
invented. Quality of cotton was decided on by how long a thread could
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be produced after ginning; generally, the longer a thread, the finer the
cotton.42
Cotton was a popular fabric in India, Egypt, South America,
and China before colonization occurred. The cotton fabric was
brought over to the Middle East, who traded it with Italy and then
with Spain. The first appearance of cotton in England occurs in the
Bolten Abbey inventory of candle wicks around 1200.43 There was not
a lot of bother about it outside of candlewicks, embroidery threads,
and occasional mention as lining for doublets. During this time,
England was busy trying to get Flemish weavers to increase the wool
trade. These same weavers, however, may have stimulated the cotton
production as well.44 England would continue to purchase cotton from
Germany, the leader of cotton in Europe at the time, until the 1600s
when the East India Trading Company officially opened to sell off
surplus wool. In the later part of the century and into the next, cotton
printing plants would open across England for the new Indian cotton
cloth that was being brought in.45
The trendy new cloth from India was immediately grabbed up
by the wealthy to such a degree that wool manufacturers demanded
that Parliament do something to stem the tide. In 1666, Parliament
passed an act that said all of England’s dead had to be wrapped in
wool or a small fine would be levied. In 1700, another act was passed
which outlawed Indian silks and calicos for clothing or housewares at
a fine of £200 to the wearer.
Despite this, by 1708, upper class
women were willing to risk getting caught for the ability to wear
Indian cotton. Finally, in 1736, Parliament passed the Manchester
Act, which forbade all Indian cloth goods inside England and allowed
the creation of cotton and wool mixed calicos.46 The act failed to stop
the trend of cotton; it gave Lancashire, which purchased cotton from
the future United States, a monopoly on the printing, manufacturing,
and sale of cotton cloth.47 Though the monopoly on printed fabrics
was a marginal achievement at first, as the middle class’s strict
thoughts of prudishness vanished and colored underclothes and
underwear were acceptable, it grew into a solid investment. Cotton’s
inception as the most popular fabric in the modern world has been
Ibid.
James A.B. Scherer, Cotton as a World Power: A Study in the Economic
Interpretation of History, (New York: Fredrick A. Stokes Company Publishers,
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passed off as economic. It has largely been accepted as simply a
natural progression of the inventions and advancements of the
nineteenth century. Another argument is that cotton’s supremacy was
linked with colonialism and the source for raw materials, and therefore
is more politically linked. Without the elite demanding more cotton,
which led to the invention of products which eased the manufacture,
wool may have continued to be the most used fabric. While there
exists no solid evidence that the healthy effects of cotton were realized
at the first stages of its popularity, without the continued pressure and
efforts of the wealthy individuals of England’s wealthy and sociable,
the healthy properties may never even have been analyzed by doctors.
Cotton’s growth is linked with the middle class’s wealth and desire to
display that wealth through foreign items placed on display.

IVAN IV: A MACHIAVELLIAN TSAR
Robyn E. Carswell
Dating back to Riurik,1 Russia has always had strong leaders
who stopped at nothing to ensure the success of the throne. With a
couple of noted exceptions, the rulers had the luxury of growing up
witnessing the rule of their fathers. Ivan IV had no role model, no
mentor, and no one to instruct him on how to be a leader. Before
assuming the throne, he looked elsewhere for information on how to
be a proper sovereign. Beginning with the Primary Chronicle,2 he
would have looked back at previous rulers and what methodologies
made them successful. At this time of growing contact with the West,
he may have also looked outside of Russia, perhaps to Machiavelli’s
The Prince. Also influencing Ivan’s reign were the bitter feelings he
had for the boyars during his childhood. Historians have traditionally
divided Ivan’s regime into two periods, the good half and the bad half.
This essay will center on the “good-half,” when Ivan focused on
reform, land conquest, and reshaping the monarchy. Ivan wanted
something that was unlike anything that had preceded it; he reformed
and changed Russia in an attempt to unite it under the supreme
sovereignty of an absolute Machiavellian ruler—the Tsar.
To understand Ivan’s state of mind when he became the
sovereign, it is important to look at his childhood. Ivan’s father,
Prince Basil III, died when Ivan was three years old. Five years later
his mother died, which Ivan attributed to poisoning. Ivan recounted
the years that followed in his “Own Account of His Early Life.” Ivan’s
account asserted that the boyars usurped the power of Tsar and left
Ivan and his younger brother without proper care.3 The ruling boyars
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ignored the young Ivan, left him ill fed, improperly clothed, and failed
to instruct him educationally.4 In short, Ivan was not prepared in any
way to assume the role of ruler. In 1557, however, Ivan asserted
himself, and upon claiming the throne at age fifteen, he literally “put
[his] kingdom in order”5 and crowned himself ‘Tsar.’ This title was
deliberate; it transcended ‘Grand Prince,’ which, in Ivan’s opinion,
insinuated that he was only the first among equals. Ivan was
determined to unite Russia under something more than just a prince.
As mentioned, Ivan had no real tutelage in the ways of being a
ruler, and therefore, formulated his rule through a combination of trial
by fire, wit, and perhaps Machiavellian influence. While there remains
no written evidence that Ivan studied Machiavelli, his actions,
reforms, and style of reign are definitely Machiavellian in style. It is
also possible to follow some of those linked with The Prince, to
establish the distribution of the manuscript, and its possible arrival in
Muscovy. Machiavelli first wrote The Prince in 1513, in an effort to
help then ruler Lorenzo De’ Medici stay in power and unify Italy.
Machiavelli did not live to see The Prince distributed, as it remained
unpublished until 1532, five years after his death.6 From this point,
the circulation of the manuscript is sketchy, but one can follow the
lives of those connected with it.
The Medici family fell from power in 1494 and fled Italy. Their
daughter, Catherine, eventually reached France and their son,
Giovanni, Rome. Catherine later became the Queen Regent of France,
and Giovanni ascended to the papacy as Pope Leo X. Catherine was
reportedly a disciple of Machiavelli, and both Leo X and his successor,
Clement VII, sought advice from the Italian philosopher.7 In 1559,
however, Pope Paul IV added Machiavelli’s work to the list of
prohibited books.8 As does anything prohibited, the manuscript
spread quickly.
The arrival of Machiavelli’s Prince to Russia during Ivan’s reign
is difficult to substantiate. The arrival of other manuscripts, however,
is not. Ivan kept a large library, containing several hundred books in
various languages.9 He also sent emissaries to Western Europe to

persuade specialists, including teachers and artists, to come to
Russia.10 Those who did venture to Russia brought with them many
manuscripts, among those, possibly, The Prince. By pure observation
of Ivan’s method of rule and reforms, one could reasonably argue that
it so characterized Machiavellian theories it deserves further attention.
Ivan aimed the majority of his early reforms at restoring a
kingdom, which, in his opinion, laid waste through years of boyar
misrule. He resented the boyars for their mistreatment of him as a
youth as well as their mismanagement of his inheritance, and he grew
more suspicious of them as the years passed. From the earliest
accounts, Ivan, plagued with conspiracies, felt it was necessary to be
strongly proactive in his own best interest, perhaps following the
template of Machiavelli. Machiavelli wrote that a prince is highly
esteemed and “not easily conspired against”11 and further stated that
in order to secure oneself from such conspiracy he should avoid “being
hated and despised…by keeping the people satisfied with him.”12 In
Machiavellian manner, Ivan sought to reach the people and keep them
satisfied. Out of this need, he created the zemskii sobor.13 The first
gathering of the zemskii sobor, in 1549, allowed Ivan’s subjects the
opportunity to voice complaints and present opinions concerning
matters of the kingdom, although notably no townspeople were
present at this first gathering.14 Some historians, reflecting on the
lack of townspeople, instead prefer to identify this meeting as the
‘Council of Reconciliation.’15 At the meeting, Ivan spoke of the cruelty
and mistreatment he had suffered at the hands of the boyars during his
youth, but agreed to forgive them and called for them to be
reconciled.16 Despite Ivan’s grace, the boyar disloyalty would again
resurface. Ivan tactically chose to defer his resentment of the boyars
and move on to more pressing issues, such as reform.
Ivan’s early reforms also addressed the organization and
distribution of power, something he wanted to change early in his
administration. A new Royal Law Code, the Subednik, introduced in
1550, was among Ivan’s firsts. The new Code circumscribed many of
the powers of the boyars. It promoted rights of elected local
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representatives, while decreasing the powers of the namestniki.17 The
Law Code also established a means of punishment for officials who
were guilty of abusing their powers. Other articles contained within
the Code dealt with rights concerning the various classes of Russian
society. Historians Andrei Pavlov and Maureen Perrie consider the
Code Ivan’s attempt to achieve “political consensus amongst the
various social groups in the country, in order to overcome the
consequences of the social and political crisis, which had been
provoked by ‘boyar rule.’”18
Ivan sensed the need for unity in all aspects of Russian life,
including Orthodoxy, one of the pillars of Russian society. Again, one
can look at Machiavelli and determine that Ivan’s motives here were
not spiritual in nature but served to further his hold on power.
Machiavelli’s instructions in this area encouraged princely intellect
over faith, which he assumed would result in the prince being able to
“overcome those who have relied on their word.”19 In 1551, a church
council convened to hear inquiries presented by the Tsar concerning
church abuses and difficulties in standardization. The Tsar called
certain rituals into question, such as the practice of crossing oneself
with three fingers, as was practiced in Novgorod, or two as was
common among the Muscovites. To avoid a split in the church, or
more likely because it was the practice of the Tsar, the council
accepted the two-finger crossing as standard.
Several other
discrepancies were resolved in favor of the Muscovite way, despite the
alternative being canonically more correct.20 One could argue that
had the decision been in favor of preserving the Novgorodian way, the
Great Schism of 1666 might have been averted.
Ivan transformed the military, in Machiavellian style, during
this period as well. Machiavelli stated that a wise prince should “never
in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with industry in
such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so that if
fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.”21 Ivan
enlarged the military by allowing sons to inherit rank and nobles to
assume certain levels based on station. Prestige would be associated
with service, encouraging young nobles to pursue a military career.
Ivan hoped the favor placed on nobility would result in their loyalty.
The system had difficulties; boyar families frequently squabbled over
rank, causing problems within the military, most notably during times

of battle.22 Russian autocrats would spend the next three centuries
undoing this particular reform.
The age of Russian reform and relative peace between Ivan and
the boyars came to end because of the events of 1553. Ivan became
seriously ill and asked the boyars to swear allegiance to his son,
Dmitrii. Quarrels arose among the boyars, which infuriated the Tsar,
after which he demanded they “kiss the cross to the heir,”23 who was
then only five months old. Pavlov and Perrie have expanded upon the
incident with added information, which lessens the disparaging picture
historians have painted of the boyars. They state that the Tsar had
become so gravely ill during the early months of 1553 that he was
unable to recognize many of the people around him. Considering this,
he most likely was unable to ask for the boyars to pledge loyalty to the
Tsarevich. Furthermore, he would have been unable to make the
speech of demand for loyalty. Several of the boyars, however, did
swear allegiance to Dmitrii while still others refused; concerned that
because of his young age the power of Russia would fall into the hands
of the Tsaritsa’s family.24 Whether the boyars refused Ivan directly or
not, the result was the same. When the Tsar recovered, he questioned
the loyalty of his boyars, setting up the crises, which would continue
until the end of his reign.
The dishonesty of those within Ivan’s realm reached beyond the
boyars and did not go without notice to outsiders. Later in the same
year as the Tsar’s illness, Captain Richard Chancellor appeared in
Ivan’s court. He had left England earlier that year in search of a
northern passage to China. Chancellor describes the conditions in
Moscow as well as the treatment he received, but most notably, he is
aware of the deceitfulness of those within Ivan’s court. He writes,
“The Duke [Ivan] gives sentence himself upon all matters in the law.
Which is very commendable, that such a Prince will take pains to see
ministration of justice. Yet notwithstanding it is wonderfully abused:
and thereby the Duke is much deceived.”25 One must consider
however, that the Captain was writing in order to make a case for the
invasion of Russia. Undoubtedly, he would have presented the ruler
as unwise and ignorant about the activities of his kingdom.
The mistrust that Ivan held for his boyars finally manifested
itself in 1564. Ivan left Moscow in December of that year with a large
entourage and upon arriving in Aleksandrova Sloboda, he sent back
word that he had abdicated the throne. He listed his reasons as deceit
Pavlov and Perrie, Ivan the Terrible, 70.
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and disloyalty on behalf of the boyars. This date traditionally marks
the beginning of the bad half of Ivan’s reign and one could argue that
a separate sovereign (at least in behavior) conducted the second half in
that it was markedly different from Ivan’s early years as the autocrat.
He began a reign of terror that even Machiavelli would have
questioned.
During the good half of Ivan’s reign, however, he managed to
hold his emotions in check and unify Russia. His self-control, desire to
please the people, and reconcile with the boyars demonstrated the
diplomatic elements of Machiavellian thought. Later, considering the
poor treatment they afforded him as a youth, the mismanagement of
his kingdom during his minority and the lack of support they showed
during his early years as sovereign, Ivan pivoted, as a Machiavellian
prince would do when backed into the corner. Acting as Machiavelli
recommended, “it is necessary for him to have a mind ready to turn
itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune force it, yet, as
I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can avoid doing
so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.”26
Ivan IV redesigned the Russian monarchy, leaving a heritage
that later Russian leaders followed.
Devoid of proper royal
instruction, Ivan looked to the past to find that many of his
predecessors struggled with the same problems he faced upon his
ascension. Russia was not alone in her troubles; other kingdoms were
suffering difficulties as well, such as a divided Italy, for whom
Machiavelli originally intended The Prince. Trade routes and
increasing contact with the west opened up new resources for Ivan,
including the possibility of acquiring Machiavelli’s manuscript as well
as his political philosophies. His lack of training proved to be the
foundation for his quest for the establishment of an entirely new style
of sovereign. To the Russian people, Ivan’s name, ‘Grozny,’ invokes
exactly what Ivan intended—complete reverence for awesome power.
Machiavelli would have been impressed.

THE SLAVERY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Ryan Ervin
From September 17, 1787 to the present day, the United States
Constitution has been the subject of much debate. Its vague language
and ambiguous wording have created disputes for generations about
the true meaning of particular clauses or the original intent of the
Framers. In its essence, the Constitution is a framework, an outline,
for government, leaving future generations to add color and depth to a
broad, somewhat undefined blueprint. James Madison’s detailed notes
on the Convention have partially illuminated the struggle going on
behind the closed doors of Independence Hall, but they have also
raised still more questions. It seems as though the more we know
about what the delegates believed during the summer of 1787, the
harder it is to link their spoken words with their written ones.
The Constitutional aspects of slavery are one of those problems
historians have disagreed about the most. How could staunch
antislavery delegates allow the continued enslavement of millions
under the government they helped form? More generally, did the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention betray the principles of the
Declaration of Independence by forming a union that seemed to
restrict such principles to a select portion of the population? From the
documentation provided thus far, it seems as though popular opinion
fully supported emancipatory efforts. A detailed overview of the
slavery debates can help to answer this contradiction, but historical
interpretation is just as useful. Indeed, historians view the very same
clauses in markedly different ways, and it is important to trace the
reasons for these differences in order to better judge the Framers’
words and actions.
The neo-Garrisonians have dominated the historical debate on
slavery and the Constitution for the past fifty years. Using the
nineteenth-century abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison’s description
of the Constitution as a “covenant with death and agreement with
Hell” as their creed, they have chiefly criticized those northern and
middle state antislavery delegates for their inability, or lack of will, to
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end slavery at the Convention. Neo-Garrisonians also depict the
southern slave owning delegates as staunchly proslavery, unified in
defending the institution, and expert bargainers. Paul Finkelman is
perhaps the strongest critic of the founders. Depicting the southern
delegates as a slave lobbying group, he writes “Rarely in American
political history have the advocates of a special interest been so
successful. Never has the cost of placating a special interest been so
high.” When Finkelman asks whether the framers could have done
more to slow slavery’s growth and weaken its permanence on the
American landscape, he says, “surely yes.” In fact, the delegates’ lack
of conviction in doing anything substantial about slavery “is part of
the tragedy of American history.” 1
Neo-Garrisonian criticism has not only focused on the three
specific clauses which historians have generally agreed mention some
aspect of slavery; they have also cited any clause which tends to
reinforce slavery rather than diminish it. For example, Article I,
Section 8, Clause 15 provides for the militia to suppress insurrections;
Article IV, Section 4 protects the states from domestic violence; and
the slave states gained added representation in Congress and
therefore, through the Electoral College, “their votes for President
were far more potent than the votes of northerners.”2 Jack Rakove has
wondered whether northern accommodation “had to go as far as it
did.” “Did the electoral college have to give southern states additional
votes on behalf of their slaves,” he asks, “when it could have been
argued that if this form of property deserved any representation, the
House alone would suffice?”3
John Hope Franklin laments that the nation’s highest law of
government “authorizes the continuation of the slave trade for at least
another twenty years, asserts the right to count three-fifths of the
slaves for purposes of representation in Congress,” and demands that
runaway slaves be caught and dragged back to perpetual servitude.4
And while certain compromises were vital to forming the Union, they
came, in Richard B. Morris’s words, “at a terrible price.”5 With so
many peripheral concessions, Finkelman says it is difficult not to
conclude that the Framers “knew the problem was there. They chose
to ignore it.”6

1 Paul Finkelman, “The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little
Gained,” 415-417.
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The charges leveled by the neo-Garrisonians are, in a way, easy
to make. They have two hundred years of historical hindsight to
stand upon, including a brutal Civil War, decades of lynches, and a
civil rights struggle still unfolding to this day. From this perspective,
it seems unusual and indeed absurd that the men who wrote the
Constitution did little, if anything, to place slavery on the road to
extinction. In the late 1780s a small window was opened by the
recent wave of natural rights ideology brought on by the Revolution,
and it seems as though the Framers missed the one golden
opportunity they had to abolish forever the inhumane practice. On
face value, this theory has some merit. Slavery was not abolished in
1787, and there were compromises made during the Convention that
allowed for it to continue. But compromise is a two-way street, and
the southern proslavery delegates may have given up just as much to
keep their slaves than antislavery delegates yielded to their demands.
Southern delegates conceded much to the antislavery forces at
the Convention, including the “strengthening of the National
Government, especially with respect to the regulation of commerce
and the levying of taxes.” Provisions also allowed Western states to
enter the Union “on an equal footing with the original States.”7 Earl
M. Maltz has described what the “ideal Constitution” would have
looked like from the slave state perspective. If the slaveholding
delegates had gotten all they wanted, “Congress would be apportioned
according to population, with slaves counted fully in the basis of
representation.” In addition, slaves “would not be considered in
determining liability for capitation taxes.” Only a supermajority in
Congress could pass navigation acts, and the power to tax exports
would be an exclusive state power. Finally, South Carolina and
Georgia, “the two most radical slave states,” would have expressly
forbade Congress from ever interfering with the slave trade or even
taxing those slaves imported. From this perspective, it is difficult to
suggest that the compromises over slavery reflected an
“overwhelming victory for the slave states” at the Convention.8
When slavery was brought up during the Convention, South
Carolina’s Charles Pinckney defended the practice on historical
grounds, and Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth “on grounds of
expediency.” Despite these justifications, “the defenders of slavery
were an isolated and embarrassed minority.”9 A clear majority of not
George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography, 64.
Earl M. Maltz, “The Idea of the Proslavery Constitution,” 41-2.
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only states, but individual delegates, wished to either end the practice
or at least sanction it and restrict its growth. This is reflected in the
final draft of the Constitution, which did not establish any general law
endorsing slavery, but instead “established laws to regulate a
condition already existing.” The primary purpose of those laws and
regulations “was to confine slavery to those places where it then
existed with the view of setting slavery on a course of eventual
extinction.”10 The containment powers under the Constitution were
the only means of promoting both liberty and equality at the time,
because slavery was a precondition that directly and indirectly affected
millions of people. As noted earlier, in the South it was a practice
inherited from previous generations, rooted in economic necessity.
Therefore, it is remarkable what the delegates did do to restrict an
institution, and indeed, even a way of life.
“One of the most important, if fleeting, consequences of
Revolutionary Northern abolition and the resulting legal sectionalism
of slavery,” writes Anthony Iaccarino, “was the fact that the delegates
to the Convention explicitly restricted slavery’s legality to state, not
federal law.”11 Iaccarino is correct on one level: the slave trade clause
prevented the federal government from ending the trade for twenty
years, and the fugitive slave clause allowed citizens of one state to
retrieve their fleeing slaves from another. However, relegating
slavery to state control prevented the federal government from ever
approving the practice in its higher law. With such words as “justly”
and “lawfully” removed from the final draft, it was implicitly defined
as a local state custom and not higher law, thus reflecting its dubious
nature.12 This careful phrasing “carried no implication of national
sanction or protection of the institution, and it lent no explicit
reinforcement to the idea of human property.”13 While Finkelman
states that southerners tried to avoid using the actual term slave in the
Constitution because “they did not want unnecessarily to antagonize
their colleagues from the North,” it is still significant that the
document is free of the word.14 Nowhere is it specifically recognized,
thus adding weight to the argument that the “language of the
10 John Alvis, “The Slavery Provisions of the U.S. Constitution: Means
for Emancipation,” 244.
11 Anthony Iaccarino, “Virginia and the National Contest Over Slavery
in the Early Republic, 1780-1833,” 46.
12 Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln, 56.
13 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 41.
14 Finkelman writes that North Carolina delegate James Iredell
explained that “The word slave is not mentioned” because “the northern
delegates, owing to their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not
choose the word slave to be mentioned.” Finkelman, “Founders and Slavery,”
232.
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document conveys a stance towards slavery that can be fairly
characterized as a stance against it in principle.”15
Throughout the debates, the southernmost states threatened to
leave the Convention if certain concessions regarding slavery were not
made. These eventual compromises not only extinguished this serious
threat of disunion from South Carolina and Georgia, but they also
prevented those states from establishing a separate confederacy free of
any limitations on slavery. Historians have thoroughly studied the
need for compromise in order to preserve the Union. Martin
Torodash writes that “Failure to recognize the institution would have
resulted in failure of the scheme of the Constitution.” Daniel Waite
Howe says that “it is certain that South Carolina and Georgia would
not ratify the Constitution without the concessions made to slavery.”
“To expect the southern states to join the Union…was both
unreasonable and unrealistic,” writes Earl Maltz.
Peter S. Onuf has called attention to “the problematic character
of the union—and the very real possibility of disunion,” during the
years immediately preceding the Convention. Conflicts over access to
western lands, anger over a feeble navigation treaty, the slow pace of
the Confederation Congress, and widespread dissatisfaction with taxes
led many to consider “radical alternatives”, including “the creation of
new regional confederations.”16 In late November 1787, after the
Constitution had been distributed to the general population, George
Washington still believed that “there are characters who prefer
disunion, or separate Confederacies,” saying that “nothing in my
conception is more to be deprecated than a disunion.”17 John Jay
warned a month earlier that “politicians now appear, who insist…that
instead of looking for safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek
it in a division of the states into distinct confederacies or
sovereignties,” and Alexander Hamilton said that “we already we hear
it whispered in the private circles of those who oppose the new
constitution, that the Thirteen States are of too great extent for any
general system, and that we must of necessity resort to separate
confederacies of distinct portions of the whole.”18
Clearly the most important objective at the Convention was to
preserve the Union, and the compromises on slavery reflect that goal.
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The Slave Trade And The Constitutional Convention
Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
understood that the slave trade could only be sanctioned, and perhaps
prohibited, by investing the federal government with broad powers.
At the same time, though, there was strong opposition towards any
proposal which limited the practice, most notably from South Carolina
and Georgia delegates. These southern delegates used the threat of
disunion to gain leverage in the debates, claiming that an end to the
slave trade would prevent them from signing the Constitution. For
example, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina declared that his state
“can never receive the plan if it prohibits the slave trade.” He added
that if each state was left to either stop or continue the trade, as was
the practice under the Articles, “South Carolina may perhaps, by
degrees, do of herself what is wished…”19 Fellow South Carolinian
John Rutledge said that the “true question at present is, whether the
Southern States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.”20 Rutledge
himself delivered a special committee report on August 6, proposing
that Congress can neither prohibit the importation of “such persons as
the several States shall think proper to admit,” nor tax them.21
The small contingent of southern delegates who wished to
protect the slave trade faced a strong opposition from the northern
and middle states, including upper-south delegates from Maryland
and Virginia. These delegates opposed the trade for various reasons.
Some believed the entire practice of slavery to be morally wrong.
Virginia’s George Mason called the trade an “infernal traffic” and
famously opined that “Every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant.
They bring the judgment of heaven on a Country.”22 Others, such as
Massachusetts delegate Rufus King, thought that an increased slave
population would invite domestic insurrection and foreign invasion.
“Shall all the States…be bound to defend each,” he asked, “and shall
each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence
more difficult?”23 Despite the various reasons for opposing the trade,
the majority opinion in the Convention universally wished for it to be
sanctioned, or prohibited, under the Constitution.
The South Carolina and Georgia delegates maintained that
their respective states would not agree to any federal government that
ended the slave trade. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles
Pinckney’s cousin, said plainly, “South Carolina and Georgia cannot
do without slaves.” If the Convention rejected the report on the slave
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trade, it would mean “an exclusion of South Carolina from the
Union.”24 Georgia’s Abraham Baldwin said that a national
government should take on “national objects” only, not local practices.
If his state were left alone, “she may probably put a stop to the evil.”25
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina thought “the Southern States
could not be members of the Union if the clause should be rejected,
and that it was wrong to force any thing down, not absolutely
necessary….”26 Rutledge spoke the loudest when he stood to declare
an ultimatum. “If the Convention thinks that North Carolina, South
Carolina and Georgia will ever agree to the plan, unless their right to
import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The people of
those states will never be such fools as to give up so important an
interest.”27
Virginia’s Edmund Randolph undoubtedly spoke for many
when he wished “that some middle ground might, if possible, be
found.” If Rutledge’s proposal, forbidding any federal interference
with the trade, became a part of the Constitution, Randolph and many
other northern and middle state delegates would have to deal with
angry antislavery constituencies in open revolt. “On the other hand,”
he said “two States might be lost to the Union.”28 This dilemma
brought the delegates to the table of compromise for the sake of the
Union. On August 24, the special committee returned with a revised
clause, which stated, “The migration or importation of such persons as
the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not
be prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1800, but a tax or
duty may be imposed on such migration or importation…”29 The next
day, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney asked that the trade be kept opened
until 1808, and several other delegates called for a ten dollar
maximum tax on each slave imported.30 Both motions were agreed to,
but James Madison reminded the delegates that “Twenty years will
produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to
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import slaves. So long a term will be dishonorable to the American
character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution.”31 In
twenty years, Congress would in fact outlaw the slave trade, thus
exerting its authority the first year it could do so.
Despite these limiting actions taken both in 1787 and 1808,
historians have not been unified in their praise for the founders.
Finkelman is critical that the Constitution “prevented the national
government from stopping the African slave trade or the domestic
slave trade for at least twenty years.” He also notes that in 1787 no
state was in fact importing slaves. Therefore, “it is reasonable to
believe that the Slave Trade Clause was unnecessary to secure support
for the Constitution.”32 Matthew E. Mason decries the twenty year
window in the clause because from 1803 to 1807, South Carolina alone
imported “tens of thousands of new slaves…a number far in excess of
the state’s need for labor.”33 Eric Foner more generally criticizes the
Convention, saying, “Whatever its other merits, the Constitution
represented a step backwards when it came to slavery.” Indeed, as
Don Fehrenbacher writes, recent historical accounts are “virtually an
indictment of the members of the Constitutional Convention. They
are accused of passing up a golden opportunity to take action against
slavery and of drafting instead a frame of government that legitimated
and protected the institution.”34
There are several important aspects of the slave trade clause,
and the overall history of the trade, which must be addressed in order
to demonstrate that these historians are mistaken. First, the history
prior to the Convention shows that the slave trade was prohibited by
all the states only under duress, when war with Britain required a
unified trading prohibition. More importantly, the Continental
Association of the Revolutionary years was a purely voluntary
commitment, neither binding nor enforceable. The states individually
agreed to end the slave trade for a period of time, and some eventually
chose to start it again.
This was the same situation among the states under the
Articles of Confederation. Several states outlawed the slave trade in
their respective legislatures, while others continued the trade as
needed. This “state sovereignty” approach stands in contrast to
Congress’s national authority under the Constitution. Despite the
twenty-year continuance, ending the trade was a power expressly
granted to Congress. James Madison reiterated the importance of this

new federal power during the Virginia ratifying convention in 1788.
“We are not in a worse situation than before,” he said. “The union in
general is not in a worse situation.
Under the articles of
confederation, it might be continued forever: But by this clause an end
may be put to it after twenty years. There is therefore an amelioration
of our circumstances.”35
The very wording of the clause itself is also significant, because
in every instance, the language is at odds with slavery. The first
portion, “The Migration or Importation of such Persons,” says
nothing of slaves or slavery. While it is acknowledged that “such
persons” meant slaves, it is critical that the word is not in the clause,
nor in any part of the Constitution. John Alvis recognizes this
important omission, writing that “the avoidance of any explicit
acknowledgment of slavery suggests that one cannot look to the
supreme law of the land for authorization in owning human beings.
Ownership of men will not derive from federal authority.”36
Designating slaves as “persons” also conferred upon them some level
of rights under the broad definition Jefferson outlined in the
Declaration of Independence. “Persons” have natural rights, such as
the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The use of
“persons” is a clear sign that those antislavery delegates at the
Convention sought to offer slavery the least possible protection under
the new government.
The second portion of the clause pertains to “any of the States
now existing.” This subtle phrase gave Congress federal power to
prohibit the slave trade in any new states admitted to the Union.
Congress was only barred from legislating against the slave trade in
the thirteen states existing in 1787, and more specifically, to those
southern states who did in fact engage in the practice. This
restriction, when read in conjunction with the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787 which outlawed slavery in the Northwest Territory, “indicated
a general disposition to view slavery as the exception rather than the
rule in an expanding government.”37 Alvis has said that with this
important qualification, “at least one door was closed to the admission
of slaves into new lands.”38
The last provision of the clause says that a maximum duty of
ten dollars may be placed on each slave imported. This tax was not
meant to demean slaves as being equivalent to taxable goods or
merchandise. Indeed, during the Convention debates, Roger Sherman
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of Connecticut said he was against laying taxes on slaves, “as
acknowledging men to be property, by taxing them as such under the
character of slaves.” Massachusetts’s Nathaniel Gorham asked
Sherman to reconsider, “not as implying that slaves are property, but
as a discouragement to the importation of them.”39 Many southerners
realized the crippling affect that taxing slaves would have on the
South. During the South Carolina ratification debates, Rawlins
Lowndes said that even with the twenty year concession, “care had
been taken to make us pay for this indulgence.” “Negroes were our
wealth,” he said, “our only natural resource, yet behold how our kind
friends in the North were determined soon to tie up our hands, and
drain us of what we had.”40 When the final draft of the clause is
compared with John Rutledge’s original proposal, which barred
Congress from either interfering with the slave trade or taxing any
import, the result was a positive gain for antislavery proponents.
The need for compromise in order to preserve the union has
been thoroughly studied, but few historians have taken the next
logical step to ask what the plight of slaves would have been under a
southern confederacy. Would they have been better off under a
southern union of states rather than the Constitution, or is such
postulating ahistorical by nature? For as much as neo-Garrisonians
have criticized the founders, they have at least acknowledged the
consequences of disunion. Finkelman states that if the northern
delegates had tried to outright end slavery nationally, “most of the
delegates from south of the Mason-Dixon line would have walked out.
Rather than creating a ‘more perfect Union,’ the delegates might have
destroyed the Union altogether if they had pushed for abolition.” But
rather than emphasize the importance of compromise for the sake of
keeping that very Union together, he says, “It is not unreasonable to
ask if the Framers might have been better off creating two separate
nations, one based on slavery and one based on liberty.” Finkelman
believes that the problem could have been solved by cutting off the
problem, thus making it a non-issue.41
What Finkelman fails to recognize is that the threat of disunion
highlights the necessity for compromise on the slave trade. Every
time slavery was subjected to criticism during the Convention debates,
the South Carolina and Georgia delegates threatened to leave the
Union. Finkelman has been highly suspicious of these threats,
claiming that the creation of a separate Southern confederacy seemed
at best “unlikely.” He says that if the framers had done nothing about
the slave trade, “it is likely the Constitution would have been ratified”
and that South Carolina “might have pouted for a while and perhaps

not been one of the early states to ratify. But the state would have
quickly realized that it was in no condition to go it alone.”42
Finkelman’s theory rests on the dubious assumption that the
South would be weakened without the defensive protections offered by
the Union, and he fails to realize the enormous gains the slaveholding
states would reap without any limitations on slavery. An independent
Southern confederacy would be free to continue the slave trade
indefinitely; it would certainly not tax any slave imports, and the
institution in general would largely be free of criticism. James
Madison echoed this fear at the ratification debates when he reminded
his fellow Virginians that South Carolina and Georgia would not have
joined the Union if the slave trade was immediately outlawed. 43 The
framers never entertained the thought of splitting the states into two
countries, because the consequences would have been detrimental to
the entire nation.
Finkelman’s “all or nothing” approach indeed would have
benefited neither the northern or southern states. George Anastaplo
has reasoned that if the work in Philadelphia had ended without
agreement and the Union was disbanded, “The South would have been
left as an independent, slavery-dominated country.” There were
“reasons to believe that [a Southern Union] would have been…an
expansionist power, moving with its slave codes into the Gulf of
Mexico, Cuba, Mexico, and even further South.” In contrast to
Finkelman, he says that “such a Southern move to go it alone probably
could not have been stopped in 1787.”44 “What, then, was in the
interest of the slaves,” he asks. “[T]o be abandoned completely to the
control of a country governed altogether by the slaveholding interests
or to be left in a country in which compromises had to be made with
slavery in order to preserve” the Union?”45 From this perspective, it is
not only reasonable that such compromises, and even concessions,
were made at the Convention, but it was the only way to prevent
slavery from being sealed off from attack in a separate sovereign
confederacy.
Anastaplo’s theory has merit, because the rising antislavery
opposition detailed earlier was at the time still diffuse and lacked the
structure it would develop in the nineteenth century. Pennsylvania
Quakers and Methodist and Virginia Baptists had been petitioning
Congress for restrictions on the slave trade since the early 1780s, but
there never was any coordination to their efforts, and instead their
petitions amounted to complaint letters. At the time of the
Convention, slavery was “supported by the laws of every state except
Finkelman, “The Founders and Slavery,” 436-7.
Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution: Part Two, 707.
44 George Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln: A Constitutional Biography, 62-4.
45 Anastaplo, Abraham Lincoln, 62.
42

Kaminski, 63-4.
40 Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Debate on the Constitution: Part Two, 21.
41 Finkelman, “The Founders and Slavery,” 415.

43

39

105

106

Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts,” while the practice and
acceptance of the institution had been entrenched in the southern
mind for generations.46 It therefore is extraordinary that not only was
the slave trade limited and ultimately abolished, but that a nascent
antislavery opposition made significant Constitutional gains at a time
when slavery was the accepted norm.
In addition, the ideal slave state Constitution which Maltz
describes adds further proof that the final product was antislavery in
its overall language. The final draft consigned slavery to state custom
and gave it no direct federal protection. Simultaneously, it established
a national forum, the United States Congress, where the issue could be
questioned and debated. Although by 1787 slavery was deeply
ingrained in the country, the Constitution gave the government the
means to restrict its growth, and the opportunity to discuss its merits.
Debates Outside The Convention
During the ratification debates in the state legislatures, the
slave trade was the most contentious of all the slavery clauses.
Delegates to these conventions held numerous opinions on the
compromise, and their arguments for and against the trade
demonstrate a real concern that the greater institution of slavery
would ultimately be either expressly legalized or entirely criminal. In
northern conventions, delegates eased their constituents’ fears by
pointing to the fact that the word “slavery” was never mentioned in
the Constitution. “Northern delegates could return home asserting
that the Constitution did not recognize the legality of slavery,” writes
Finkelman. “In the most technical linguistic sense they were perhaps
right.”47
Here, Finkelman misjudges the importance of such an omission.
If the framers sanctioned that which they could not bring themselves
to name, what does this say about the Constitution they wrote? Most
assuredly, that such a term was anathema to them. On another level,
putting slaves on par with other persons speaks to the document’s
universal nature. If the framers intended to keep slavery protected in
the Constitution, then why was it only vaguely referred to? The
answer cannot be that “persons” would be more palatable to northern
ears, because if everyone knew that “persons” meant slaves, then why
go through pains to not have slavery written into the document? The
only logical answer is that the framers intended to write a charter of
government that transcended the present local perplexities and
customs within various regions, one that spoke to current and future
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generations, even for those who in 1787 were doomed to perpetual
servitude.
The slave trade clause was discussed more than any other issue
related to slavery in the ratifying conventions, mainly because of its
potential to limit the trade in the future, but also because many
believed it amounted to a delayed power of abolishment. Many
northern citizens lamented the very practice, but looked toward a
promising pattern emerging in many states. Simeon Baldwin of
Connecticut said that most “of the southern & middle states have
made salutary provision by law for the future emancipation of this
unfortunate race of men,” and it was enlightening that the southern
states had “consented to [the slave trade clause] in our new
constitution evidently calculated to abolish a slavery upon which they
calculated their riches.”48
Even before the Constitution was sent to the states for debate
and ratification, the political propaganda and campaigning had already
begun. In early October 1787, just weeks after the Convention ended,
Pennsylvania state representative Robert Waln wrote to his brother
in Philadelphia about the Constitution’s power to influence slavery.
Waln thought that “as each state is still at liberty to enact such laws
for the abolition of slavery as they may think proper, the Convention
cannot be charg’d with holding out any encouragement to it.”49 Noah
Webster believed the Constitution wisely allowed each state to decide
on emancipation, because an “immediate abolition of slavery would
bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon the blacks, in the
southern states.” During the twenty-one years before Congress could
outlaw the slave trade, each state was free to “pursue its own
measures.”50
Northern newspapers were filled with abolitionist and
antislavery tracts, and they led the initial assault on slavery and the
slave trade in the fall of 1787. The Providence United States Chronicle
referred to the trade as the “horrid Practice” and “that Heaven-daring
Wickedness.”51 Tench Coxe wrote that the slave trade clause laid a
“solid foundation…for exploding the principles of negro slavery.” He
reasoned that any “temporary reservation…must be deemed an
admission that it should be done away.”52 Samuel Hopkins, however,
did not agree that the slave trade clause benefited the cause. The
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delegates, Hopkins wrote to Moses Brown, “have carefully secured the
practice of it in these States for 20 years…They have taken it out of
the hands of Congress.” Hopkins also believed that compromises such
as this were necessary to establishing the Constitution. He knew that
the southern delegates had insisted on the slave trade provision, and
“obstinately refused to consent to any constitution, which did not
secure it.” Therefore, it was apparent to him “that if this constitution
be not adopted by the States, as it now stands, we shall have none, and
nothing but anarchy and confusion can be expected.”53
William Rotch was less forgiving than Samuel Hopkins, and in
a letter to Moses Brown in November 1787, he wrote that “it is
evident to me [the Constitution] is founded on Slavery and that is on
Blood…”54 Both Rotch’s and Hopkins’s views on the Constitution
relate the essence of northern opinion on the slavery provisions: they
were seen as either a necessity to ward off greater evils (like disunion),
or they were atrocities added purely to placate southerners in some
underhanded bargain. Benjamin Workman strongly voiced his
disapproval of the Constitution, writing how strange it was “that the
professed enemies of negro and every other species of slavery, should
themselves join in the adoption of a constitution whose very basis is
despotism and slavery.” The plan of government, Workman said,
“militates so far against freedom, that even their own religious liberty
may probably be destroyed.”55 Oliver Ellsworth, writing in the
Connecticut Courant, was more optimistic. “The only possible step that
could be taken towards it by the convention was to fix a period after
which they should not be imported.”56
In the Pennsylvania convention, Thomas McKean rejoiced that
the “abolition of slavery is put within the reach of the federal
government.”57 Anthony Wayne, like so many others, compared the
clause to the lack of any restraint under the Articles of Confederation.
James Wilson worked to persuade others that the slave trade had been
dealt a fatal blow. He said that at present “states may admit the
importation of slaves as long as they please,” but “by this article after
the year 1808, the congress will have power to prohibit such
importation…” Wilson thought that Congress’s powers would, or
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should, extend to outright abolition. Combined with the power to tax
imported slaves, he believed the twenty year limit laid “the foundation
for banishing slavery out of this country; and though the period is
more distant than I could wish, yet it will produce the same kind,
gradual change, which was pursued in Pennsylvania.”58 Believing that
the tax on imported slaves was “an immediate advantage,” Wilson told
his fellow delegates that during the subsequent twenty years, “the new
states which are to be formed, will be under the control of
congress…and slaves will never by introduced amongst them.”59 In
his view, the clause was one of the more “lovely” features in the
Constitution. “Yet the lapse of a few years,” he said, “and Congress
will have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders.”60
A large portion of the delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying
convention were uneasy about the slave trade clause. While many
voiced concern that the trade would continue for twenty years, a
strong group of Federalists worked to ease such fears. Reverend Isaac
Backus explained that “we have now gained a check which we had not
before,” hoping that “in time we shall stop the slave trade.”61 He
would also reason that with the delayed prohibition, “a door is now
opened” to end the trade.62 General Samuel Thompson stood to
elaborate on Backus’s rationalization, reminding the convention that
under the Articles of Confederation there was no such prohibitive
power. The Constitution, however, provided “that Congress may,
after 20 years, totally annihilate the slave trade; and that all the states,
except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might reasonably be
expected that it would then be done.” In addition, because “all the
states, except two, have passed laws to this effect, it might reasonably
be expected, that it would then be done.” In the meantime, “all the
states were at liberty to prohibit it.”63
William Heath reminded the Massachusetts convention that
while compromise meant northern states acquiesced to southern
demands protecting the trade, the slave states did not get what they
entirely wanted either. “The federal Convention went as far as they
could,” Heath said. The “migration or importation, &c. is confined to
the States now existing only, new States cannot claim it. Congress by
their ordinance for erecting new States…declared, that the new States
shall be republican, and that there shall be no slavery in them.”64 At
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the same time, though, he cautioned radical antislavery advocates that
in 1808 many southern states would not emancipate their slaves.65
On January 30, Heath elaborated on his conviction that the
north could not force the south to abolish slavery. “Each state is
sovereign and independent to a certain degree,” he said, “and they
have a right, and will regulate their own internal affairs, as to
themselves appears proper.” Heath was expounding upon the notion,
born out of the Revolutionary era, that the individual should ideally be
at liberty to possess private property free of government intrusion.
Bluntly stating that “we are not in this case partakers of other men’s
sins, for in nothing do we voluntarily encourage the slavery of our
fellow men,” he at the same time drew a line between northern
antislavery and southern proslavery ideals.66
The location of slaves influenced the arguments used in the
ratifying conventions. As Fehrenbacher has said, “advocates of
ratification were likely to stress [the Constitution’s] proslavery
features in the South and its antislavery potential in the North.
Opponents of ratification tended to do the reverse.”67 David Ramsay
of Charleston, South Carolina said that though “Congress may forbid
the importation of negroes after 21 years, it does not follow that they
will. On the other hand, it is probable that they will not.” Ramsay
believed the rice crops would increase business in the north, and they
would in turn allow for the slave trade to continue.68 In such upper
south states as Virginia, however, it was difficult to frame the
Constitution either way, because there was a strong mixture of both
pro- and antislavery sentiment in the area. At the Virginia
convention, George Mason and James Madison both pointed out that
the clauses concerning the general welfare and defense, and those
pertaining to taxation, could be interpreted as expressly opposing
slavery. “Their expressed concerns should give pause to historians
who suggest that the Constitution was an unequivocally proslavery
document,” writes Anthony Iaccarino.69
The genuine disagreement in Virginia over whether slavery
would be protected or abolished under the Constitution highlights the
institution’s potential vulnerability at the time, and shows that all did
not agree that it was safe from federal intervention. Patrick Henry
thought that several confederacies would best protect slavery, and he
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believed such a framework was possible at the time. “Compared to
such a consolidation, small Confederacies are little evils,” he said.
Virginia and North Carolina “could exist separated from the rest of
America” and they would not be “swallowed up” in any Union they did
not agree to.70 Zachariah Johnston reminded his fellow Virginians
that, though slavery was at least acknowledged under the
Constitution, the document as a whole was better than anything yet
produced. “This Constitution may have defects,” he said. “There can
be no human institution without defects. We must go out of this
world to find it otherwise. The annals of mankind do not shew us one
example of a perfect Constitution.”71
A dissolution of the union was on the minds of many citizens
when they read the slavery provisions, and they realized that such
concessions were needed in order to maintain a solid union of states.
Governor Edmund Randolph gave an impassioned speech on the
consequences of failure. “I entertain no less horror at the thought of
partial confederacies,” he wrote. A confederacy composed of southern
states would be weighed down by their slave populations; their ability
to defend themselves would be diminished “by the mixture of unhappy
species of property.”72 George Washington also believed secession
was not only dreadful, but a very real possibility. “I am fully
persuaded it is the best that can be obtained at this Time,” he said, “and
that it or Disunion is before us to choose from.”73 Still, there were
many who supported Simeon Baldwin’s view that “an odious slavery,
cruel in itself, degrading to the dignity of man, and shocking to human
nature, is tolerated, and in many instances practised with barbarian
cruelty.” Threat of disunion or not, Baldwin scorned the delegates for
missing a prime opportunity to abolish the institution.74
As mentioned earlier, Virginia’s George Mason emerged as the
leading opponent of the slave trade, but his criticism conflicted with
his firm belief that slavery within the states should be protected. On
June 11, 1788, he spoke of “the continuation of this detestable trade,”
but then complained that “there is no clause in the Constitution that
will prevent the Northern and Eastern States from meddling with our
whole property of that kind. He argued for a clause “to secure us that
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property, which we have acquired under our former laws, and the loss
of which would bring ruin on a great many people.”75 Incredulous,
Henry Lee explained that Mason “abominates [the Constitution],
because it does not prohibit the importation of slaves, and because it
does not secure the continuance of the existing slavery!” Lee asked, “if
it be reprehensible in the one case, it can be censurable in the other?”76
Mason tried to elaborate on his position, explaining that “the
augmentation of slaves weakens the States; and such a trade is
diabolical in itself, and disgraceful to mankind.” He even said that he
“would not admit the Southern States into the Union, unless they
agreed to the discontinuance of this disgraceful trade,” because it
would weaken the Union.77 It seems Mason opposed the slave trade
more because he thought it weakened the nation’s defensive
capabilities, and less because of its “disgraceful” nature. Indeed, it was
difficult for him to criticize a trade providing the landed gentry of
which he was a part with the very species of property he wished to
protect. On the contrary, Mason had ample reason to abhor the trade
but tolerate the practice of slavery. In 1787-88 Virginia had a surplus
of slaves and did not need anymore; slave owners sought to sell the
excess slaves to planters from other states, and therefore wanted
greater protection for a commodity that was scarce elsewhere.
James Madison, rising to answer Mason’s charges, agreed that
such a clause would seem imprudent, “if it were on of those things
which could be excluded without encountering greater evils.” Such an
evil was disunion, Madison explained. “The Southern States would
not have entered into the Union of America, without the temporary
permission of that trade. And if they were excluded from the Union,
the consequences might be dreadful to them and to us.”78 Turning to
the language of the clause itself, Madison said, “We are not in a worse
situation than before.” Virginia already prohibited the trade, and they
were free to continue its proscription. Even the Union was better off
with the clause, because “an end may be put to it after twenty years,”
and a tax “may be laid in the meantime.”
The slave trade compromise, when compared to no sanctions or
rules under the Articles, provided “an amelioration of our
circumstances.” Madison again reminded Mason and others that,
“Great as the evil is, a dismemberment of the Union would be worse.
If those States should disunite from the other States, for not indulging
them in the temporary continuance of this traffic, they might solicit

and obtain aid from foreign powers.”79 George Nicholas readily
agreed with Madison that disunion was worse than twenty years more
of the slave trade. “As the Southern States would not confederate
without this clause,” Nicholas asked “if Gentlemen would rather
dissolve the Confederacy than to suffer this temporary inconvenience,
admitting it to be such?”80 The point was clear: the southernmost
states would not have signed the Constitution if slavery was abolished.
If the northern, middle, and upper south ratifying conventions
demonstrate a consistent belief that the slave trade was put in
jeopardy under the Constitution, then it seems that Deep South
conventions should conversely be pervasive with defenses of the trade,
and praise for its continuation. Instead, many southerners were upset
that the trade would be subject to review in twenty years, and they
criticized their delegates for bargaining away their rights to import
slaves. For example, in the South Carolina House of Representatives
Rawlins Lowndes asked pointedly, “Why confine us to 20 years, or
rather why limit us at all?” He thought “this trade could be justified
on the principles of religion, humanity and justice,” and without
slaves, “this state would degenerate into one of the most contemptible
in the union.” While slaves “were our wealth, our only natural
resource,” the northern states “were determined soon to tie up our
hands, and drain us of what we had.” Citing the lack of any
restrictions on New England importations, Lowndes wondered why
anyone would “call this a reciprocal bargain, which took all from one
party to bestow it on the other?”81
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had bargained for the slave
trade clause in Philadelphia, tried to answer Lowndes’s charges.
Pickney said that the South Carolina and Georgia delegations “had to
contend with the religious and political privileges of the eastern and
middle states, and with the interested and inconsistent opinion of
Virginia, who was warmly opposed to our importing more slaves.”
The southernmost states could not acquire an unsanctioned slave
trade; they had to bargain for any allowance. Turning to the clause
itself, Pinckney highlighted the advantageous portions for the House
members. “By this settlement we have secured an unlimited
importation of negroes for twenty years; nor is it declared that the
importation shall be then stopped; it may be continued.” In addition,
the south would have “a security that the general government can
never emancipate them, for no such authority is granted.” When all
the circumstances were considered, Pinckney thought “we have made
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the best terms for the security of this species of property it was in our
power to make.”82 Robert Barnwell stood to support Pickney, saying
that “Congress has guaranteed this right for that space of time, and at
is expiration may continue it as long as they please.”83 Picnkey and
Barnwell were correct in a sense, but in another, the limited power of
the new government with respect to slavery implicitly acknowledged
that such powers needed to be stated. The very act of stating powers,
or restrictions on power, implies that they have been challenged,
either in the Federal Convention or in public opinion throughout the
country. That such powers and restrictions were necessary to settle
disputes of ambiguity points to a certain degree of slavery’s
vulnerability. To men like Rawlins Lowndes, the delegates had not
attained a ringing endorsement of slavery, but only a temporary
continuation of a vital “resource.”
During the North Carolina ratifying convention slavery was,
for some, a problem with no clear solution; the slave trade clause
presented an opportunity to limit at least one aspect of the practice.
On July 26, 1788, James Iredell said that “were it practicable to put an
end to the importation of slaves immediately, it would give me the
greatest pleasure; for it certainly is a trade inconsistent with the rights
of humanity, and under which great cruelties have been exercised.”
While he believed that emancipation “will be an event which must be
pleasing to every generous mind, and every friend of human nature,”
he added that “we often wish for things which are not attainable.”84
The final version of the clause settled upon, Iredell explained, “was the
utmost that could be obtained.” Wishing that more could have been
done, he asked the convention delegates, “Where is there another
country in which such a restriction prevails? We, therefore…set an
example of humanity, by providing for the abolition of this inhuman
traffic, though at a distant period.”85 James Galloway also spoke in
favor of the clause, saying he wished “to see this abominable trade put
an end to.”86
The debates over the slave trade in the state ratifying
conventions suggest that the majority of delegates voting on the
Constitution wished for the trade to end as soon as possible, while
many also despised the larger practice of slavery. Only in the Deep
South was slavery, much less the importation of slaves, viewed as
something along the lines of a positive good. Those advocates such as
82
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Charles Pinckney, who judged the slave trade clause as great
concession to the south, were in the clear minority, but the fact
remains that it was indeed added to the Constitution.
Despite the fervent antislavery stance in the northern and
middle states, the established government would allow for the slave
trade to continue. It is clear, however, that while the Constitution
indirectly acknowledged slavery to exist within the states, this was in
no way a positive endorsement of the institution, much less the
importation of slaves. The slave trade clause was the most forceful
stance a fledgling country could take at a time when disunion was a
genuine threat. A nation that had cut ties with slave states would
never see the problem diminish, but only expand and grow at an even
faster rate. The slave trade clause restricted this expansion and
stunted this growth.
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The Civil War was the most tragic of American wars. It pitted
neighbors against neighbors, sons against fathers, and the citizens of
America against their fellow citizens. Amidst the men caught in the
maelstrom, Native Americans fought admirably on both sides of the
conflict. America was divided, but not often remembered was a similar
division driven through the Cherokee Nation, that was as bad if not
worse than that of America as a whole. For the Cherokee, the war was
not fought for the same reasons as it was for white Americans. The
division within the tribe was not simply North versus South, or
merely pro-slavery versus abolitionist, but also had within its confines
a division of full-blood versus mixed-blood and in some ways, a
division based upon whether or not the Cherokee should trust the
American government. One of the most paramount of the divisions
was based upon the feud between John Ross and Stand Watie, which
had existed for decades. Watie had been one of the four leaders who
had signed the treaty in the 1830s that moved the Cherokee to the
reservation in Oklahoma.1 The decision divided the tribe, although
most were not in favor of relocation. After arriving in Oklahoma, the
feud between Watie and Ross fermented over time. Because of this
feud, the Cherokee nation had its own civil war that finally appeared
to end when principal chief John Ross and Stand Watie shook hands
and signed a treaty that established one Cherokee government,
recognized all Cherokee land claims, and pardoned all who had signed
the removal treaty.2 The feud between the two men and their
respective factions seemed to die as the Cherokee nation rebuilt itself.
Where there was once two factions there existed one tribe that
seemingly worked together to empower its government, educate its
children, and strengthen its infrastructure.3 Unfortunately, as time
would tell, the Civil War would again divide the tribe along the same
fault-lines as the earlier feud, splitting the Cherokee into factions more

distinct than they had been in the past. This division ultimately caused
significant losses for the Cherokee Nation, in terms of economy,
government, and the lives of its people.
In 1860, John Ross, then principal chief of the Cherokee, was
determined to keep his tribe neutral, and he encouraged the
surrounding tribes to do the same.4 But, maintaining neutrality was a
difficult task. Southern tacticians saw the benefits of an alliance with
the Cherokee Nation. Indian Territory was perfectly placed to provide
sustenance for Southern troops, to build bases for raiding the Union,
and it offered a clear route to Texas.5 Having access to Indian
Territory would prove most beneficial to the Confederates and they
quickly and aggressively sought the favor of the territorial chiefs,
most notably John Ross.6
As the Confederacy maneuvered to gain an alliance with the
Cherokee, the tribe began to divide into two factions, one supporting
the Union and the other the Confederacy. In addition to the old line
drawn between Ross and Watie, there emerged new differences for the
factions to fight for. Each group saw benefits where the other saw
drawbacks. Ross originally favored neutrality because he longed to
avoid bloodshed and the loss of his people, but Watie envisioned all
that could be gained by siding with the Confederacy. As a slaveholder
who had become invested in both agriculture and commerce, Watie
felt that the Civil War was an opportunity for those investments as
well as an opportunity to topple John Ross’s political power.7 Ross
was also a slaveholder, but he and many of his supporters were wary
of the Confederacy because many of the Southerners seeking an
alliance were the same men who had been involved with the
confiscation of sacred lands.8 While Ross’s supporters were wary of
the Confederates, Watie’s supporters were not. Watie already had
many followers due to his success and involvement in the Cherokee
pro-slavery group, The Knights of the Golden Circle.9 In spring of
1861, the Confederacy asked Watie and his followers to join them. By
July of the same year, Watie was commissioned in the Confederate
army as a colonel. His support quickly grew, and he rallied many more
Cherokees to the Confederate cause.10
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Initially, Ross successfully maintained neutrality, but as time
passed, he realized that the Confederacy completely enveloped
Cherokee land and that Watie and his followers had already allied
themselves with the Confederacy.11 The Cherokee Nation was
essentially an island in the ocean of the South. The Confederates
continuously wrote letters and sent delegates offering the Cherokee
enticing benefits to an alliance such as permanent ownership of their
territory, large annuity payments, and representation in Confederate
Congress.12 John Ross handled the pressures and the temptations
throughout the various meetings and letters until it became apparent
that Watie’s group had already formed a regiment and had been
armed by the Confederacy.13 Knowing that Watie’s group would use
these weapons to attempt to depose him, Ross called a general council
on October 7, 1861, following his reception of a final letter from the
Confederacy proposing a beneficial alliance and explaining that the
majority of the other tribes in the Indian Territory had already made
treaties with the Confederates.14 At that point in time, it appeared that
the South would be victorious, meaning that the nation would remain
divided, and since Indian Territory was geographically positioned in
the South, it made sense for the Cherokee Nation to support the
Confederacy.15 Thusly, it was not surprising that at the general
council, which was open to all Cherokees, Ross and his followers
explained that given the situation in which they found themselves, the
wisest course of action for the Cherokee would be to ally themselves
with the South.16
The Confederacy proved to be an unpleasant ally to the
Cherokee Nation, however, and the alliance would not last. After the
Confederacy forced the Cherokee to attack a band of Creeks led by an
old friend and ally, Opothleyohola, at the battle of Red Fork on
November 19th, the battle of Bird Creek on December 9th, and finally
on December 26th of 1861 at Chustenahla, Reverend Evan Jones plead
Ross’s case before the Indian Commissioner W.P. Dole.17 Jones cited
lack of protection by the Union, threats from the Confederacy, and the
alliance of neighboring tribes in defending Ross and his decision to
ally with the Confederacy.18 Ross was eventually given a chance to
explain his actions to the Union and to repudiate the treaty he signed

with the Confederates.19 Ross reaffirmed his and his tribe’s loyalty to
the Union upon meeting with President Lincoln in Washington D.C.20
A friendship even developed between the president and the principal
chief, who remained in Washington for the reminder of the war,
eliciting a promise from Lincoln that the treaty with the Confederacy
would not be held against the Cherokee.21
For all practical purposes, Ross was doing all he could to
protect and preserve the Cherokee nation, but at this point, the tribe
itself was divided in a way that mirrored the secession of the
Confederacy from the Union. A rebel group of Cherokee, led by Stand
Watie, remained loyal to the Confederacy. Meanwhile, Watie viewed
Ross’ stay in Washington as desertion and took the opportunity to
seize control of the tribe and become the principal chief of the
Cherokee.22
Watie proved to be a very capable military leader, even though
his soldiers were often poorly armed and lacking in food and
supplies.23 Although his troops would sometimes commit what whites
would view as barbaric atrocities, they did not engage in blind
terrorism; they always followed, and almost always achieved, a
military objective.24 Watie and his troops, unlike many Native
American troops that were viewed as disorganized and poorly trained,
fought exceptionally well during the Civil War, impressing many
Confederate officials and earning Watie the rank of General.25
On the adverse side, many loyal Cherokee fought against the
Confederates. Many of these men lost their lives in battle but even
giving their lives and killing their own people would not gain them
any post-war consideration from the United States.26
During the war, a great many of the loyal Cherokee who did
not fight were simply refugees, living in Kansas, without adequate
food and clothing.27 They were a great burden on Kansas, who
demanded that the Union do something to alleviate the strain. The
Union army made many forays into Indian Territory to reduce
Confederate forces there. When they felt they had made Cherokee
land safe for the refugees to return home and plant crops, they ordered
them to do so.28 Upon their return home, however, they were attacked
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by Watie’s forces, and those that survived were ordered to leave
immediately and to seek refuge at Fort Gibson in Oklahoma. Fort
Gibson was subsequently attacked by the Confederate Cherokee;
however, they were out numbered and out-gunned, and so retreated.
Shortly afterwards, a large number of Union troops left the area,
leaving the loyal Cherokee to their own devices. Just as they had
feared, it was not long until they were attacked again when Watie
returned.29
The Civil War was brutal, and the Cherokee were caught right
in the middle of it, despite Ross’s initial attempts at neutrality. The
Confederate Cherokees had won many decisive battles, and these
victories greatly encouraged the Confederacy and frightened the
Union. But as time pressed on, the major fighting of the Civil War
drifted eastward, away from Cherokee territory, and the Union began
winning more decisive battles. Eventually, it would become clear that
the increased number of Union victories marked the beginning of the
end for the Confederacy.30
Like America itself, the division within the Cherokee nation did
not subside at the end of the war. Watie held the distinction of being
the last general of the Confederate army to surrender.31 Following his
military surrender, however, his faction of the Cherokee nation did not
simply go away. The peace that followed Watie’s surrender was only a
military peace; the two factions still aggressively sought control of the
Cherokee Nation.32 While Union Cherokees were anxious to return to
their homes and begin rebuilding, most Confederate Cherokees were
afraid to return to their homes, as retaliation seemed inevitable, and
many felt that a permanent division of the tribe was the only way to
find true peace and safety.33
Ross and his group of loyal Cherokees argued against the idea
of officially dividing the tribe, believing that such a division would
weaken and inevitably shorten the life of the Cherokee Nation.34 The
Loyal Cherokee Council met on July 13, 1865 and came to the decision
that they would grant a pardon to all Cherokees that had served with
the Confederacy, with the condition that the rebel Cherokees swore an
oath of loyalty to God and the Union.35 This offer of amnesty was
offered to all Confederate Cherokees, with the exception of Watie and
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his closest supporters, who were still in favor of permanently splitting
the tribe.36
The Cherokee Nation faced many problems shortly after the
Civil War had ended. One of the greatest was that even though a large
portion of the tribe had served the Union during the war, the United
States government reneged on Lincoln’s promise to Ross, and decided
that since the Cherokee Nation had forged an alliance with the
Confederacy they had “forfeited and lost all their rights to annuities
and lands.”37 New treaties would have to be arranged but before that
could occur, a decision had to be reached about who was the legitimate
principal chief of the Cherokee Nation, John Ross, or Stand Watie. At
a meeting between commissioners and delegates from Watie’s and
Ross’s factions, commencing on September 8, 1865, the United States
government agents tried to finalize a treaty. Ross was unable to
attend the meeting until September 14, when he was informed that he
was not recognized as the principal chief of the Cherokee and viewed
as an enemy of the Union, most likely because Watie’s faction was
more responsive to the government’s agenda.38
The commissioners representing the United States seemed
responsive to the idea of splitting the Cherokee nation, possibly
because Watie’s faction was willing to accept all the stipulations of the
treaty they were being urged to sign, with the exception of allowing
former slaves to become Cherokee citizens and detribalization under
governmental supervision. This led to the common practice among
commissioners of dealing with the cooperative Watie faction, rather
than with the loyal Cherokees. But, the United States changed its
viewpoint before the end of the treaty process, and encouraged the
Cherokee to remain one united tribe, despite their differences.39 The
Loyal Cherokee reaffirmed John Ross as their principal chief in
October of 1865, and he, along with a set of delegates from his party,
set out at once to arrange a treaty with the United States that would
not divide the Cherokee nation, even as Watie’s faction did everything
it could to undermine Ross’s efforts and his authority as principal
chief.40
In the end, the Cherokee, as a whole, were forced to sign a
treaty that weakened them and robbed them of even more land. Since
the Cherokee Nation had sided with the Confederacy at one point in
time, they were all treated as disloyal. Finally, Watie and Ross agreed
on something; their contention with the treatment the Cherokee
Nation received from the United States. This did not end the feud
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between them, however, and many of Watie’s allies still settled in a
separate section of the territory than the loyal Cherokees.41 Ross died
shortly after the treaty was ratified, but he died knowing that the
Cherokee nation would not be officially divided, although the
Southern Cherokees were given authority to elect their own council
representatives and local offices.42 The treaty was ratified by the
United States, even though the Southern Cherokees did not support it
or even sign it. But the government had decided to treat the Cherokee
as one nation, not two separate nations, and thus, the treaty applied to
both factions within the Cherokee Nation. This treaty, as Grace Steel
Woodward summarized, “abolished slavery forever; proclaimed a
general amnesty; and repealed confiscation laws imposed on southern
Cherokees during the war and restored to these Cherokees their
confiscated property.”43 But the treaty also established federal courts
and military posts within Indian Territory and required the tribe to
cede the Neutral Land and the Cherokee Strip to the United States.44
Not surprisingly, given that a division had existed long before
the war, dating back to the pro-removal and anti-removal parties
present in the 1830s, the division in the Cherokee Nation between the
two factions remained beyond the Civil War. 45 Feelings of
brotherhood between the two factions were non-existent and the
bitterness simply would not dissipate.46 At a time when the Cherokee
nation suffered from a reduced population, striking poverty, and a
desperate need for unity, the two factions still feared one another.47
The same lingering Ross-Watie family feud that had caused problems
before the war still haunted the Cherokee Nation during
Reconstruction, and as it had done during the war, it brought them
nothing but problems.48 The Cherokee did their best to rebuild their
nation. Population slowly increased, as did their prosperity.49 Still, the
division in the tribe remained.
Eventually, the two parties of the Cherokee reconciled, but it
was a slow and laborious task, despite the apparent political unity that
emerged in the late 1860s through the early 1870s.50 Many Cherokees
worked harmoniously to rebuild the nation, but personal fears and
animosities still existed. The true process of uniting as one people was

a gradual one that involved taking small steps little by little to move
towards forgiving the past and becoming one nation.51 Slowly, fears
shrank, people forgave, and the tribe came together. Cherokee unity
took much longer than the reconciliation of the Northern and
Southern states.52
The Civil War was an incredibly bloody war that tore a nation
apart. Within the midst of it, the Cherokee Nation was torn apart as
well. A decades old feud was re-ignited, and it lead to the bloodshed of
Cherokees by Cherokees. This split not only forced Cherokees to fight
their own people, but almost created a permanent division in the
tribe’s government, organization, and worst of all, its people. Like the
United States as a whole, there was no easy way to reconcile such
divisions after the war. For the Cherokee the situation was just as bad;
at least one quarter of the Cherokee population had died, the tribe was
poverty-stricken, and their lack of unity slowed the rebuilding of their
nation and caused multiple governmental and organizational
problems.53 These problems could only be solved by the Cherokee
themselves, because until 1875, when Judge Isaac Charles Parker was
appointed and became determined to restore peace to the Indian
Territory that fell under his jurisdiction, government officials took
little interest in the tribe beyond the possible uses of its land.54
It could be said of the Civil War that the Confederates were not
the losers, but rather the Native American tribes, like the Cherokee,
that were caught in the middle. They fought on both sides of the war,
and in the end, regardless of their allegiance, received no restitution
for their service. In the case of the Cherokee Nation, all were
punished, even those that had fought on the side of the Union. The
Cherokee, having been forcibly removed from their homes merely
decades prior, were once more reduced to a poverty stricken nation.
The Civil War tore their nation in half, diminished their population,
and in effect, took away even more Cherokee rights and land.55 All the
work they had done since relocation was in vain; they were in the
same position that they had worked so hard to get out of. What the
Trail of Tears had done to the Cherokee nation, the Civil War
renewed. It was the Confederates who surrendered the Civil War, but
it was the Cherokee that lost.
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BUCK v. BELL
Ryan D’Arcy
In an age of discrimination and racism, the Supreme Court
interpreted the constitution in ways allowing the use of police powers
to control the characteristics of the American population following
eugenic theory, which was beyond the authority granted to the federal
government. Buck v. Bell (1927) was a keystone case for the practice of
eugenics in the United States. Eugenics was a theory in which a
population tried to control it’s characteristics by determining who
could reproduce and inject their own traits into that population. This
dealt with whether the right to bodily integrity of the inmates of the
State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded were protected in
Virginia, especially the rights of Carrie Buck. The constitutional
question was whether the law requiring the sterilization of such
people deemed feeble-minded was in violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Carrie Buck
was deemed mentally incompetent because she had given birth to a
child out of wedlock, as had her mother. It was determined by the
state that Buck’s daughter was also feeble-minded. The State of
Virginia decided to sterilize Buck to prevent her from further
procreating and perpetuating her defect. The case was decided in
1927, a high period for the eugenics movement in the United States.
This movement tried to control the genetic makeup of society by
writing laws governing procreation. The majority opinion in this case
about eugenics was written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
who was known for judicial restraint.1
Carrie Buck was at a disadvantage from the very beginning of
her case. She was in an institution run by Albert Priddy, one of the
leaders behind the act that would eventually cause her sterilization.
The other main leader behind the act was one of the authors of the
state law, Aubrey Strode, who was the defense attorney for the case.
The reason that the case is called Buck v. Bell rather than Buck v.
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Priddy is that Priddy died, and Dr. John Bell became the
superintendent of the Virginia State institution.2 Dr. Bell was
eventually the person responsible for sterilizing Carrie Buck.3 This
was not the end of Buck’s disadvantage, however. She was to be
represented in court by Irving Whitehead, a close friend of Aubrey
Strode. His lack of effort on her part is evident when one considers his
actions. He neither called expert witnesses nor called character
witnesses to testify on her behalf.4 Legal scholar Paul Lombardo said
that Mr. Whitehead was in fact colluding with the “state’s lawyer to
guarantee that the sterilization law would remain in force.”5 All of
this, combined with a country that was very much in the mood to
believe in eugenics, meant Carrie Buck was never likely to succeed,
and so she did not.
Buck was also at a disadvantage because so many things were
considered to be genetically inheritable at the time. According to Dr.
Lynne Curry, “eugenicists’ notion of ‘inherited traits’ was quite broad
when compared with the twenty-first-century understanding of the
term, encompassing virtually everything one acquired from one’s
parents, from social and economic standing to eye color and physical
height.”6 Strode, when addressing the Supreme Court, also noted in
his statement why Carrie Buck could not offer her own insight. He
said, “She cannot determine the matter for herself both because being
not of full age her judgment is not to be accepted nor would it acquit
the surgeon, and because she is further incapacitated by congenital
mental defect.”7 Justice Holmes, in his majority opinion, said
“Experience has shown that heredity plays an important part in the
transmission of insanity, imbecility, &c.”8 According to eugenic
thought, the social costs of these less than desirable traits could be
erased.9 It should be noted that Carrie Buck’s mental incapacity is in
fact doubtful. As Curry said, “Although Carrie Buck herself was
described as being capable of working constructively under
supervision, a social worker asserted that the fact of her illegitimate
pregnancy was strong evidence of Buck’s feeblemindedness since ‘a
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feeble-minded girl is much more likely to go wrong.”10 Today, this
would hardly be grounds to determine someone as feeble-minded.
To understand why there was only a single dissenting justice
and why he did not write an opinion, it is necessary to understand the
mood of lawmakers at the time of this decision. Following eugenic
theory, many supported limiting immigrants who entered the
country.11 As stated by Curry, this was because:
In their view, the massive influx of eastern and southern
European immigrants bearing criminal and imbecilic tendencies, the
substantial proportion of the native-born population that was nonwhite (and thus self-evidently genetically contaminated), and the
propensity of degenerates of various stripes to multiply at higher rates
than their more desirable fellow citizens had all come together to
create a national epidemic more insidious and more threatening to the
public’s well-being than any contagious disease.12
Many ideas were proposed to prevent further contamination of
American blood, and several were put into place. Many of them were
not even directed at immigrants but were still based on race.
According to Paul Lombardo in The American Breed: Nazi Eugenics and
the Origins of the Pioneer Fund, “eugenicists advocated the elimination
of ‘suspect biology’ using the legal methods of court-ordered eugenical
sterilization, criminalization of interracial marriage and prohibitions
on immigration of groups with ‘inferior genetic potentiality.’”13
White men of Anglo-Saxon descent were in power politically at
that time in history. These men held themselves to be the “normative
standard by which all humans were to be judged.”14 It should be noted
that “Virginia successfully passed both its compulsory sterilization law
and the Racial Integrity Act in the same year the immigration quotas
became national policy.”15 These all seem to be directed at maintaining
white supremacy. The next logical step was for those in power to
make sure that the white race remained in power and a strong race.
This can be done by eliminating the threat of those people with either
real defects or with undesirable characteristics. For example,
undesirable characteristics could include either immorality, as
perceived by those in power at the time, or mixed-race ancestry. The
Curry, The Human Body on Trial, 59.
Benedict, The Blessings of Liberty, 255.
12 Curry, The Human Body on Trial, 58.
13 Paul Lombardo, “The American Breed: Nazi Eugenics and the
Origins of the Pioneer Fund” Albany Law Review (Spring 2002): 743.
14 Curry, The Human Body on Trial, 35.
15 Gregory M. Dorr, “Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim,
and the Supreme Court.” The American Journal of Legal History 42, no. 6 (April
1998): 119-159.
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whites in power wanted to purify their race. This sounds like the
policy adopted by the Nazis prior to World War II
For those politicians who were intent on purifying the white
race, the final subject to deal with was the control of characteristics
within that race. They saw what they were doing as beneficial to
society. The white majority was, after all, the most important part of
society to lawmakers. Justice Holmes understood how legislated
eugenics was supposed to benefit society and included it in his opinion.
He said that “it is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”16 He, in effect, said that it was necessary to
protect society from itself, which is the perfect statement of the
principle of police powers, or the power to control aspects of a society
for the betterment of that society.
A good statement of the police powers can be found in a later
case, Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942). In Skinner, Chief Justice Stone said
that “a state may, after appropriate inquiry, constitutionally interfere
with the personal liberty of the individual to prevent the transmission
by inheritance of his socially injurious tendencies.”17 Curry said that
eugenicists believed that the genetic deterioration of the United
States’ population justified the use of the police powers as a way to
infringe on personal liberties.18 Strode used this argument when he
argued Buck. As his example, he explained how school children were
vaccinated against their will for the good of society as a whole and
equated the compulsory vaccination to the compulsory sterilization in
question in Buck.19
The imperfection of law was not ignored. Holmes said that “the
law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a
policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the
lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”20 This
means that the laws in question should specifically state what type of
person is being targeted. However, the laws are not entirely foolproof
and thus rely on human intuition to apply them accurately. Before
proceeding, it should be noted that Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) was the
court decision that limited the application of Buck v. Bell without
overturning it. The justices in Skinner interpreted the laws more
narrowly when they said that “strict scrutiny of the classification
which a state makes in a sterilization law is essential lest unwittingly,
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18 Curry, The Human Body on Trial, 37.
19 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
20 Ibid.
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or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.”21 Thus, only fifteen years later, it was asserted by
Justice Douglas that the law can do more than just indicate a policy; it
can also protect people from violations of their rights by that policy.
But what rights are being violated? Those involved were fully
aware as they argued against Buck’s rights. Strode knew what
constitutional questions would be raised and argued against them
well. He focused largely on the eighth amendment’s protections.22
Strode said that “In State v. Felin… it was expressly held that an
asexualization operation… was not a cruel punishment.” He also
argued that the protection against cruel and unusual punishment was
intended to protect against torture. Another of Strode’s arguments
was that it was decided in “Weem’s Case that the provision of the
federal Constitution (Amendment VIII) does not apply to the state
legislatures.” The initial act that brought all of this about was an act of
the Virginia state legislature. Justice Holmes also helped to point out
rights that people believed were being violated by these compulsory
sterilization laws. He believed that due process of law was present and
said so in these words:
There can be no doubt that so far as procedure is concerned the
rights of the patient are most carefully considered, and as every step in
this case was taken in scrupulous compliance with the statute and after
months of observation, there is no doubt that in that respect the
plaintiff in error has had due process of the law.23
Strode also argued that restrictions on those who were deemed
unsuitable to reproduce had already been protected in Gould v. Gould
when it was sustained that a statute could prohibit the marriage of
epileptics.24
Whitehead argued for her rights without using previous
precedent to a great a degree. In fact, a good example of his
arguments for her rights was when he said that “the inherent right of
mankind to go through life without mutilation of organs of generation
needs no constitutional declaration.”25 While this fit with the
eighteenth century federalists’ view that the Constitution need not
enumerate all of the American citizens’ rights, it hardly helps support
his argument very strongly. Precedent appeared to be the strongest
form of support for such arguments, and he did not offer precedent

well. He did offer the precedent of the case Munn v. Illinois (1876).26 He
used this to show how the court defined deprivation of life. The court
said that it protected against the “deprivation not only of life but
whatever God has given to everyone with life.”27 According to
Whitehead, “the inhibition [of the government] against its
deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is
enjoyed. The deprivation not only of life but whatever God has given
to everyone with life…is protected by the provision in question.
While Mr. Whitehead used the statement from Munn v. Illinois
out of context, it is still a relevant statement in this situation. God
gave most people the ability to reproduce; the government does not
have the right to take that away. The ruling of the court did not find
Whitehead’s case to be strong enough.
It is very tempting to compare and contrast Buck with Skinner
in depth. However, this shall be done briefly because it is important to
understand how much changed from 1927 to 1942. The people
targeted by the eugenics movement were obtaining rights that they
had previously been denied in Buck v. Bell. Justice Jackson wrote in his
concurring opinion in Skinner that “there are limits to the extent to
which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological
experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural
powers of a minority – even those who have been guilty of what the
majority define as crimes.”28 This represents a change in the thinking
of Americans. The white majority was no longer the “normative
standard” by which people were to be judged. The Supreme Court
recognized in Skinner both the rights of minorities and that there were
limits to the police power when used to accomplish eugenic goals. It
did not overturn Buck v. Bell, though Justice Douglas acknowledged
that “[an] Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power,
in view of the state of scientific authorities respecting inheritability of
criminal traits.” They merely observed those points mentioned
without “intimating an opinion on them.”29
The differing opinions of the two courts within such a short
time period shows just how unclear the constitutional issues around
the police powers and the fourteenth amendment were. Taking each
decision in context can also show how great an influence the opinion
of the public can have on the Supreme Court as well, even though the
justices are supposed to be buffered against public opinion by not

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
23 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
24 Ibid.
25 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).

26 The case of Munn v. Illinois was not concerning bodily integrity. It
concerned the abilities of states to regulate certain businesses, such as
railroads, within their borders.
27 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
29 Ibid.
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being popularly elected and being appointed for life. In the 1920s the
people deemed unfit to procreate were expected to acquiesce in order
to benefit the larger society. As stated by Justice Holmes:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.30
Justice Holmes’ scorn for these people who “sap the strength of
the state” is very evident. His statement is a very clear and concise
statement of eugenic thought. Justice Holmes’ prejudice was evident
when he said “so far as the operations enable those who otherwise
must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the
asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.”31
What he implies is that the people being kept in these asylums were
not being kept there because they were in need of help or were a
threat to society directly, but were being kept in the asylums because
they were a threat to society only if they were allowed to procreate
and reproduce “their kind.” They were not deemed a threat worth
keeping out of society for any other reason than the transmission of
their genes and the muddying of the American gene pool.
When the Supreme Court showed its approval of eugenic
theory by the Virginia law requiring compulsory sterilization, it
helped lead a great change, not only in our country, but in the world.
According to Paul Lombardo, Buck “paved the way for more than
60,000 operations in more than thirty American states with similar
laws and provided a precedent for 400,000 sterilizations that would
occur in Nazi Germany.”32 It was not until Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942)
that the Supreme Court began to think along what most Americans
today would call “saner” lines. More restrictions on such rampant uses
of the police power were put into place but not before the harm was
done and thousands of people had been sterilized for the purpose of
maintaining the quality of the American bloodline. That the
fourteenth amendment was considered not to apply yet again in this
case was no great surprise when considering the constitutional
conservatism practiced by the Supreme Court at that time. This was
one example of where a broader interpretation of the amendment
would have made a huge difference in many lives. Much suffering
could have been spared for many people if the Court had interpreted
the amendment and laws regarding the police powers differently.

Though the case of Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) made it more
difficult to pass eugenic laws, it was decided in a time when racism
was still a strong part of American culture. It should be noted that
other precedents support mandatory vaccination and laws promoting
the general health and welfare of the citizens of the United States, so
Buck is not needed for this purpose. Buck is still a means of control
over the population that is not needed in the twenty-first century.
Today, the concerns that fueled the case of Buck v. Bell, such as the
genetic inheritability of certain characteristics and the befouling of the
American bloodline, are no longer worries due to a better
understanding of how traits are truly inherited as well as what can be
inherited from parents. Buck v. Bell does not serve a protective purpose
today and could only serve the purpose of the subjugation and
oppression of a minority group again in the future. However, it has
never been overturned. Justice Holmes said that “three generations of
imbeciles are enough” when referring to the Bucks, but the question is,
was it ever really his place to decide whether it was enough or not?33
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THE IRISH FAMINE: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
Lori Henderson
The great Irish famine of the 1840s and 50s resulted in over a
million deaths from starvation and disease and witnessed the
emigration of millions more. It has been estimated that Ireland lost an
eighth of its population from 1846 to 1851. The fact that a disaster of
this magnitude took place in relatively modern times is as surprising
as the fact that it took place in a country that was part of the
wealthiest empire in the world, Great Britain. However, with great
power and wealth comes the paranoia that everyone is determined to
take advantage of that prosperity. The British perception of the Irish
peasantry was that their reliance on the potato had destroyed their
work ethic and produced a society of lazy, indolent, and violent people.
They also blamed the primitive landlord-tenant relationship for a
backward agrarian arrangement. British policy and aid for the Irish
through the calamity was thus restrained by their concern that the
Irish would not progress in reforming their society and would only
take advantage of any assistance. Historian Christine Kinealy asserts
that “from the beginning, members of the British government saw
themselves as being involved in a crusade to bring about social
changes in Ireland, the enemies being the recalcitrant landlords on
one side, and the perfidious potato on the other.” 1
Research on Anglo-Irish relations could fill a library, but it was
not until the sesquicentennial commemoration that an abundance of
research on the famine was published. In spite of the enormity of the
disaster, the historiography of the famine was extremely sparse up
until the last decade. This paper seeks to understand what compelled
historians to first neglect, then revise, and ultimately return to a
nationalist interpretation of the Irish famine.
Despite a cast of colorful characters, a tragedy of epic
proportions, and endless stories of personal suffering that any
Hollywood screenwriter would envy, the Irish famine received very
little scholarly attention until the middle of the twentieth century.
Historian James Donnelly’s research discovered that the scholarly
journal Irish Historical Studies, founded in 1938, published only five
articles related to the famine in the first fifty years of its existence. He
Lori Henderson, a senior from Charleston, Illinois, wrote her paper for Dr. Michael
Shirley’s Fall 2005 session of HIS 2500, Historical Research and Writing. Her work
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1Christine Kinealy, This Great Calamity: The Irish Famine ( Dublin: Gill
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also notes that the journal Irish Economic and Social History offered no
improvement on that record.2 This period of neglect for an event that
altered the social and economic fabric of Ireland is puzzling. However,
some historians have developed intriguing theories as to why the
famine was literally ignored by historians in the century following the
disaster.
Hazel Waters theorizes that the famine “has been little
remarked by historians mostly concerned to distance themselves from
charges (powerful but not validated) that government policy
amounted to deliberate genocide.”3 The claims of genocide by the
British government were a recurring theme of the Irish nationalist
response to the ineffective and limited aid received during the famine.
Further discussion of these claims and how they have influenced the
historiography will be covered later in this paper. Waters may have a
valid point; however, Christine Kinealy develops the theory further
with her claim that Irish historians have enforced a “self-imposed
censorship” for fear of providing “ideological bullets to the Irish
Republican Army.”4 Further echoing Waters’ theory is Cathal
Portier’s argument that the difficulty for historians resides in the fact
that folklore is often the primary storyteller of the famine. The claim
is that historians fear folklore carries a nationalist bent so severe that
accurate and unbiased research cannot be accomplished.5
Irish historian Colm Toibin takes a social approach to the
neglect and speculates on how much guilt plays a factor:
[T]o suggest that it was merely England or Irish
landlords who stood by while Ireland starved is to miss
the point. An entire class of Irish Catholics survived the
Famine; many, indeed, im-proved their prospects as a
result of it, and this legacy may be more difficult for us
to deal with in Ireland now than the legacy of those who
died or emigrated.6
Toibin claims that Irish silence might possibly be traced to
Irish guilt as well as a fear of offending the farmers and traders who
had gained wealth and prestige at the expense of human suffering.
2James Donnelly, Jr., The Great Irish Potato Famine (England: Sutton,
2001), 12.
3 Hazel Waters, “The Great Famine and the Rise of Anti-Irish
Racism,” Race and Class 37, 1 (1995): 95.
4 Mary Daly, “Review Article: Historians and the Famine: A
Beleaguered Species,” Irish Historical Studies 30, (1997): 591-2, quoting
Christine Kinealy, A Death Dealing Famine: The Great Hunger in Ireland
(London: Pluto Press, 1997), 1.
5 Ibid., 599.
6 Colm Toibin and Diarmand Ferriter, The Irish Famine: A Documentary
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), 6.
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Whatever theory historians adhere to regarding the lack of
scholarly research, it is clear the interruption of that silence began
with the centenary commemoration and exploded by the
sesquicentennial. The first century following the famine found
historians paralyzed by the nationalist sentiment of Irish folklore,
afraid of stoking further nationalist unrest, and reluctant to offend
those who benefited from the calamity. The second century began a
new chapter in the historiography, and its title was revisionism.
To commemorate the centenary of the famine, Eamon de
Valera, serving as Taoiseach7 of Ireland in the 1940s, offered funding
for the purpose of researching and producing a scholarly book on the
famine. The result was The Great Irish Famine: Studies in Irish History
1845-52. Published in 1956, too late for the 1945 commemoration, it
has become the flagship for the revisionist school. Revisionism
absolves the British government and lays the blame on Ireland’s
dependence on the potato, Irish landlords, and a backward agricultural
economy. In the foreward of The Great Irish Famine, K.B. Nowlan
writes,
Modern research on the administrative and political
backgrounds to the Great Famine reveals more clearly
the limitations of men in office who were unwilling to
rise or incapable of rising effectively above the economic
conventions of their day and struggling with no
outstanding success against a disaster that had its roots
deep in Irish history. The disaster originated in that
ordering of human affairs which condemned so many to a
life-long dependence on a single crop. The potato
economy, the primitive state of agriculture and the bad
relations between landlord and tenant were but different
expressions of the same evil, poverty. 8
The historian James Donnelly, an American of Irish descent,
claims that the editors “appear to have been quite anxious to avoid
reigniting old controversies or giving any countenance to the
traditional nationalist-populist view of the famine.”9 In order to
accomplish this task, it has been necessary for revisionists to approach
the famine clinically and analytically, in the process extracting the
emotional and national component. Professed critic of the revisionist
school, Brendan Bradshaw claims that “the trauma of the famine
reveals, perhaps more tellingly than any other episode of Irish history,
the inability of practitioners of value-free history to cope with the
Taoiseach is a title given to the head of government of the
Republic of Ireland and the leader of the Irish cabinet.
8 R. Dudley Edwards and T. Desmond Williams, eds., The Great
Famine, Studies in Irish History (New York: University Press, 1957), xi.
9 Donnelly, The Great Irish Potato Famine, 17.
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catastrophic dimensions of the Irish past.”10 It has been noted that de
Valera was disappointed in the project that he funded and envisioned.
Irish historian, Cormac O’Grada remembered that “he expressed
unhappiness with the book, presumably because it seemed to
downplay those aspects of the tragedy that had been etched in his own
memory.”11
If de Valera was disappointed in the revisionist classic, in
1962 he was able to acknowledge and celebrate a book that took a
great leap in the opposite direction. Cecil Woodham-Smith’s The Great
Hunger: Ireland 1845-49 was a bestseller at the time of publication and
still sells well to this day. Although Woodham-Smith was not a
professional historian, her work involved over ten years of research.
O’Grada credits her as a “formidable researcher.”12 Revisionists
dismissed her work as too emotional and passionate to be taken
seriously as a scholarly work. In reality, Woodham-Smith revived the
nationalist interpretation, placing the blame for the famine back at
Britain’s door.13 While the revisionists were chagrined at the
publication and subsequent commercial success of her book, de Valera
finally had the book he had hoped for. President of Ireland at the time,
he held a dinner in her honor and she was awarded an honorary
degree from the National University of Ireland. Toibin reflects on
Woodham-Smith’s legacy:
Her crisp style belongs to another age. It is full of
certainties and judgments about matters which have
since been surrounded with qualifications and altered by
shifting perspectives. She presents pen portraits of her
protagonists of a kind that is now frowned upon. Her
work is readable- something which later historians of the
Famine have tried hard not to be. If she relies too much
on the study of personalities, her command of detail, her
insistence on the cruelty of those in charge and the
misery of those who suffered, and her ability to structure
the narrative, account for the book’s extraordinary
impact. Reading The Great Hunger is like reading
Georgian poetry.14
Despite the success of The Great Hunger, the revisionist school
was not prepared to give up their cause. First published in 1986, Mary
Daly’s book, The Famine in Ireland, generated criticism that provoked
new debate and controversy among historians. Toibin describes the
10 Brendan Bradshaw, “Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in
Modern Ireland,” Irish Historical Studies 104, (1989): 340.
11 Toibin and Ferriter, The Irish Famine, 9.
12 Ibid., 29.
13 Donnelly, The Great Irish Potato Famine, 14.
14 Toibin and Ferriter, The Irish Famine , 29.
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book as “short on emotion, long on detail and cautious
examination…careful not to blame the administration.”15 In his
scathing attack on revisionism, Bradhsaw does not spare Daly’s work
of criticism. He accuses her of isolating herself from the trauma of the
disaster and in the process isolating her audience. Bradshaw writes
that her method consists of “assuming an austerely clinical tone, and
by resorting to sociological euphemism…thus cerebralising and
thereby de-sensitizing the trauma.”16 Donnelly maintains that
Bradshaw’s “criticisms appeared to be especially relevant to the
general scholarly approach to the great famine. That approach had
long been almost entirely dismissive of the traditional nationalist
interpretation, which laid responsibility for mass death and mass
emigration at the door of the British government, accusing it of what
amounted to genocide.”17 Bradshaw’s essay arrived just in time for the
commemoration of the sesquicentennial of the famine, a
commemoration that would yield a plethora of new research and
publications. Christine Kinealy has been quoted as claiming that “more
has been written to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Great
Famine than was written in the whole period since 1850.”18 This last
decade of work has seen historians attempting to un-revise the
revisionists, address the issue of blame, and assess Britain’s role in
managing the disaster. In essence, a return to the nationalist
interpretation has been necessary to engage in a more balanced and
open dialogue to examine the disaster in Ireland in the 1840s.
The sesquicentennial of the famine was surrounded by a hoopla
of concerts, speeches, monuments and, in the process, it began a new
chapter in famine historiography. For years, revisionists had worked
hard to absolve Britain of blame for the famine. In an ironic twist of
fate (or perhaps savvy political maneuvering), British Prime Minister
Tony Blair offended all sentiment of revisionist theory with an
apology. Below is an excerpt of Blair’s speech delivered by Irish actor
Gabriel Byrne in 1997:19
The Famine was a defining event in the history of Ireland and
of Britain. It has left deep scars. That one million people should have
died in what was then part of the richest and most powerful nation in
the world is something that still causes pain as we reflect on it today.
Those who governed in London at the time failed their people through
Ibid., 11.
Brendan Bradshaw, “Nationalism and Historical Scholarship in
Modern Ireland,” Irish Historical Studies 104, (1989): 341.
17 Ibid.
18 Mary Daly, “Review Article: Historians and the Famine: a
Beleaguered Species,” Irish Historical Studies 30, (1997): 599.
19 Blair was unable to attend the event and commissioned the Irish
performer to deliver his words.
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standing by while a crop failure turned into a massive tragedy. We
must not forget such a dreadful event.20
Of course Blair’s apology stirred a generous amount of
controversy but it provides an appropriate starting point for the
journey that witnessed a return to the nationalist interpretation in the
historiography of the famine. After a century of neglect, there is no
denying that there are a good number of scholarly works now
available dealing with the Irish Famine. There is also no denying that
these works include the nationalist interpretation; therefore, at this
point we will examine the compelling evidence that those historians
relied upon to produce their work.
In recent works, historians point to the British ideologies of
providentialism and moralism, along with how these attitudes resulted
and justified the limited aid and disastrous policies by the British
government. The ideology of providentialism espoused that the
famine disaster was the work of divine providence; the potato blight,
in other words, was a result of God’s plan to reform Irish society.
Moralism naturally follows providentialism in the belief that the Irish
suffered a moral deficiency of character, therefore calling upon them
the wrath of God in the form of famine. James Donnelly contends that
Charles Trevelyan, an influential policy maker and head of the
treasury during the famine, was a proponent of these ideologies.
Trevelyan was identified not only with providentialism and
laissez-faire but also with what has come to be called moralism- the
set of ideas in which Irish problems were seen to arise mainly from
moral defects in the Irish character. Trevelyan and other moralists,
who were legion, believed passionately that slavish dependence on
others was a striking feature of the Irish national character, and that
British policy during the famine must aim at educating the Irish
people in sturdy self-reliance.21 Underlying these ideological beliefs
was the ultimate tool for disaster for the Irish people: racism.
Middle-class public opinion in Britain at the time of the famine
served to influence government policies.
Public opinion was
distributed to the masses by London’s newspaper, The Times. Kinealy
claims that the Times “was the most influential newspaper of the day”
and that it “had an impact on parliamentary and public opinion.”
However, she also asserts that “much of the information upon which
these stories were based was supplied by Wood and Trevelyan who
used the powerful medium to their own advantage.”22 The racist
attitudes of the British toward the Irish are overwhelmingly played
20 Christine Kinealy, The Great Irish Famine: Impact Ideology and
Rebellion (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 1, quoting Prime Minister Tony Blair.
21 Donnelly, The Great Irish Potato Famine, 20.
22 Christine Kinealy, This Great Calamity: the Irish Famine (Dublin: Gill
& Macmillan, 1994), 105.

138

out in newspapers as well as cartoons such as Punch. A reproduction
of a Punch cartoon is featured in Donnelly’s study, titled The English
Labourer’s Burden, which portrays a very simian-like Irish character
grinning atop a humble, noble, and miserable Englishmen’s
shoulders.23 What are harsh words for the consciousness of modern
readers trained in the verse of political correctness, the Times printed
such text as, “we have to change the very nature of a people who are
born and bred, from time immemorial, in inveterate indolence,
improvidence, disorder, and consequent destitution.”24
Many historians have devoted entire studies to the issue of
racism during the famine. Among them, Michael de Nie’s article, “The
Famine, Irish Identity, and the British Press,” focuses on the issue of
race and the failures of the British government. Even in the early
years of the famine, de Nie notes that the Times was already setting a
precedent of otherness and racism. In September of 1846, the Times
stated that “They have come amongst us, but they have carried back
neither our habits or our sympathies, neither our love of cleanliness
nor our love of comfort, neither our economy nor our prudence. Is this
distinctive character capable of subjugation or change?”25
De Nie finds that it “is interesting that even in this plea for
empathy the Irish were held to be to blame for the cultural distance
between the two peoples. They were incomprehensible because they
had failed to Anglicize themselves.” He concludes that by employing
racism the British people accomplished “self-justification by projecting
the blame for Irish suffering onto the Irish themselves.”26 Edward
Lengel has produced a book titled, The Irish through British Eyes, where
he addresses the effect racist attitudes had on British policy making.
Perhaps the most damaging policy for the relief of the Irish people
was the amendment to the poor law in 1848 with the addition of the
Gregory clause.
The Gregory clause prohibited anyone from seeking relief in
the workhouses if they held more than a quarter of an acre of land. In
essence, this law forced smallholders to give up their land before they
could seek to feed their starving families. This policy was disastrous
for the victims of the famine and was added to the arsenal of the
nationalist cause that accused the British of intentional genocide.
Donnelly writes of the poor laws defects being so “serious that they
gave plausibility to charges (then and later) that there was genocidal
intent at work.” He also contends that Parliament recognized “its

enormous potential as an estate-clearing device.” Gregoryism, as the
clause came to be known, “became a byword for the worst miseries of
the disaster- eviction, exile, disease and death.”27
With ample evidence pointing to the intentional limits on aid
by the British government, the racist views of the British public, and
ultimately the millions of deaths of Irish citizens only miles from the
shores of the world’s wealthiest nation, it is difficult to understand
how the nationalist interpretation was ever lost to the historiography
of the famine. It is even more perplexing as to how the disaster could
be neglected for so many years. As we have learned from the theories
on neglect, complex political and social conventions paralyzed
historians and stifled any serious scholarly treatment of the famine
until the centenary. One hundred years later, historians still felt
compelled to distance themselves from the nationalist sentiments of
the folklore and claims of genocidal intent by the British government.
In order to accomplish this, a new school of thought was created, now
known as revisionism. It took another fifty years to untangle the
revisionist’s model and ultimately open the debate and dialogue as to
what went so wrong in Ireland during the 1840s.

23 Punch cartoon as reproduced in Donnelly’s The Great Irish Potato
Famine, 120.
24 The Times (London), 23 March 1847.
25 Michael de Nie, “The Famine, Irish Identity, and the British Press.”
Essays in History 38 (1996) : 28.
26 Ibid.
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THE EASTER RISING AND THE FALL TO FREEDOM
Margaret Hawkins
History regards the 1916 Easter Rising in Ireland as a dismal
military failure, led by fanatic but condemned rebels resolute in their
determination to achieve an independent, republican, Gaelic, united
Ireland. However, the Easter Rising set into motion the means by
which Ireland would realize her freedom. Though the rebels did not
realize their aspirations, their actions set off a series of events that
caused Ireland to unexpectedly stumble upon the path that would lead
them to freedom. This unanticipated fall onto the right path coincided
with perfect timing. That year, the British Parliament had once again
pushed Home Rule away from the Irish. Incensed by the
disappointments of failed constitutional nationalism, they turned to
revolutionary nationalism, in the spirit of the Rising, to achieve what
Parliamentary action could not. The immediate effects of the Rising,
namely the reaction of Britain, fueled Irish nationalism with the
indignation of an exasperated people. With the leaders of the Rising
having been executed, two men emerged from the ashes to lead
Ireland to independence. Without the military aptitude of Michael
Collins and the political resolve of Eamon de Valera, Ireland might
not have secured its freedom. However, the combination of timing,
the actions of the British and the new leaders who were willing to
travel down that unexpected path was just what the nation needed.
Inspired by the spirit and the heart of the martyrs, Ireland stood up,
looked Britain directly in the eye, and said, “No more.”
Historians agree that a military victory against Britain was not
feasible. Some, such as Alan J. Ward, describe the leadership of the
rebels as disorganized and divided, despite their dedication.1 As early
as 1926, W. Alison Philips argued that the British reactions to the
Rising had started the Irish fall to freedom.2 The popular support for
the revolutionaries that followed, according to Ward, was an anomaly
in Irish history. He strongly believed that if the three nationalismsconstitutional, revolutionary and romantic- would have been merged,
the conglomeration would have been a sophisticated political machine,
effectively led, enforced with popular support, enabling the cultivation
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of a distinct nationality.3 Unfortunately for Ireland, these three never
seemed to coincide effectively. This mishap did not prevent the Easter
Rising from becoming the cataclysm that began the chain reaction.
Michael Collins claimed that the Easter Rising awoke “the sleeping
spirit of Ireland.”4 Richard B. Finnegan and Edward T. McCarron
argue that the Easter Rising became a symbol of Irish independence
and a focal point for nationalist identity. They assert that 1916 was
given a place of pride in Irish history, despite its “failure.”5 The fall to
freedom had begun.
The Easter Rising exhorted the first great push to an
independent nation with its immediate effects. It had failed as a
military venture, it had failed as a political gesture, and it had failed to
arouse the support of Dubliners.6 The leaders of the Rising had
assumed that when the Rising began, the people of Dublin, angry at
British grievances, would join in the fray. Their initial reaction,
however, was one of inconvenience and distaste.7 John Redmond, the
leader of the Irish Party in Parliament, condemned them and accused
the rebels of obliterating the progress that Ireland had made toward
the goal of Home Rule.8
Britain itself had been taken by surprise. She knew that the
Irish Volunteers and treasonous activities had been growing, but she
also knew that, because of the fight for Home Rule, there was no
widespread antagonism.9 When the Rising caught the attention of the
British government, its immediate concern went to the current trouble
in World War I. David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister,
feared the reaction of his powerful American ally. This grew in
importance when Woodrow Wilson told Lloyd George to solve the
Irish problem and return his attention back to the war.10
Therefore, Britain attempted to undervalue the gravity of the
Irish situation. The Times initially placed blame for the Rising on the
Germans, stating, “They have striven to provoke it from the outbreak
of the war, and at last they have succeeded in getting their dupes to
indulge in an insane rising.”11 The newspaper alluded that the
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Germans were attempting to use the Rising to disable Britain, but
Britain was certain that the “lack of alarm” in the United Kingdom
would prevent its spread. The Times directly told the world that the
Rising would be suppressed immediately.12 This, unfortunately, amid
the subsequent wave of executions, left the world wondering why
Britain had reacted with such savage punishments for a mere street
riot.13
Britain’s mistake was the fifteen executions of rebel leaders.
The irrationality of these executions manifested itself when a chair
held up James Connolly, wounded during the actual experience of the
Rising, in order for him to be shot. After these needless executions,
outrage surged throughout Ireland. The Irish who had previously
condemned the Rising were shocked,14 and they grew weary of long
court proceedings and executions each day.15 Observing the conduct
of those to be executed, Irish public opinion began to swing rapidly.
The leaders upheld their cause until their death, securing the
sympathy and support of many Irishmen. On the eve of his execution,
Sean MacDiarmada declared, “We die that the Irish nation may live.
Our blood will rebaptise and reinvigorate the land.”16 Roger
Casement spoke out to his countrymen, maintaining that selfgovernment was their right. He pleaded with them to continue the
fight, portraying Ireland as a criminal in worldview. He pledged, “If it
be treason to fight against such an unnatural fate as this, then I am
proud to be a rebel, and shall cling to my ‘rebellion’ with the last drop
of my blood.”17 George Bernard Shaw warned Britain that if Casement
was executed, he would become a national hero. He asserted that if
Britain continued to manufacture martyrs “in fits of temper experience
has thrown away on her,” she would continue to be governed by the
Irish.18 These claims went unheard, and Casement was hung in
August of 1916. The other executions could possibly have been
sanctioned as occurring in the heat of the moment, but Casement’s
execution, months after the Rising, was just seen as absurd, and it
further pushed Ireland’s opinion towards that of the rebels.19
The Easter Rising alone could not have pushed Ireland into the
war for its independence. The actions of the British government were
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instrumental in turning the majority of Ireland to nationalism. It
failed to cultivate the initial belief that the rebels had devastated
Ireland’s chance at Home Rule, and instead the British turned on
Ireland in rage. Ward believed that it would have been generous of the
British to forgive the rebellion, allowing them to keep Irish favor.
Instead, he said that the executions aroused and focused the latent
hostility towards Britain, and the British government could not
control the emotional aftermath of the Easter Rising.20 The martyrs
became immortal heroes and the Easter Rising became a foundation
for Irish nationalist identity.21 The sympathy for the rebels turned the
Irish majority against Britain, gave Irish nationalism the fuel it needed
to get off its feet, and led to a growing dissatisfaction for the yet
unsuccessful approaches of Irish constitutional nationalism.
The Easter Rising signified a change in the Irish approach from
constitutional nationalism to revolutionary nationalism. Ireland had
allowed its nationalists to attempt the realization of governmental
freedom through Parliamentary action, but to no avail. A drawn out,
fervent fight for Home Rule had been thrust aside when World War I
emerged, revealing the inconsequentiality that the British placed on
Irish concerns.
Constitutional nationalism, prior to the Easter Rising, had been
one of the best political party organizations of the time. It had
adequate funding, dedicated and talented leaders, and it compiled
popular support, which was evident from its election successes.22
Constitutional nationalists were primarily concerned with the
establishment of a regional government that could focus on the
interests and needs of Ireland, not the United Kingdom.23 They saw
this goal as a means to the final end: governmental independence.
The revolutionary movement had been motivated by a hatred
for Britain, disdain for the failures of constitutional nationalism, and a
strong desire for political independence.24 Prior to the Rising,
revolutionary nationalism was purely provoked by hatred of British
oppression, and its principal concern was removing Britain from
Ireland’s back. The dedicated, unorganized and divided leaders of the
Rising left Ireland with the realization that she deserved better.
Revolutionary nationalism became devoted to the creation of an
independent Irish republic, determined to drive out the British who
refused to willingly leave.25
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Michael Collins believed that the “valiant effort [the Easter
Rising] and the martyrdoms which followed it finally awoke the
sleeping spirit of Ireland.”26 He knew that revolution would follow.
Collins concluded that the Rising had expressed the Irish right to
freedom and their determination to have it, and he proclaimed that
Ireland would challenge the right of Britain to dominate her.27
Ireland had been put under martial law. Constitutionalism had lost its
appeal. Ireland was itching, resolute to remove the sand from her
shoe.28 The time for change had come.
Irish politics had been altered as a result of the Rising.
Although the faction had no formal role, the press and the
government hailed it as the “Sinn Fein rebellion.” This was not
entirely accurate, but following the Rising, the Sinn Fein officially
became the political wing of the revolutionary movement.29 The Irish
people, growing in resolve, began to put nationalists in power. The
General Election of 1918 returned a Sinn Fein majority of 73 seats,
although protest became their parliamentary policy and they refused
to take their seats, not accepting the legitimacy of the United
Kingdom’s Parliament.30 The Irish Party temporarily disappeared
when nationalists, frustrated with a party of moderation, had nowhere
to turn except to Sinn Fein.31
It grew increasingly clear to the Irish Party that they had to
assume more active opposition to the United Kingdom if it was to
retain credibility in Ireland. It condemned the executions, but more
importantly, it abandoned a Home Rule objective. The Irish Party
realized that the Irish would not accept limited autonomy, and it
therefore demanded dominion status.32 Unfortunately, posture now
was more highly regarded than policy, and Sinn Fein’s militancy was
proving to be more attractive.33
Revolutionary nationalism rapidly won political favor and Irish
support. It was the support of the Irish-Americans, however, that
kept it alive. They viewed Britain as the oppressor of Ireland and the
traditional enemy of American democracy.34 They had long supported
the goals of constitutional nationalism financially, but this crumbled
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when Redmond announced Irish support of Britain’s World War I
involvement in 1914.35 The money from Irish-Americans then went
to revolutionary nationalism, which kept the previously weak
movement strong.36
Thus, dissatisfied with the disappointments of constitutional
nationalism, the Irish turned to revolutionary nationalism to attain
their freedom. This would prove to be a wise venture, for it ultimately
would lead to their goal. This ambition could not have been possible,
however, without the dedication and leadership of two men that
emerged from the ruins of the Easter Rising. Michael Collins and
Eamon de Valera would prove to be crucial to the events that followed
the revolutionary conversion until the attainment of freedom.
At the end of 1916, hoping to improve Irish opinion, the British
government released many of the prisoners from the Rising.37 This
proved to be a terrible mistake, for two of those prisoners were the
men that would damage the union the most – Collins and de Valera.
Between the years of 1919 to 1921, Michael Collins pioneered 21st
century guerilla warfare, aided by the sanctuary of a few sympathetic
people,38 while Eamon de Valera commanded an illegal Irish
government in order to stabilize the fight of the country. Collins
called the period between 1918 and 1921 the “struggle between our
determination to govern ourselves and to get rid of British
government and the British determination to prevent us from doing
either.”39
Sinn Fein was determined to make Ireland ungovernable for
Britain. From 1917-1919, the British government authorized
thousands of raids on private homes. Erratic fighting broke out
between the Irish Republic Army and the British police. Labour
arranged transportation strikes to impede British troops. Michael
Collins led ‘The Squad,’ which was a branch of the IRA that was liable
for disabling British intelligence through murder, informants and
double agents. Lawlessness spread through the country.40 Brutal
murders occurred on each side. Between January 1919 and December
1921, the Irish suffered 752 dead and 866 wounded, while the British
endured 600 dead and 1200 wounded.41
In 1918, Lord French was summoned to complete an
investigation of public order in Ireland. He professed that “a minority
of rebels” misled Ireland. He proceeded to extend martial law into
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nationalist parts of the country, and soon most of Sinn Fein’s leaders
were imprisoned without a trial on the basis of the “German plot in
Ireland.”42 Also in 1918, the British Parliament, desperate due to
World War I devastation, extended conscription to Ireland. Its effect
was immediate, overwhelming and unprecedented.43 The Irish Party,
Sinn Fein, the Irish Catholic bishops and trade unions, united by de
Valera and John Dillon, rallied to oppose conscription. Ward believes
that nothing did more to legitimize the Sinn Fein than this anticonscription coalition.44
Collins contended that all the brutality, disorder and slaughter
transpired from the British forces. He publicized murders and wounds
of innocent men, women and children. He emphasized that nationalist
newspapers were suppressed, thousands were arrested for political
offenses, and nationalist leaders were deported.
The British
government attempted to stifle the nationalist movement before it
suffered defeat. Collins declared that the Irish did not instigate the
atrocities, but only defended themselves.45 He stated that they broke
up communications and attacked armed forces and British spies.
According to Collins, it was because of the British brutality that
Irishmen hailed the war as “the Terror”.46
The war led by Collins eventually ended in victory. By 1921,
Britain was proposing a truce, having failed to subjugate the rebels.
The distraction of World War I led to the use in Ireland of poorly
trained police and military forces that were never properly integrated.
Britain attempted to succeed by utilizing a large force, which the
government believed would be necessary to defend possible targets
from attack and to search out adversaries.47
The objective of Collins and de Valera was not a military
overthrow, which they knew was not possible. Instead, they focused
on creating propaganda and anarchy in the hopes that the British
would withdraw from Ireland.48 One purpose of guerilla warfare,
which Collins used to great effect, is to use calculated aggravation to
coerce the government to participate in the collapse of law and order.
Thus, the government becomes the enemy. The malice of the
government indicated that the provocation of the IRA was prevailing,
and the British forces became the problem, not the solution in
Ireland.49

Ireland secured world sympathy, however passive, due to the
murderous rage of Britain. Therefore, although Britain could regain
control of Ireland, she was reluctant to do so against world opinion.50
Their radical neighbors terrified the Unionists in the North.51 The
overwhelming support for revolutionaries, according to Ward, was an
anomaly in Irish history that has since been regretted.52 Thus, the
Irish understandably turned back to constitutional nationalism once
revolutionary nationalism had brought Britain to submission.
While Michael Collins was instrumental in the revolutionary
tactics that attained independence for the Irish, it was Eamon de
Valera who ensured that Ireland retained a system of government
during the war, and it was de Valera who became imperative to the
conversion back to constitutional nationalism.
In January of 1919, twenty-four Sinn Fein members of
Parliament gathered for the creation of the Dáil Éireann, the illegal
legislature of Ireland. It established a government for Ireland, and in
April, de Valera became its president.53 The Dáil instituted its own
court system, as well as departments of education, labor, fisheries,
trade, industry and agriculture. It was not, however, able to
completely control the IRA, which was still diffused with the Irish
Republican Brotherhood.54
De Valera went to America in 1919 to campaign for the Irish
Republic, the definitive governmental goal of the Dáil. The British
atrocities and the Irish suffering won political support in the United
States, and De Valera earned American recognition of the Irish
Republic through the American press and people. His excursion
renewed America as a financial benefactor.55
Impeded by Collins’ revolution, the British Parliament
instituted the Government of Ireland Act in 1920. This granted
Ireland two Parliaments, one in the North and one in the South, with
a Council of Ireland to plan for eventual integration. The Unionist
approved this because the Southern Parliament could not absorb the
North without its consent. The Sinn Fein declined on the basis that
the Irish Republic, albeit illegally, had been in effect since 1916.56
Collins increased military efforts after this slight, but de Valera, upon
his return from America, willingly went into negotiations with David
Lloyd George.57
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In 1921, a series of letters were written between de Valera and
Lloyd George. These began with a persuasive document from Lloyd
George imploring for peace. He called the conflicts with Ireland an
“embarrassment to our forefathers.”58 He offered a settlement giving
Ireland all the powers and privileges which the self-governing
dominions of Britain had, including control of home defense, police,
courts, education, transportation and many other local matters.59
Britain would be allowed free trade, military bases in Ireland, money
and troops for the military, and aid in the debt of the United
Kingdom.60
De Valera, whose primary concern was a republic for Ireland,61
adamantly refused. He called dominion status an illusion, and
maintained that a harmonious relationship with Britain would only be
achieved through complete separation.62 De Valera informed Lloyd
George, “The sole cause of the ‘ancient feuds’ which you deplore has
been, as we know, and as history proves, the attacks of English rulers
upon Irish liberties. These attacks can cease forthwith, if your
Government has the will. The road to peace and understanding lies
open.”63
Lloyd George was willing to compromise for peace, but could
not accept separation.64 De Valera was insistent on a small nation’s
right to defend its liberties from the powerful, and he threatened war
if Britain attempted force.65 In the end, they agreed to meet, after a
quarrel over Ireland delegates as coming from a sovereign and free
state. During the course of these letters, the eloquence and evidence
the leaders use dissipates, and by the closing stages, they became very
short, terse, firm and unyielding. The tension was evident and
negotiations were set for October of 1921.
De Valera sent Michael Collins, among others, to the
negotiations. On December 6th, the Anglo-Irish Treaty was reached.
This treaty inaugurated an independent Irish Free State with
dominion status under the crown and a governor general.66 The new
state had to assume some of the United Kingdom’s debt, to assist with
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war and defense amenities for British forces,67 and to submit to a
boundary commission to determine the line between Northern Ireland
and the Irish Free State.68
The Anglo-Irish Treaty split the wartime partnership of
Collins’ military tactics and de Valera’s governmental strategies. The
Civil War in Ireland had begun. De Valera and others were irate that
the representatives failed to accomplish a united Ireland, but they
were absolutely livid at the betrayal of their republic ideal.69 Collins
upheld that they had maneuvered the best arrangement for the
circumstances, for Lloyd George had threatened full-scale war if the
treaty was refused. Collins knew that the IRA had the power to
compel Britain to negotiate, but winning a military victory was
decidedly improbable. Lloyd George would not tolerate a united
Ireland or a republican government. Collins defended his decision,
stating that the treaty granted “not the ultimate freedom that all
nations aspire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it.”70
As it turned out, Collins was accurate. The Civil War brought
a divided Ireland to her knees. Restoration of civic order was
arduous.71 A war of erratic guerilla attacks and retaliations ensued,
creating a brutal war, with many dead and many executed. The antitreaty forces were finally forced to surrender in May of 1923.72 The
Civil War resulted in the death of Collins, a legacy of blame,73 and the
ancestors of Ireland’s future political parties, the Fine Gael and the
Fianna Fáil, from the pro-treaty and anti-treaty factions
respectively.74 Shortly after the end of the Civil War, Collins’
prediction of the treaty as a means to an end came to light.
By 1932, de Valera became the Prime Minister of the Irish Free
State, from which he legally abolished the Irish oath of allegiance to
the British crown. In 1937, the Irish Free State eradicated all
allusions to the crown from its constitution, other than that allowing
the British king to act for Ireland in foreign affairs. Later that year,
the Irish Free State adopted an entirely republican constitution and
renamed the country Eire. Consultation in 1938 resulted in the
abandonment of United Kingdom naval bases in Ireland. Eleven years
later, in 1949, Eire assumed the designation “Republic of Ireland,” and
she withdrew from the British Commonwealth. As stated by
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Desmond Williams, “By the time the British found the answer, the
Irish had lost interest in the question.”75
The Easter Rising of 1916 had set into motion the events that
led to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922. After repeated
mistakes on the part of the British, they eventually had to surrender to
the revolutionary force that the Rising and its aftermath incited.
Ireland was no longer playing the games of the British. After the
sacrifices of the Rising, she was inspired, relentless, and angry.
Collins and de Valera refused to fail, they refused to deter from their
dream, and they refused to settle for anything less than everything.
Pearse and the other leaders of the Rising had died for the realization
of an independent, republican, Gaelic, united Ireland.76 It was because
of them that Ireland fought in the way that she did, invigorated by the
support the Rising secured and the leaders that the Rising left behind.
They died so that Ireland might live, and live she did.
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NAZISM AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE:
A HISTORIOGRAPHY
Kevin Korst
On April 30th 1945, Adolf Hitler took his sidearm, pointed it at
his head and fired a single shot, killing himself instantaneously. With
this, the German Fuhrer quite unceremoniously ended a war that had
been raging for six bloody years. Around Hitler’s body, his beloved
capitol lay in ruins while the reign of his thousand-year Reich was
abruptly cut short. Ever since the extraordinary events of April 1945
unfolded, historians have grappled with the Nazis and their horrific
chapter in history. Numerous questions have been raised regarding
the circumstances of their rise to power and dealings while in control.
Even more important, however, is the inquiry into the attitudes and
actions of the common German citizen during this time. How was it
that so many people seemingly supported a political organization
obsessed with racial “purification” and bent on world domination?
What exactly was their view of Nazism and their racial policies during
the height of its power? Such complicated questions require equally
complicated answers, leaving historians the great task of searching for
a response through the remnants of Nazism.
The years following the end of the Second World War saw
many historians take a sympathetic view toward the general
population of Nazi Germany. It was believed that they were victims
of a great illusion, one ruled by terror in which numerous atrocities
were allowed to occur. The issue of German denial helped to
encourage this type of thinking until historians began to take a closer
look at the situation, seeking better answers. From the creation of
this new partition came two primary schools of thought. The
functionalist and the intentionalist groups disagree about the core
explanations for the Holocaust. The functionalists believe that this
tragic event came out of the chaos of the Nazi bureaucracy and the
increasing desperation of their circumstances. On the other side, the
intentionalists see the Holocaust as a preplanned event that came to
fruition because of a mad man’s twisted dream. Each of these groups
offers a different and unique perspective on the Holocaust, giving
historians several different avenues of thought from which to pursue.
In 1969, historian Martin Broszat released his work, The Hitler
State: The foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third
Reich, which tended to take a functionalist view of Nazism. Broszat’s
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book describes the policies of the Nazis and how they operated within
the structure of the state. He believes that Nazi policies did not truly
grow out of their ideology, but were the outcome of the structure and
conditions of government in Germany. Broszat specifically focuses on
a Hitler that, while being the center reference point for the entire
organization, tended to operate on the periphery of actual government
decisions. In reference to ordinary Germans, Broszat does not disclose
much but states,
Even the excessive Fuhrer cult in Nazi Germany, that
persuasive belief in the leader which had a meaning and real
importance far beyond determining ideology, for the integration and
mobilization of the German people in the Nazi era, cannot be
understood simply in terms of personality, as a result of the superior
strength and leadership of Adolf Hitler.1
Even with Hitler’s rise to power, the “success in overthrowing
the Weimar Republic and in establishing the Hitler regime was
primarily due to the collaboration between the conservative opposition
to democracy and the national Socialist mass movement.”2 In other
words, the German people who opposed democracy and wanted a
restoration of conservative and authoritarian principles helped put
Hitler in power and fostered the growth of his cult-like image. While
there were struggles in the beginning as to how the party would be
run within the German government and who would exert their new
power, by 1938 Hitler filled this void when he ceased to be the party
leader and became the Fuhrer.3
Martin Broszat sees the Nazis as an organization that needed
popular support to establish its power in Germany. This was not a
revolution in the usual sense of the word, but merely an exchange of
authority. Once the Nazis grasped this authority, however, the
German people, fueled by Hitler himself, the Nazi propaganda
machine and their own social expectations, allowed Hitler to become
the object of a cult of personality that we see today. His influence
continued to grow with the successful implementation of Nazi foreign
policy and only subsided after 1941 with the tide of the war turning
against Germany. Overall, Broszat suggests that “Hitler’s special
authority as Fuhrer was not founded like [Joseph] Stalin’s on the
control of the central organizational apparatus of the Party and state,
but in the last resort of charismatic appeal, and the ability this gave to
integrate the nation as a whole.”4 Inevitably, this was just one part of
a larger story brought to life with the consent of many Germans.
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Continuing with the precedent set by Broszat, in 1982 historian
Detlev J. K. Peukert published a fascinating study of everyday life in
Germany titled Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition, and Racism
in Everyday Life. Peukert seems to take a middle course regarding the
question of whether German citizens, both young and old, had been
active participants in Nazism and its subsequent policies. He focuses
on the various groups that existed in Nazi Germany, beginning with
the working class. In this instance, Peukert reveals that “the Nazis’
use of terror in the working-class districts and the continuous
pressure to conform combined to create a ubiquitous sense of
persecution and insecurity, as in a city occupied by foreign troops.”5
He believes that the working class as a whole may have offered some
small measure of token resistance, but because of the Nazi terror
apparatus, could not organize in any significant way.6
Shifting focus slightly, Peukert understands that the young
people of Germany have a slightly different story to tell. Peukert
evaluates the impact of the Hitler youth and sees a program that,
while at first possessing a major influence, lost its grip over younger
Germans. Initially, the systemized Hitler Youth institution offered
many young people opportunities they would not have normally had
access to. However, as the war dragged on, more youth leaders were
called into service and “the war reduced the Hitler Youth’s leisure
activities: playing fields had been bombed, official hiking trips were
cut down and finally discontinued.”7 Because of this, opposition
groups known as “Edelweiss Pirates” began to form and physically
harass the Hitler Youth patrols.8 Youths would gather together
listening to music forbidden by the Nazis, and engage in swing
dancing, helping to create an atmosphere of passive resistance.
Peukert reasons that no major resistance was mounted because of the
Nazi policy of “atomizing” the public, meaning that numerous social
structures and traditional networks were broken down and swept
away forcing many to see Nazism as a new center of focus.9
Even with these small measures of resistance, Peukert
acknowledges that some aspects of Nazism were generally accepted by
the population. He states that
The terror, directed against political or social trouble makers
was not only not concealed from the population-as many who pleaded
for excuses were to suggest after 1945-but was highly visible, was
documented in the press during the Third Reich, was given legitimacy
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in the speeches of the Reich’s leaders and was approved and welcomed
by many Germans.10
More important was the public policies of Nazi racism, which
while being decried by churches and some members of society, more
often than not “were accepted and even approved, provided that they
were applied within a framework that was outwardly legal.”11
Throughout his book, Peukert seems to align himself with the
functionalist camp of Nazism. In reference to the ordinary Germans’
stance on the Nazis, he sees a nation that operates under an umbrella
of terror and offers some resistance to its oppressors, yet
acknowledges the dark underbelly of acceptance that did exist. On the
whole, Peukert realizes that terror played an important role in the
Nazis control of Germany, but refuses to believe they were completely
unaware and unwilling to cooperate in the racially and ethnically
charged system of government.
Several years after Peukert released his work, author Ian
Kershaw contributed to the discussion with his work titled The ‘Hitler
Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich. This comprehensive review
on the source behind Hitler’s control of the government and its
people, in a minute way, resembles Broszat’s effort. In his book,
Kershaw takes an interesting approach to the average German’s
outlook on Nazism by separating the Nazi party and Hitler into two
separate and distinct categories. He claims that many citizens,
especially in the early years of the World War II, disliked the Nazi
party and their policies. However, they adored Hitler to the extent
that when things went badly or policies backfired, Hitler was spared
much of the criticism, at least until the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943.12
Before, though, the German people seemed to gravitate to answers
that drew attention away from Hitler by claiming that he was being
misinformed, curbed by the Allies or so engaged in foreign affairs that
he had no time for the home front. According to Kershaw, it was the
Nazi propaganda machine that takes the greatest responsibility for
this feat and states, “After 1933, Nazi propaganda, largely uncontested
now that opponents within Germany had been silenced, could almost
deify Hitler. Joseph Goebbels,13 as we saw, ranked his creation of the
public Hitler image as his greatest creation”14 Kershaw also looks into
the German people’s thirst for a new leader who could unite and
stabilize a nation which had floundered under the tutelage of the
Weimar government. Hitler provided such an opportunity and using
Ibid., 197.
Ibid., 219.
12Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 192.
13 Propaganda minister of the Third Reich.
14 Ibid., 254.

Goebbels’ machine, he lured the German masses into a state of trust
and misguided belief, a trust that, in certain ways, outlasted the Hitler
and the war itself.15
While Kershaw does portray the Germans as a “victimized”
group, in his eyes they are not without fault, especially surrounding
the circumstances of the Jewish question. In his book, Kershaw
recognizes that while many Germans were anti-Semitic before Hitler’s
arrival, most did not support extreme racial policies. The Jewish
question was therefore avoided by fusing the Third Reich with the
popular and attractive aspects of Nazi rule symbolized by Hitler
himself. Kershaw says that “this in itself distracted attention away
from the seamier side of Nazi policy,” which in turn “ensured at least
passive acquiescence in if not outright approval for escalating
inhumanity of Nazi anti-Jewish policy.”16 More frightening are
Kershaw’s examples of how the Hitler myth, for some people at least,
continued until the end of the war and beyond. “In 1968, six percent
of the West German population (compared with four percent in 1965
and 1967) reported their willingness to vote again for a man such as
Hitler.”17 Kershaw exemplifies just how powerful the image of Hitler
created by his propagandists was, and how far reaching its effects
could be felt. He believes that the German people fell under the spell
of the image of a man who never really existed, but he is not shy about
condemning their indifference to the most horrific of Nazi policy.
The aforementioned authors, while having slightly different
ideas, tend to agree that Germans citizens were both ruthlessly
deceived and themselves at fault in their sometimes lax views and
approval of Hitler and Nazism. However, the topic of rule by terror is
given only a small amount of reference in proportion to each work’s
scope. The treatment of this subject was improved upon in 1990 when
historian Robert Gellately published The Gestapo and German Society:
Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-1945. In his work, Gellately looks into
the Gestapo and how they managed to control an entire nation with
only a small core of individuals. He concludes that it was impossible
for the terror organization to follow the orders that were given to
them, especially as their responsibilities grew during the war.
Gellately claims that “it simply did not have the physical resources to
accomplish the task assigned to it, especially as these increased in
number and scope. And this point stands even when one includes the
help it could count on from other organizations of the Nazi party and
German state.”18 How then was this task accomplished with such

10
11

155

Ibid., 264.
Ibid., 252.
17 Ibid., 267.
18 Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial
Policy 1933-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 253.
15
16

156

horrific efficiency? For this answer, Gellately points to the average
German citizen as an accomplice to the Gestapo’s mission of state
control and racial purification. Since it was impossible for the German
Gestapo to be everywhere at once, they relied heavily on the
information and participation readily given by many citizens.19 Why,
according to Gellately, were Germans so eager and willing to commit
these acts? For starters, the Nazis had done such an impressive job
through their propaganda techniques and examples that many
believed there truly was an agent on every corner, watching their
every move. Gellately presents evidence that a number of Germans
came forward with information because of petty differences including
relationship squabbles, heated competition between businesses, and
disputes involving neighbors.20 This helped to create a society in
which its citizens engaged in a kind of self-regulation, ensuring the
Gestapo could easily control a numerically superior target with little
or no difficulty.
Robert Gellately’s take on Nazi Germany sees a society in
which total control was achieved through active participation. The
average German seemed to view the Gestapo as an omnipotent being,
even though evidence clearly points to the opposite. Even so,
Gellately says that “one ought to be cautious, however, in
extrapolating from Wurzburg, the focus of his study, to the rest of the
country. Enforcement may have been easier to achieve in smaller
cities and towns in rural districts.”21 He paints the common German
in a way that few authors had up to this point. Through his evidence
and analysis, they appear much more as aggressors, rather than
victims.
Following the course that had been laid out by Robert Gellately
and others, historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen took the case against
the German people to a place few had before. In 1996, with the release
of his book Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust, Goldhagen attacks the German people as a nation that was
willingly and actively participating in the Holocaust. Furthermore, he
asserts that only in Germany could an atrocity on the level of the
Holocaust have occurred, thanks to Germany’s highly anti-Semitic
past. Goldhagen sets up a scenario where anti-Semitism had been
rampant in Germany for centuries. He believes this was ingrained
into the German psyche until a particular situation came along to set
in motion an event that was literally hundreds of years in the
making.22 One of the examples he uses to support his thesis is the

actions of Police Battalion 101.23 This group of men who were mainly
composed of regular German police was sent to Poland to commit the
unthinkable. While most had no affiliation with the Nazi party, they
participated in the killings of innocent people, with apparently very
little remorse. They even told their friends and family about their
actions, leading Goldhagen to state that “the Germans’ openness
about their genocidal slaughtering-making it available to the view of
so many other German men and women who happened to be stationed
in Poland-is but an indication of the perpetrators’ obvious approval of
their historic deeds.”24 According to Goldhagen, this is just one
example of what countless Germans were ready to do, giving little
thought to the extraordinary consequences of their actions.
Hitler’s Willing Executioners created a firestorm of criticism
upon its release in 1996. Many historians assaulted the book as
nonsense, saying that he could not adequately defend many of the
controversial statements held within his writings. Goldhagen, in
return, defended his thesis claiming “that the perpetrators approved of
the mass slaughter, that they willingly gave assent to their own
participation in the slaughter, is certain. That their approval derived
in the main from their own conception of Jews is all but certain, for no
other source of motivation can plausibly account for their actions.”25
If anything, Goldhagen showed that ordinary Germans were much
more involved in Nazi racial policies than historians initially thought.
He seems to conform to the intentionalist view of Nazism but includes
nearly every German in the equation.
However, there are many
flaws within his argument, especially in regard to his point that the
Holocaust could only happen in Germany, but for better or worse, his
assertions led the discussion into relatively uncharted territory.
Following the storm created by Goldhagen, author Eric A.
Johnson published his book, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and
Ordinary Germans, in 2000. Following the lead set by Gellately and
Goldhagen, Johnson analyzes the Gestapo and their impact on the
German population. Reacting as several of the previous authors had,
Johnson sees the Gestapo as a well-trained and staffed organization
without the necessary resources to control the targeted population.
How then did the average German view this organization? First,
Johnson claims that most Germans had little or no contact with the
Gestapo in their daily lives, and for the most part, did not fear them.26
Also, the citizen informer that previous historians, such as Gellately,
point to did not truly exist on a large scale, and if a person did present
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information to the Gestapo, many times it was ignored. Johnson sees
that Germany was still indeed a “police state” and that the Gestapo
was not merely a reactive organization.27 Still, he does not absolve
Germans for their crimes against the Jewish race. He believes that the
evidence of mass deportations reveal that by 1942, most Germans
knew exactly what the Nazi regime was trying to accomplish, and the
Gestapo agents who were shipping Jews away from their homes were
well aware that they were headed to near certain death.28 For their
part in maintaining silence in view of these crimes, Johnson is not
afraid to direct blame squarely at them. Even so, Johnson does reveal
elements of the resistance movement, such as the church, showing that
certain sects of German society did fight the Nazis and their twisted
ideology.29
Johnson’s work follows a pattern set in the preceding decades
by fellow historians. As he states in his book, “A recent trend in
historical scholarship places the onus of guilt on ordinary Germans for
the perpetration of Nazi crimes.”30 However, Johnson is careful to
note that “the recent trend in historical scholarship threatens to
underestimate and obscure the enormous culpability of the leading
organs of Nazi terror, such as the Gestapo and to overestimate the
culpability of ordinary German citizens. It needs to be remembered
that some Germans were far more guilty than others.”31 Johnson’s
book attempts to pursue the middle course, in showing that ordinary
Germans were a greater factor in the Holocaust than first believed,
but they were far from the only factor. Johnson reinforces the idea
that the Gestapo did not rule by fear alone, and were not the everpresent demon in people’s lives. Representing a moderation of the
extreme views held by Goldhagen and others, Johnson understands
that culpability and blame is to be shared by many in Nazi Germany,
but by none completely.
From 1945 to the early 1980s, a majority of historians pointed
the blame for wartime atrocities solely in the Nazi party and their
underlings. Even in Martin Broszat’s 1969 book The Hitler State, he
makes only a small reference to the German people and instead
concentrates mostly on Hitler and the bureaucracy. Historians saw
German citizens as victims of an elaborate scheme, one in which they
entered a state ruled by terror, and the truths of the Holocaust were
hidden from them. This interpretation held for over thirty years, until
scholars began to question what exactly occurred during the Nazi
reign, along with the German people’s place in it. Harnessing the
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burgeoning field of social history, coupled with newer quantitative
methods, they poured over voting records, Gestapo files, military
papers, court documents, and other related materials. What they
found was something quite startling and contrasting to previous
sentiments. Historians like Broszat and Peukert saw a Germany
where many of its citizens bowed before Nazi policies and even wanted
a figure such as Hitler to obtain power. They argue, however, that the
German people did not necessarily actively participate in the killings
of Jews and other minorities. Complementing this are historians
Johnson and Gellately, who see German citizens as holding a greater
proportion of guilt than had been previously associated, but still
refraining from the extreme nature of Goldhagen’s thesis. In addition,
the concept of the Gestapo has changed dramatically over the last
three decades, ranging from a nearly invincible organization that
controlled the whole of the civilian population, to one struggling with
meager resources and relying heavily on citizen participation. In the
end, the field of German studies during the Second World War has
seen drastic changes over the past sixty years. Splintering groups
such as the functionalist and the intentionalists, along with those
debating the true power of the Gestapo have added dimensions once
thought impossible. This rapidly evolving subject continues to divide
scholars, but ultimately clarifies our understanding of one of the most
dramatic eras in human history.
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